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5I Foreword
The EMCDDA has been monitoring the drug situation for the last 20 years. In that time, 
the nature and range of drugs available has changed considerably and, in more recent 
years, the manner in which people acquire drugs has also undergone a change. There has 
been a shift from face-to-face purchases to also acquiring drugs through unseen, and 
often unmonitored, parts of the world wide web. Almost any kind of illegal drug can be 
purchased online and delivered by mail, without the buyer making direct contact with the 
drug dealer.
In this first detailed exploration of the subject, we collate the most recent evidence from a 
range of experts, each with his or her own unique perspective. Our compilation will add to 
the collective knowledge available on this part of the supply chain and highlight the gaps 
for future research. It does not claim to be complete or up to the minute. What it is, 
however, is our inaugural in-depth analysis of a facet of the drugs phenomenon that the 
agency has not yet explored extensively. 
Searching on the internet today can be compared to dragging a net across the surface of 
the ocean. While a great deal may be caught in the net, there is still a wealth of information 
that is deep and, therefore, missed. Similarly, drug markets can make use of the various 
levels of the web in order to operate. There is the surface web, often used for illicit 
medicines and new psychoactive substances, and also the deep web, with its dark net 
markets or cryptomarkets, supported by innovative technologies to protect privacy. 
Furthermore, the proliferation of social media and development of web technologies that 
allow greater user interaction have the potential to influence customer and user 
involvement in drug markets.
We are delighted to release this investigation into the world of online drug markets. 
Although at present, it appears that only a minority of drugs are purchased in this manner, 
it seems likely that online drug markets could in the near future disrupt drug dealing in the 
same way that eBay, Amazon and PayPal have revolutionised the retail experience. 
This report is destined for both readers with a previous specialised knowledge and those 
trying to gain insight into a new and rapidly evolving topic. Along with information on what 
the deep web is, how it operates, the role of ‘The Onion Router’ in the anonymous sale and 
purchase of illegal drugs, the role of encryption and cryptocurrencies, the content raises 
certain questions. For example, how will illicit drugs be marketed and trafficked in the 
future? Are the current tools and responses fit for purpose? How can the EMCDDA address 
the challenges of monitoring such a dynamic and fast-changing environment? 
Alexis Goosdeel 
Director, EMCDDA

7I Executive summary
I Background
The last decade has seen the emergence of new internet technologies that have acted as 
important facilitators of online drug markets. Historically, illicit drug retail markets have 
operated in physical spaces, with associated practical limitations and boundaries. The 
development of virtual markets changes the dynamics of the selling and buying process, 
potentially opening the market up to a wider audience.
Drug markets operating on the surface, or clear, web appear to be primarily associated with the 
distribution of either non-controlled substances or substances for which legal controls differ 
between countries and jurisdictions (medicines, lifestyle products, new psychoactive 
substances, precursor chemicals). Online pharmacies have flourished, broadening their 
supplies from lifestyle products to performance enhancement products and prescription drugs. 
A rapid expansion of the online market for new psychoactive substances has been observed 
over the last decade, with these substances sold as both ‘research chemicals’ and ‘legal highs’ 
in online shops. Alongside these markets, the growth of social media has seen the emergence 
of forums and mobile applications where drugs are discussed, advertised and sometimes sold.
This publication aims to unravel some of the complexities surrounding online markets: 
what they are, how they operate, the technologies underlying them and how they interact 
with the traditional drug market. Expert contributions come from a number of individuals 
who attended a meeting in Lisbon to share experiences and knowledge on the topic of the 
internet and drug markets. They represent a wide range of international expertise on both 
the deep web and the surface web, providing insights from IT, research and monitoring, 
law enforcement and drug user perspectives.
I Dark net markets
Recently, attention has shifted to the sale of drugs and other illicit products and services in 
what have become known as dark net markets or cryptomarkets, which exist in what is in 
effect a ‘hidden’ part of the internet that is not accessible through standard web browsers. 
Dark net markets represent a notable innovation in the online drug trade and one of the 
main appeals is the relative anonymity they provide to users wishing to purchase illicit 
goods and services. A range of strategies are used to hide users’ identities and conceal the 
physical locations of servers. These include anonymisation services, such as Tor (The 
Onion Router), which hide a computer’s IP address when accessing the site; decentralised 
and relatively untraceable cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin and litecoin, for making 
payments; and encrypted communication between market participants. Reputation 
systems play a central role in the functioning of dark net markets. They help regulate 
vendors and are used by buyers to inform their purchasing decisions. 
Both demand reduction and supply reduction interventions on the surface web have been 
gathering pace. The deep web, however, has provided new opportunities and challenges 
for both health and law enforcement professionals. A number of studies cited by authors in 
this publication suggest that Silk Road may have helped users reduce the harm caused by 
illicit drug use, particularly compared with street-based drug marketplaces. Examples 
include the sale of high-quality products with low risk for contamination, vendor-tested 
products, sharing of trip reports and online discussion of harm reduction practices. There 
appears to be a growing interest in the provision of health-related interventions directly to 
users of the deep web, and ‘DoctorX’, for example, has offered a range of services to dark 
net market users, including information, advice and drug-testing services.
The internet and drug markets
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For law enforcement agencies, online monitoring represents a new approach to tackling 
drug markets, and they continue to build experience in this area. Law enforcement 
strategies have focused on market disruption, which includes reducing trust around 
anonymity, as well as the identification, arrest and prosecution of sellers in cryptomarkets. 
At the EU level, Project: ITOM (Illegal Trade on Online Marketplaces) has established an EU 
cybercrime network, with one of its tasks being to establish effective ways to combat the 
illegal trade within online marketplaces.
I Surface web markets
Several studies have explored the online supply of new psychoactive substances, or 
so-called legal highs, through shops on the internet. The I-TREND (Internet Tools for 
Research in Europe on New Drugs) project aimed to develop a software-automated tool for 
monitoring online shops using a less resource-intensive method than had been available 
previously. This showed the need to take duplicate sites into consideration to understand 
the reality of online supply. In some cases, online shops target individual countries, with 
the type of shops available and the substances offered influenced by cultural factors and 
structural characteristics of national drug markets.
The online sale of medicines has expanded since the early 2000s and, although various 
platforms have been used, online pharmacies have been a primary source of distribution. 
In the early days, the most popular products supplied on the web were natural and herbal 
medicinal products, smoking cessation aids, and beauty and sexual performance 
enhancement products. More recently, the market for enhancement drugs such as muscle 
builders and diet pills has been expanding. Although there is increasing concern about the 
potential role of illegally operating online pharmacies in the supply of psychoactive 
medicines for misuse, there is little evidence to suggest they are an important source of 
medicines for illicit drug markets at present. 
I Social media
The growth of social media has revolutionised methods of communication and social 
interaction with each other. Drug-related content exists across social media: on social 
networking sites, in drug-themed apps, on video- and picture-sharing services and in drug 
forums. Furthermore, virtual social networks provide opportunities for drug-related 
encounters and there is evidence that this is happening particularly among small groups of 
men who have sex with men. There is also some evidence of drug selling through social 
media, often using drug slang.
There remains insufficient evidence, however, about the role of social media in the supply 
of drugs. There is also a need to identify ways in which the research and monitoring 
community and prevention and treatment agencies can harness social media to better 
understand drug use and to improve demand reduction responses.
I A multiplicity of interconnected marketplaces
A wide range of factors appear to be driving change and development in internet drug 
markets; most are linked to technology, globalisation and market innovation. There is a 
consensus that the internet has changed drug markets by expanding possibilities for drug 
supply and trafficking. Research indicates that drug markets have become hybrid markets 
that combine the traditional social and economic opportunity structures with the new 
opportunities provided by the internet. Furthermore, not only has the internet opened the 
Executive summary
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way for new criminal actors, but it has also reconfigured relations among suppliers, 
intermediaries and buyers.
Drug trafficking patterns are constantly changing. Identifying patterns of criminal 
behaviour and matching them to different cyber-hotspots could have important 
implications for tackling offenders and potential offenders in the internet age. More 
criminological research is needed to take into consideration transformations in technology, 
society and crime caused by the internet, and to allow new preventative thinking on 
reducing criminal opportunities in cyberspace.
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I Background: drug market dynamics
The last decade has seen the emergence of new 
internet technologies that have acted as important 
facilitators of online drug markets. Historically, illicit 
drug retail markets have operated in physical spaces, 
with associated practical limitations and boundaries. 
Whether taking place in a city-centre open drug scene 
or in a dealer’s flat on a suburban housing estate, 
low-level drug sales have typically been associated 
with tangible people, places and geographical spaces. 
New developments have enabled the growth of online 
commerce in virtual marketplaces with global reach. 
This has the potential to expand the boundaries of drug 
supply and provide more opportunities for those 
wishing to buy drugs to do so. Virtual drug markets also 
offer participants the opportunity to sell and shop from 
their own homes, avoiding the face-to-face encounters 
associated with offline markets. Participants report 
that this can provide a degree of anonymity and 
physical safety that would otherwise be difficult to 
attain.
Technology has always been linked with changes in 
drug markets. A recent example is the widespread use 
of mobile phones, which has allowed the buying and 
selling of drugs to move out of more openly accessible 
physical spaces and into closed networks of known 
contacts. The development of virtual markets changes 
the dynamics of the selling and buying process further, 
potentially opening the market up to a wider audience, 
with participants unlikely to be known to each other. 
Thus, such markets may represent to participants the 
best of both worlds: open markets operating in a covert 
manner.
In reality, not all aspects of drug markets can take place 
in a virtual world. Both the production and distribution 
phases remain firmly linked to tangible real-world 
processes. Physical transactions, often involving postal 
delivery, must still take place.
Recent evidence suggests that practically any type of 
drug can be bought on the internet. Drug markets 
operating on the surface, or clear, web appear to be 
primarily associated with the distribution of either 
non-controlled substances or substances for which legal 
controls differ between countries and jurisdictions 
(medicines, lifestyle products, new psychoactive 
substances, precursor chemicals). Online pharmacies 
have flourished, broadening their supplies from lifestyle 
products to performance enhancement products and 
prescription drugs. A rapid expansion of the online 
market for new psychoactive substances has been 
observed since 2008, with these substances sold as 
both ‘research chemicals’ and ‘legal highs’ in online 
shops. A market for the supply of precursor and pre-
precursor chemicals has also been identified. Alongside 
these markets, the growth of social media has seen the 
emergence of forums and mobile applications where 
drugs are discussed, advertised and sometimes sold.
More recently, attention has shifted to the sale of drugs 
and other illicit products and services in what have 
become known as dark net markets or cryptomarkets, 
which exist in what is in effect a ‘hidden’ part of the 
internet that is not accessible through standard web 
browsers. Cryptomarkets represent a notable innovation 
in the online drug trade. Software enabling 
anonymisation (e.g. The Onion Router) or encryption 
(e.g. PGP) and cryptocurrencies (e.g. bitcoin) provides a 
high level of anonymity for buyers and sellers, and drugs 
are delivered through the post, avoiding direct contact 
between the parties involved.
Although some commentators suggest that this 
virtualisation of drug-related trading, with forums 
providing user advice and ratings on sellers and their 
products, may reduce criminality, violence and 
intimidation in drug markets (Barratt et al., 2013; 
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014; Van Hout and Bingham, 
2014), the speed with which the internet is transforming 
drug markets poses a major challenge to law 
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referring to online drug marketplaces. We note, however, 
that certain authors have preferred usage that may differ 
from these definitions, and have used editorial discretion 
to allow variation in some cases. An example here is that 
some authors use the term ‘dark net markets’ while 
others prefer ‘cryptomarkets’. Readers should note that a 
more detailed glossary section can be found at the end 
of this publication, on page 135.
The surface or clear web is the part of the internet that 
can be found by the link-crawling techniques used by a 
typical search engine such as Google, Bing or Yahoo 
(http://www.brightplanet.com). On the other hand, the 
deep web is a part of the internet not accessible to these 
search engines. The only way to access the deep web is 
by conducting a search within a particular website. 
Government databases and libraries, for example, 
contain huge amounts of deep web data.
The dark web or dark net is defined as a small portion of 
the deep web that has been intentionally hidden and is 
inaccessible through standard web browsers. The dark 
net can be accessed only using additional software such 
as the Tor Browser (Bright Planet, 2013), and it is the 
portion of the internet most widely known for illicit 
activities, because of the anonymity it offers to users.
Tor is an acronym for The Onion Router; it is free 
browsing software that hides a computer’s IP address, 
enabling online anonymity and protecting the personal 
privacy of the internet user. The relatively recent 
development of usable interfaces with anonymity 
networks such as Tor has made it easy for anybody to 
browse the internet anonymously, regardless of their 
technical ability. It allows, for example, military 
operations to avoid being tracked and enables any 
individual to browse the internet protected from ‘traffic 
analysis’. However, this has also facilitated the 
emergence of anonymous online markets specialising in 
‘black market’ goods, such as pornography, weapons 
and drugs (Christin, 2013; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 
2014).
Cryptomarkets or dark net markets are located in the 
dark web and accessed via Tor. A cryptomarket can be 
defined as an online forum where goods and services 
are exchanged between parties who use digital 
encryption to conceal their identities (Martin, 2014). To 
date, most studies on online drug markets have centred 
on cryptomarkets, and in particular on Silk Road, one of 
the earliest cryptomarkets to be established. Silk Road 
began operating in February 2011, and captured 
worldwide media and political attention following an 
expose in the New York-based blog Gawker (Chen, 2011; 
Martin, 2014). Although it was not the only drug 
enforcement, public health, and research and monitoring 
agencies.
I  The EMCDDA study on the internet and drug markets
With a view to shedding further light on this complex 
topic and fast-changing environment, in autumn 2014, 
the EMCDDA initiated a mixed method study on internet 
drug markets, aiming to map out the territory and better 
understand the potential impact of this phenomenon. 
The objectives of this study were to increase 
understanding of the online supply of drugs with a focus 
on the sale of new psychoactive substances, research 
chemicals and ‘legal highs’; the use of social media and 
apps; online sales of medicinal products for illicit use; 
and the sale of drugs on the deep web. The study 
methodology incorporated a number of investigative 
approaches and used data from multiple sources, and 
the work culminated in a meeting attended by 
international experts. During the meeting, the experts 
shared their experiences and contributed to an analysis 
of the topic, providing insights from IT, research and 
monitoring, law enforcement and drug user 
perspectives. Given the importance of the topic and the 
quality of knowledge and expertise shared during the 
meeting, it was decided to initiate a joint publication in 
which many of the meeting participants would be given 
the opportunity to share their insights in a structured 
way.
The 13 chapters of this publication on the internet and 
drug markets are the result of this endeavour and 
incorporate contributions from over 20 authors. By 
design, this is a heterogeneous work, drawing on the 
different backgrounds and world views of the multiple 
authors. It is the unique combination of different 
perspectives, including from academia, journalism and 
frontline practice, that makes this work rich and 
informative, offering a global overview of the situation 
alongside more detailed technical insights into specific 
aspects of this complex area.
I A note on terminology
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the novelty of the 
discipline, there are both overlaps and some 
discrepancies in the way certain terms are used in the 
scientific and popular literature. Below, we define how a 
number of key terms are used in this publication when 
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buyers placed the corresponding number of bitcoins in 
escrow with Silk Road, and payments were only released 
to vendors when the item reached its destination and 
the delivery was confirmed. In fact, cryptocurrencies 
such as bitcoin are not anonymous (as there is a central 
ledger) and they require laundering (e.g. using a website 
such as Bitcoin Fog) if they are to be used for illicit 
activity. An important feature of Silk Road was that both 
sellers and buyers received ratings, with trust built on 
reputation. This system, explained in more detail in 
Chapter 5, was weakened by various scams.
I Drug markets on the surface web
I Legal highs, research chemicals and trade sites
The use of the surface web for the sale of new 
psychoactive substances is a topic that has received 
increasing attention over the last decade. The online 
market for these substances has been categorised into 
four primary segments: shops selling new psychoactive 
substances as research chemicals, mostly under their 
chemical names; a commercial segment, with products 
sold under brand names; classified ads, often located 
within public websites; and a deep web segment (Lahaie 
et al., 2013). The EMCDDA has been involved in online 
monitoring for a number of years and identified 651 
websites selling ‘legal highs’ to Europeans in 2013 
(EMCDDA, 2015). New methods for automated 
monitoring of this area are being developed by the 
I-TREND (Internet Tools for Research in Europe on New 
Drugs) project and are reported on in Chapter 10. In 
addition to the methodologies used, the project team 
describe some recent developments in the online new 
psychoactive substances market including increased 
hybridisation between the commercial and research 
chemical segments and the development of a ‘grey 
market’, with some websites having both a surface web 
presence and a hidden element on the deep web.
I Online pharmacies
Online sales of medicines increased substantially in the 
early 2000s (Forman, 2006), and, although various 
platforms have been used, online pharmacies have been 
a primary source of distribution for both the legitimate 
and the illicit supply of medicinal products. Legitimate 
websites are those that comply with national and 
international regulations and standards, thus 
guaranteeing the quality of the product; sell controlled 
medicines only with a valid medical prescription; and 
cryptomarket, it was certainly the largest and best 
known (Barratt et al., 2014). Others, such as Black 
Market Reloaded, The Armory, Evolution and Agora have 
offered similar services.
It is important to note that bitcoin and encryption, as well 
as Tor, serve the legitimate purpose of protecting one’s 
privacy. Individuals might wish to opt out of having their 
internet browsing habits recorded and stored, or to 
spend their own finances without the intermediation of a 
bank; journalists can use such technology to protect 
their sources. Although these technologies are used for 
criminal purposes, criminals are by no means their only 
users.
In the following sections, we briefly introduce the main 
online market segments and the thematic areas covered 
in more detail by the individual chapters in this 
publication.
I Online anonymous drug marketplaces
On the deep web, drug sales can take place within a 
marketplace (e.g. Silk Road), within a decentralised 
network or between individuals. However, it is the dark 
net drug markets, also referred to as cryptomarkets, that 
have received most attention. Silk Road is to date the 
best known and most researched cryptomarket, and 
within this publication it functions almost as a case 
study. Although the situation has changed and many 
other markets have opened and closed, the information 
gathered around the first and, at the time, largest 
cryptomarket provides unique and invaluable insights.
Although it differed in offering anonymity, Silk Road 
provided a similar infrastructure for sellers and buyers to 
conduct transactions to those provided by other online 
marketplaces such as eBay, with professional dispute 
resolution mechanisms, use of vendor and buyer ratings, 
hosting of member discussion forums, and so on. 
Although a wide variety of products was advertised on 
Silk Road, established recreational drugs such as 
cannabis, MDMA and LSD, and some prescribed 
medicines, were reported to be the most popular 
(Barratt et al., 2014), while the sale of new psychoactive 
substances on the dark net markets seems to be limited.
Silk Road maintained the secrecy of its operators and 
location by combining two technologies: Tor and bitcoin. 
Tor enables anonymous communication between buyer 
and seller, and bitcoin can be used to facilitate 
anonymous transactions. Silk Road used bitcoins as a 
trading currency. Instead of paying the seller directly, 
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substances or ‘legal highs’ in the last 12 months, only 
3 % had purchased them from the internet. In contrast, 
68 % had been given them or had bought them from a 
friend (European Commission, 2014).
Numbers may be higher, however, in certain drug- and 
internet-savvy groups. The results of the Global Drug 
Survey 2015, an online survey that attracted more than 
100 000 responses from individuals around the world 
about their drug use, showed that just over 1 in 10 
respondents reported buying drugs via conventional 
internet sites and dark net sites in the previous year.
There are a limited number of studies on those buying 
drugs from dark net marketplaces. Van Hout and 
Bingham (2013) described the motives and purchasing 
experiences of a small group of Silk Road users. These 
were predominantly male and in professional 
employment or tertiary education. Their patterns of drug 
use were described as typically recreational and 
confined to weekend consumption, and several 
participants referred to themselves as ‘psychonauts’. The 
majority reported commencing internet drug sourcing on 
Silk Road with little prior experience of cyber drug 
retailing prior to 2011 and finding out about the site by 
chance, for example when Googling, watching TV or 
browsing Craigslist. Van Hout and Bingham concluded 
that the need for a conscious decision on the part of the 
user to access Silk Road, as well as for technical 
resources and expertise, combined with the time 
needed for delivery, appears to exclude more vulnerable 
consumers. One of the conclusions here is that internet 
supply assumes planned drug use — which may explain 
why drugs such as MDMA appear to be more popular 
online. This raises important questions about whether or 
not and how the online market changes purchasing 
behaviour and consumption. Have those buying drugs 
from the internet bought drugs (the same ones in the 
same quantity) elsewhere?
Given the relatively low levels of internet purchasing, an 
important area explored further in this publication is the 
extent to which bulk or wholesale purchases of drugs are 
occurring online. Evidence is presented in Chapter 2 to 
suggest that drug dealers may be the primary customers 
for some dark net markets.
I Dark net markets and interventions
Both demand reduction and supply reduction 
interventions on the surface web have been gathering 
pace (EMCDDA, 2013; Interpol, 2015). The deep web, 
however, has provided new opportunities and challenges 
ultimately ensure consumer safety. Reports suggest, 
however, that there are a sizeable number of illegitimate 
online pharmacies involved in the illicit supply of 
products. These sites are not registered with any 
recognised accreditation system and do not abide by 
regulations and professional standards; therefore, they 
are operating illegally. There is concern that illegitimate 
online pharmacies may have a role in the supply of drugs 
for misuse. This is an area explored in more detail in 
Chapter 11, drawing on the limited studies available in 
this area.
I Social media and apps
Social media are Web 2.0 technologies, characterised by 
increased participation and multidirectional lines of 
communication. They largely operate on the surface 
web, although Facebook, for example, has recently 
allowed access to its services through Tor. Social media 
may have an active role in drug markets, with sites and 
apps being used for buying and selling drugs, or they 
may have a more indirect role, providing a platform for 
experience sharing, photo and video sharing, opinion 
forming, and so on.
As explained in Chapter 12, many forms of networking 
might best be described as taking place on virtual social 
networks (VSNs), rather than online social networks, as 
much communication takes place via smart phones and 
tablets. VSNs can be categorised into static networks, 
which are more permanent and may include user profiles 
and terms of use (e.g. Facebook), and dynamic networks 
(e.g. Skype or ooVoo video chat), which are temporary 
and often by invitation only. A feature of VSNs is the 
creative use of slang and argot to get around 
moderation. Static (and especially) dynamic VSNs that 
use webcams have been recently associated with 
‘chem sex’ parties and/or ‘slamming’ among men who 
have sex with men.
I  Who uses the internet to obtain drugs?
There is limited information available on the customers 
or users of street and virtual drug markets, with limited 
survey data tending to focus on overall sources of drug 
supply. These data indicate that, for most people who 
use drugs, the internet plays only a limited role in supply. 
The 2014 Flash Eurobarometer, a telephone survey of 
13 128 young adults aged 15–24 in the 28 EU Member 
States found that, of those who had used new 
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for both health and law enforcement professionals. A 
number of studies cited by authors in this publication 
suggest that Silk Road may have helped users reduce 
the harm caused by illicit drug use, particularly 
compared with street-based drug marketplaces. 
Examples include the sale of high-quality products with 
low risk for contamination, vendor-tested products, 
sharing of trip reports and online discussion of harm 
reduction practices (Barratt et al., 2013; Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2013, 2014). There appears to be a growing 
interest in the provision of health-related interventions 
directly to users of the deep web, and ‘DoctorX’ (www.
elsubmarinodeldoctorx.com; see Chapter 7) offers a 
range of services to dark net market users, including 
information, advice and drug-testing services.
For law enforcement agencies, online monitoring 
represents a new approach to tackling drug markets, and 
they continue to build experience in this area, as 
described in Chapter 8. Law enforcement strategies are 
primarily focused on market disruption, which includes 
reducing trust around anonymity, as well as the 
identification, arrest and prosecution of sellers in 
cryptomarkets. Undercover officers may engage in 
covert operations by infiltrating markets, becoming a 
trustworthy buyer and arranging a face-to-face meeting. 
More overt tactics involve making individuals aware of 
police presence and ensuring that the takedown of 
markets receives media attention. At the EU level, 
Project: ITOM (Illegal Trade on Online Marketplaces) has 
established an EU cybercrime network, with one of its 
tasks being to establish effective ways to combat the 
illegal trade within online marketplaces.
I A note on the structure of this publication
This publication is divided into four sections. In the first, 
the reader will find a series of chapters introducing dark 
net markets and their role, function and interaction with 
traditional drug markets, as well as the infrastructure 
and technology that support their operation. Section 2 
includes a group of chapters that build on this topic by 
providing perspectives from different dark net market 
actors: drug users, health professionals and law 
enforcement practitioners. Section 3 expands the focus 
to look at a range of surface web drug markets, some of 
which overlap and interact with dark net drug supply. The 
final section pulls together some insights into and 
implications for the future in this area.
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I Overview
In Chapter 2, Judith Aldridge and David Décary-Hétu provide a brief 
introduction and history of the development of cryptomarkets on the deep 
web. They explore the impact of cryptomarkets on local and global drug 
markets, present some results from their own investigations of Silk Road 
marketplace shortly before it was taken down, and finally they offer 
consideration how drug cryptomarkets may be likely to impact on the 
global drugs trade should they should they continue to grow.
In the deep web, cryptomarkets facilitating drug trafficking have flourished 
during recent years due to the combination of anonymising software such 
as Tor, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, and encrypted messaging. The Tor 
Browser enables users to anonymously host and browse content (e.g. 
websites) and services within a vast address space. In Chapter 3, Andrew 
Lewman, former director of the Tor Project, explains how this technology 
works, how it is used to create cryptomarkets and how law enforcement 
agencies are trying to identify criminals using it. He provides insight into the 
technical infrastructure that supports cryptomarkets and gives the reader a 
glimpse of what the next generation of these marketplaces might look like.
In Chapter 4, Joseph Cox follows up on the previous chapter by introducing 
the two other essential technologies that have made cryptomarkets 
possible: cryptocurrencies and encryption, explaining the process of 
Bitcoin transactions from their purchase to their exchange for regulated 
currency. He explains the rationale for using encryption and the tools that 
make it possible, as well as the process cryptomarket users go through to 
keep their communications anonymised. In Chapter 5, Joseph Cox provides 
the reader with an introduction to the role of ratings, feedback and reviews 
in cryptomarkets, including a look at why vendor reputation matters and 
how these systems may be abused.
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I Introduction
A cryptomarket is an online marketplace platform bringing 
together multiple vendors and listing mostly illegal and 
illicit goods and services for sale. Cryptomarkets have the 
same look and feel as surface web, or ‘clear web’, 
marketplaces such as eBay and Amazon, and they allow 
their customers to search and compare products and 
vendors. What differentiates these markets from 
established clear web marketplaces, however, is that they 
offer anonymity. Cryptomarkets employ a range of 
strategies to hide the identities of their participants, make 
transactions anonymous and conceal the physical 
locations of servers. These include anonymisation 
services, such as Tor (The Onion Router), that hide a 
computer’s IP address when accessing the site (see 
Chapter 3); decentralised and relatively untraceable 
cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin and litecoin, for making 
payments; and encrypted communication between 
market participants. Like some others (e.g. Barratt, 2012; 
Martin, 2013) we employ the term ‘cryptomarkets’, 
following early use of this term in hacker forums, but we 
note that the term ‘dark net markets’ is also gaining 
currency (e.g. Buxton and Bingham, 2015).
Although the academic research literature on 
cryptomarkets is growing (e.g. Barratt, 2012; Barratt et al., 
2013, 2014; Martin, 2013, 2014; Van Hout and Bingham, 
2013a, 2013b, 2014; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014, in 
press; Phelps and Watt, 2014; Buxton and Bingham, 
2015; Dolliver, 2015; Décary-Hétu et al., in press), our 
understanding of these marketplaces has been shaped in 
no small part by journalists (e.g. Bartlett, 2014) (1), 
bloggers (e.g. Ormsby, 2014) and other independent 
researchers (e.g. Branwen, 2015). Through a combination 
of these efforts, we are able here to piece together 
evidence about and conjecture on the implications of 
cryptomarkets (2) for global and local drug markets.
(1) Also ‘Wired,’ http://www.wired.com/author/andygreenberg
(2) It is important to note that our understanding of cryptomarkets is 
limited by the fact that these markets are, by their very nature, hidden. The 
ones that have come to the attention of researchers and others interested 
This chapter begins by sketching a brief history of these 
markets and the technologies that gave rise to them. We 
chart the growth of the first cryptomarket, Silk Road, its 
demise, and the proliferation since of such marketplaces 
in spite of law enforcement activities. We show that, 
despite the growth and popularity of these markets, they 
tend to be short-lived, and their success substantially 
hampered by the growth of mistrust amongst market 
participants due to scams and, to a more limited extent, 
law enforcement activities. At present, cryptomarkets 
represent only a tiny fraction of the global drug trade. 
Their effect on how illicit drugs change hands is therefore 
minimal in global terms. Their potential for expansion is 
hampered by the fact that, given the risks of making 
international shipments, vendors elect to ship 
domestically in the absence of strong ‘push’ factors to 
do otherwise, and by the fact that the postal system 
through which all shipments must ultimately reach their 
destination remains a weak link. Nevertheless, drug 
cryptomarkets have substantial advantages for both 
buyers and sellers, and should be considered, we argue, 
a significant drug market innovation. They allow vendors 
operating on these markets to sell to unknown 
customers (thus shifting drug markets back to ‘open’, as 
opposed to the ‘closed’ markets many have become as a 
result of mobile phone technology) and to do so on a 
global scale; their appeal to drug sellers and their 
customers cannot be ignored.
We then consider how drug cryptomarkets, or some 
decentralised version of these (see Buxton and 
Bingham, 2015), may be likely to impact on the global 
drug trade should they overcome existing obstacles, 
continue to grow and ultimately flourish. Cryptomarkets 
allow for the possibility of a direct link between drug-
using buyers and producers, growers or synthesisers of 
illicit drugs, and may eventually serve to cut out some of 
the middle level of the market. On the other hand, we 
know that a substantial proportion of cryptomarket 
in documenting their activities tend to be English language and 
dominated by drug sales.
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In November 2014, a little over a year after the original 
operation against Silk Road, cryptomarkets were hit once 
again by law enforcement agencies in Europe and the 
United States, in Operation Onymous. This time, multiple 
marketplaces were targeted, including Silk Road 2.0, 
Cloud 9 and Hydra (Department of Justice, 2014). 
Although many smaller marketplaces were also shut 
down, only the administrator of Silk Road 2.0 was 
arrested, alongside a small number of vendors. What 
was reportedly unique to this particular operation, 
however, was the undercover agent who had been 
involved from the start of the market working as an 
administrator (Afilipoaie and Shortis, 2015). As a result, 
the very aspect of cryptomarkets that provided their 
users with confidence in the platform — anonymity — 
may simultaneously have undermined that confidence; 
anonymity obscures the identities of criminals and law 
enforcement actors alike.
In spite of scams and law enforcement efforts, however, 
cryptomarkets continue to proliferate. Independent 
researcher Gwern Branwen, who has been 
systematically documenting and archiving these 
markets, found that 43 new markets opened in 2014 and 
46 markets closed. Most of these closures, he estimates, 
were due to scams by marketplace administrators (or 
outside hacks), with only six closures attributable to law 
enforcement. Of the markets remaining in operation, 
nine opened during 2014 (Branwen, 2015). Soska and 
Christin (2015) found that these marketplaces are 
extraordinarily resilient, with law enforcement ‘take-
downs’ resulting primarily in vendor displacement to 
other marketplaces. In summary, cryptomarkets tend to 
have a fairly short life, and their longevity is reduced 
more by scams than by law enforcement crackdowns. 
Our own data collection efforts tell us that, at the time of 
writing, four marketplaces are open, each with over 
1 000 active listings.
The emergence of online sales of illicit drugs has been 
detailed by Buxton and Bingham (2015). They, and 
Martin (2014), refer to Markov’s description of marijuana 
transactions as far back as 1971 between students at 
Stanford University and MIT using technology at the 
artificial intelligence laboratories that became the 
foundation of the internet. As we and others have 
discussed elsewhere (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014; 
Buxton and Bingham, 2015; Décary-Hétu and Aldridge, 
2015), however, cryptomarkets are the direct 
descendants of markets for a range of illegal goods and 
services that emerged in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. These markets were hosted in Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC) chat rooms and online discussion forums, 
providing participants with virtual locations where they 
could meet to arrange transactions. These ‘first-
customers are drug dealers themselves, sourcing stock 
to sell offline, thereby allowing cryptomarkets to function 
in a middle market location. We conclude that both of 
these characterisations are likely to be true, depending 
on the drug in question. Finally, we consider the 
possibility that drug cryptomarkets may have some 
capacity to reduce the harm caused by drug markets by 
reducing the violence sometimes associated with these 
markets by virtue of their virtual location.
I A brief history of drug cryptomarkets
Silk Road was the first cryptomarket devoted 
predominantly to the sale of illicit drugs, including 
cannabis, a wide range of psychedelic drugs, stimulant 
drugs such as cocaine, and prescription medications 
(Christin, 2013). Drugs were purchased online from 
vendors displaying eBay-style shopfronts and delivered 
through postal services. Buyers were protected by a 
system of escrow: they ‘paid’ for their purchases in the 
anonymous and difficult to trace cryptocurrency bitcoin 
(so no need for identity-carrying credit card payments), 
but payments were not released to vendors until buyers 
were satisfied with their deliveries (Aldridge and Décary-
Hétu, 2014). This market functioned successfully 
because it was part of the hidden or ‘dark’ web, where all 
communications are anonymised by the Tor service. The 
site was launched in February 2011 and ran successfully 
for over two and a half years until the US FBI seized it on 
2 October 2013.
Within weeks of Silk Road’s closure, Silk Road 2.0 was 
launched, although by this time rival marketplaces were 
vying for dominance. One of these, Sheep, quickly grew 
to a size comparable to that of Silk Road, but a few 
weeks later its administrators shut down the site, 
claiming that a user had exploited a security loophole 
and stolen 5 400 bitcoins of their users’ money (at the 
time worth around USD 6 million) (Pangburn, 2013), 
although many believed this was an ‘exit scam’ by the 
marketplace administrators, designed to enable them to 
abscond with the funds themselves. Throughout 2014, 
marketplaces grew in size, with Pandora, Agora, Hydra, 
Evolution and Silk Road 2.0 competing to win back the 
trust of vendors and buyers once the possibility of 
scams by marketplace administrators became apparent. 
Another exit scam by market administrators occurred on 
18 March 2015, when the Evolution marketplace closed, 
with administrators reportedly having stolen 
USD 12 million from buyer and seller accounts (Woolf, 
2015), with others since this time.
CHAPTER 2 I Cryptomarkets and the future of illicit drug markets
25
I  The impact of cryptomarkets on global and local drug markets
A number of estimates — by Christin (2013) and by 
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2014) — of revenue 
generation (3) on Silk Road before it was first shut down 
suggest that the marketplace generated around 
USD 16.7 million in 2012 and USD 89.7 million in 
2013 (4). Estimating the value of the global trade in illicit 
drugs, by comparison, is notoriously difficult (Reuter and 
Greenfield, 2001). Estimates regularly quoted in the 
media that ostensibly derive from the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates range 
from USD 300 billion to USD 1.3 trillion annually, but the 
methodologies employed, it has been argued, generate 
little more than wild guesses (Thoumi, 2005). Even in the 
absence of a sensibly derived estimate of the global drug 
trade, however, we can be sure that sales on 
cryptomarkets are likely to represent only a tiny fraction 
of the global drug trade.
This should be unsurprising, since the bulk of supply and 
trafficking activities in the worldwide drug trade rely on 
conventional interpersonal networks of drug 
manufacturers, wholesalers and brokers (Martin, 2014). 
At first glance, then, it seems unlikely that cryptomarkets 
will have had much of an impact on traditional drug 
markets.
However, as Martin goes on to argue persuasively:
Cryptomarkets transform conventional drug sales by 
facilitating the creation of global networks of offenders. 
These networks comprise both vendors and purchasers 
of illicit drugs who, once online, are able to conduct a 
range of illicit activities not only on an unprecedented 
scale, but also with a degree of freedom that 
significantly exceeds what is possible through 
conventional, interpersonal criminal networks. … This 
suggests that cryptomarkets facilitate a form of illicit 
drug sales that is qualitatively different from the 
conventional, offline variety. (Martin, 2014, p. 10)
(3) These estimates were made possible by the automated feedback 
system that strongly encouraged buyers to leave feedback on vendors, so 
that feedback could be used as a proxy measure for a transaction with 
reasonable confidence. Our research indicated that about 88 % of buyers 
posted publicly available feedback after a purchase (Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu, in press). By multiplying the number of transactions 
received by the price of a listing, it was possible to estimate the sales 
generated on cryptomarkets with a high level of certainty.
(4) By the time of its closure, the first Silk Road was a well-functioning, 
confident, successful and growing market; no cryptomarket since has 
operated with the same success or in an environment with the same 
confidence, and, even if some of these second-generation markets 
generate high revenues, their instability and short lifespans suggest that 
our best source of data about a well-functioning cryptomarket remains 
the first Silk Road.
generation’ online criminal markets were popular but not 
engineered for security; indeed, they did little to 
obfuscate the location of their servers. This led to a 
series of highly publicised arrests and shutdowns 
(Poulsen, 2012), and enabled law enforcement officials 
to access public and private messages as well as logs of 
connections, leading them directly to market 
participants. These markets, furthermore, were not 
terribly efficient; it was difficult to assess before 
purchase the trustworthiness of vendors or the quality of 
the goods and services they sold. Because of the 
rudimentary security features of these online platforms, 
therefore, criminal operators could face a considerable 
degree of victimisation both from vendors and platform 
administrators (Décary-Hétu and Aldridge, 2015).
Cryptomarkets, the ‘second-generation’ online criminal 
markets, represent a step change in criminal innovation 
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014). Visually, they look just 
like any other legitimate online marketplace (eBay, for 
example): they bring together a range of vendors in one 
location, each listing products for sale, and allow 
customers to comparison-shop. They offer the same 
opportunities for networking and carrying out business 
transactions as the first-generation criminal markets, but 
in a much more secure environment. Cryptomarkets did 
not invent any technology per se, but they brought 
together four security measures never used in 
conjunction before. First, cryptomarkets require that 
participants make their payments in virtual currencies 
such as bitcoin. Transactions made in virtual currencies 
are exceptionally difficult to trace and their use does not 
entail checks by regulatory agencies, for example in 
relation to anti-money laundering legislation. Second, 
cryptomarkets require that their participants use an 
anonymising protocol, such as Tor or the Invisible 
Internet Project (I2P), to hide their identities when 
connecting to them. Cryptomarkets also take advantage 
of these protocols to hide their IP addresses, thereby 
hindering the ability of law enforcement to seize their 
servers. The remaining two measures are aimed at 
providing buyers with security and confidence in relation 
to their transactions. Cryptomarkets use escrow 
systems, and finally, they employ feedback or purchase 
review systems similar to those found on large online 
merchant sites such as Amazon and eBay. Buyers can 
check the feedback scores for vendors and their 
products to help them evaluate the likelihood that they 
will be buying the product they want from a trusted 
vendor (Van Hout and Bingham, 2013).
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more time and cost more than purchases made within 
local jurisdictions. For all these reasons, both customers 
and vendors may prefer illegal goods to be shipped only 
within their own country’s borders.
The authors’ own research, based on data collected from 
Silk Road in September 2013, just before closure, 
confirmed this: vendors generally chose only to ship 
domestically (71 % of US vendors, for example) unless 
there were substantial ‘push’ factors to do otherwise. 
Our multivariate analysis found six such push factors: (i) 
insufficient domestic demand for illicit drugs; (ii) a 
perceived lower effectiveness of law enforcement, 
making it safer for vendors to operate internationally with 
impunity; (iii) a lower GDP per capita that limits the 
purchasing power of local customers; (iv) a lower vendor 
rating which makes it more difficult to compete on the 
national level against vendors who have a perfect rating 
score; (v) the scope of the products offered by vendors 
measured by the number of listings offered and; (vi) the 
sale of smaller packages (as measured in weight) given 
that it should be easier for these packages to pass 
through the inspections at the borders undetected 
(Décary-Hétu et al., in press). These results suggest that, 
although cryptomarket vendors can theoretically sell in a 
global marketplace, many elect not to in the absence of 
substantial factors pushing them to do so.
Even though cryptomarkets still have a minor market 
share in the overall illicit drug trade, evidence suggests 
that they may be expanding. Research by Barratt et al. 
(2014) using Global Drugs Survey data suggests that, 
among survey respondents who usually buy their own 
(primarily recreational) drugs, access to drugs via the 
first Silk Road was not insubstantial. In Australia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, 7 %, 10 % and 
18 % of the sample (respectively) had consumed drugs 
purchased via the first Silk Road, and just over half of 
these had self-purchased (between 5 and 10 %). 
Customers appreciate the ease of access and the quality 
and range of products that cryptomarkets offer, as well 
as perceiving these markets as providing them with a 
higher level of security than street drug markets (Barratt 
et al., 2014). Drug sellers perceive the likelihood of arrest 
to be substantially reduced and appreciate access to a 
much larger potential market of buyers (Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2014).
This last point — cryptomarket vendors having access to a 
larger market of buyers — has important implications for 
the potential effects of drug cryptomarkets on local and 
global drug markets. Cryptomarket dealers can effectively 
transcend the physical restrictions of a local drug market 
— the limited number of people they could physically 
reach to transact with — to supply, through postal 
In other words, it seems likely that the kind of trade 
facilitated by drug cryptomarkets may not simply replace 
conventional trade but supplement it, for example by 
catering to a different kind of buyer, able to purchase a 
range of substances not previously available to them. 
Christin (2014) has recently underlined the importance 
of this question for future research: do cryptomarkets 
primarily displace drug purchases from traditional 
markets or instead provide access to drugs for those 
without previous access?
We have already discussed the loss of confidence in 
cryptomarket platforms on the part of both buyers and 
vendors following scams and law enforcement activities, 
creating a potential limiting factor for the future growth 
of drug cryptomarkets, but there are additional factors 
that may impose limitations on the growth of these 
markets. Access to them requires a degree of 
technological knowledge; for example, a buyer needs to 
understand how to use Tor or another anonymising 
service and how to purchase and use a cryptocurrency. 
Some of those who are willing and able to learn to use 
these services may simply mistrust the security they 
afford, particularly in light of media coverage of arrests 
associated with cryptomarkets. Furthermore, 
cryptomarket drug purchases require advance planning: 
some drug users may be unwilling to plan their drug use 
sufficiently in advance, preferring instead to make 
purchases from known dealers, in person, who can 
supply their requirements as and when the desire for 
consumption arises. Another limitation on the growth of 
cryptomarkets arises from the fact that drugs must be 
sent using postal systems, with the accompanying risks 
that result from monitoring and seizure, which can take 
place both within and at borders. It seems likely that 
some drug users may be unwilling to purchase from 
cryptomarkets because of a reluctance to have illicit 
drugs sent to them through the post, perceiving that 
doing so carries risks and preferring their existing access 
to drugs through known and trusted retail dealers.
This concern about the risks of sending/being sent illicit 
drugs through the post may be heightened where drugs 
are shipped across international borders. Shipping 
across borders carries greater risks for both vendors and 
their buyers because of the increased chance that a 
package will be searched and confiscated. From the 
vendor’s point of view, this increases the risk of customer 
dissatisfaction if a package is not received, potentially 
affecting the vendor’s ever-important feedback rating. 
From the customer’s point of view, having illegal goods 
shipped to an address formally connected to them might 
be a risk they are especially unwilling to take if those 
packages risk being confiscated or held at borders. 
Shipments across international borders also simply take 
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although it is possible, as Martin (2013) argued, that 
drug cryptomarkets may directly connect producers/
synthesisers with drug users buying for their own use, 
thereby cutting out the middle level of the market, our 
findings suggest that cryptomarkets may also perform a 
middle market function. It seems likely that both of these 
characterisations may be true simultaneously, 
depending on the drug in question. We suspect, for 
example, that direct producer–user transactions are 
more likely for the kinds of drugs where small-scale 
producers can operate without large-scale international 
networks (cannabis, for example, and easy-to-produce 
psychedelic drugs such as mushrooms, varieties of 
NBOMe and DMT). These direct producer–user 
transactions seem much less likely for drugs such as 
cocaine or heroin, both of which require large-scale 
international networks for distribution. We have not yet 
disentangled the potential effects that the online drug 
trade has on global and local markets in this regard, and 
this remains a fruitful avenue for future research.
Finally, we consider the possibility that cryptomarkets 
may have the capacity to reduce the harm caused by 
drug markets in some important ways. Others (e.g. 
Ormsby, 2014; Van Hout and Bingham, 2014; Caudevilla, 
see Chapter 7) refer to the online culture of harm 
reduction that was evident in the first Silk Road, and 
many have referred to the high level of purchase 
satisfaction amongst its customers, suggesting that 
drug quality may be superior to that in traditional retail 
drug markets. Recent research by Caudevilla (see 
Chapter 7) shows positive results on the quality of 
cryptomarket purchases for 129 samples submitted by 
cryptomarket customers to Energy Control’s testing 
service. In 120 (93 %) of the samples submitted, the 
drug that customers thought they had purchased was 
the only psychoactive substance detected. The purity of 
cocaine samples submitted (n = 54) was high (mean 
70.4 % purity) compared with that we see reported for 
street seizures in the United Kingdom, for example, 
which averaged 38 % in 2013 (Burton et al., 2014). In 
addition to the possibility of these markets being ‘good’ 
in this sense for drug users, these markets may also be 
‘good’ for drug dealers and for the environments in which 
they operate. Before the advent of online availability of 
bulk-quantity illicit drugs, dealers had to have on-the-
ground connections and relationships of trust built with 
middle-level drug dealers and/or importers in order to be 
able to acquire product (McCarthy and Hagan, 2001; 
Morselli, 2001), as well as a tough reputation (Topalli et 
al., 2002). With the advent of the cryptomarket, almost 
anyone with sufficient technological skills can access 
stock. In other words, the type of ‘subcultural capital’ 
(Thornton, 1995) required to be a drug dealer is likely to 
be different for those who operate on a cryptomarket.
delivery, a (potentially) worldwide market. In recent years, 
many drug markets have moved from ‘open’ to ‘closed’, in 
which drug dealers sell only to those customers with 
whom they have trusted relationships (see May and 
Hough, 2004). However, cryptomarkets reverse this 
arrangement, with vendors able to transact with unknown 
customers, whom they encounter only in the virtual 
sphere (Aldridge, 2012; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014).
There is some debate about the extent to which drug 
cryptomarkets, if they continue to proliferate and grow, 
will change the structure of drug markets. To the extent 
that these markets allow a direct link between drug-using 
customers and producers, cryptomarkets may serve to 
cut out some of the middle or wholesale level in the drug 
market chain (Martin, 2013) and/or may reduce the links 
in the chain between producer and end-user. We have 
argued, in contrast, that cryptomarkets may instead in 
part function at the middle level of the drug market.
Our evidence is derived from an analysis of the nearly 
12 000 listings on Silk Road downloaded in September 
2013, only weeks before it was shut down by the FBI 
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, in press). Wholesale-level 
revenue generation (sales for listings priced over  
USD 1 000) accounted for about a quarter of the revenue 
generation on the first Silk Road overall. Ecstasy-type 
drugs dominated wholesale activity on this marketplace, 
but we also identified substantial wholesale activity for 
benzodiazepines and prescription stimulants. Less 
important, but still generating wholesale revenue, were 
cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin. Although vendors 
on the marketplace were located in 41 countries, 
wholesale activity was confined to only a quarter of these, 
with China, the Netherlands, Canada and Belgium 
prominent. The terminology employed by vendors in some 
instances made this explicitly clear; for example, one 
cannabis seller stated: ‘This is a mid-grade commercial 
hash perfect for resale due to the low price.’ The fact that 
vendors gave substantial discounts for bulk purchase 
seems likely to have further facilitated the likelihood that 
purchases made there by drug dealers could have made 
for profitable offline resale (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 
2014). These large-sized purchases could have been 
made by customers for a number of reasons, such as for 
personal use over a long period or ‘social supply’ (with the 
purchases made by one individual on behalf of a group of 
friends) (Aldridge et al., 2011; Coomber and Moyle, 2013). 
However, the sometimes very large prices/sizes of the 
purchases provide compelling evidence that a substantial 
proportion of customers on Silk Road were drug dealers 
sourcing stock.
Therefore, Silk Road functioned as a virtual broker, 
connecting upper-, mid- and retail-level sellers. So 
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investigate and clamp down on this drug market 
innovation. One important question must therefore be 
asked: given the potential we’ve discussed here for harm 
reduction to arise from the online drug trade — for drug 
dealers, for users and within the markets themselves 
— should drug cryptomarkets be a high priority for law 
enforcement? We might consider reframing the problem: 
instead of deeming cryptomarkets problematic because 
the criminals operating there are harder for law 
enforcement to reach, perhaps we should consider the 
possibility that cryptomarkets reduce the problems 
associated with this kind of criminality. The extent to 
which harm might actually be reduced by cryptomarkets, 
however, remains an open question that requires 
systematic empirical research.
The impact that cryptomarkets have will depend largely 
on the shifting balance between the success of those 
seeking to set up and run effective cryptomarkets with 
longevity, on the one hand, and the investigative success 
of law enforcement, on the other. Law enforcement may 
seem to have the upper hand, having successfully 
closed large cryptomarkets two years in a row. However, 
the limited number of arrests made and quantity of 
drugs seized, and the proliferation of markets that has 
followed each law enforcement effort, suggest that 
these police operations are having only a limited impact. 
For now, it seems inevitable that the internet will 
continue to be a source of drug market innovation.
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I Introduction
Recent years have seen the development of software 
that allows individuals to browse the internet 
anonymously and which supports the anonymous 
hosting of content and services on the internet. This 
chapter provides an introduction to Tor: how it works, its 
‘hidden services’ feature and how cryptomarkets, 
particularly those selling drugs, use its features. It also 
gives an overview of the development of cryptomarkets 
and the potential future of such markets.
I The Tor Project
The Tor Project (1) researches and develops software to 
enable people to maintain their privacy and anonymity 
while on the internet. The most popular product is the 
Tor Browser (2), which has been downloaded hundreds 
of millions of times over the past few years. The Tor 
Browser is a web browser, much like a normal browser 
such as Internet Explorer, Safari, Chrome or Firefox. 
However, it has the Tor Network built in and enabled by 
default. The Tor Network provides around 7 000 relays (3) 
(as of February 2015) for global usage. The Tor Network, 
and the underlying Tor Browser software, both rely upon 
a protocol known as ‘onion routing’. Onion routing was 
originally a project of the US Naval Research 
Laboratory (4) in the 1990s. The core of onion routing is 
separating where you are in the world and on the 
network from where you are connecting in the world and 
on the network. Onion routing, and therefore the Tor 
Browser, provides a ‘flexible communications 
infrastructure that is resistant to both eavesdropping 
and traffic analysis’. Eavesdropping is the ability of one 
or many secret parties to see, record or otherwise listen 
in to your communications with or without your 
knowledge. Traffic analysis is the ability to infer who is 
(1) http://www.theonionrouter.com/
(2) http://www.theonionrouter.com/projects/torbrowser
(3) http://metrics.torproyect.org/networksize.html
(4) http://www.onion-router.net/
talking to who, how much they talk and how frequent 
their communications are.
As an analogy, think of your post office: the postal 
system can learn how often you send letters or 
packages, how large the letters or packages are, and 
who the sender and recipient of each letter or package 
is. This provides a simple example of how easy it is to 
map your contacts and easily sort them into most 
frequently contacted, most content sent/received, and 
so on. On the internet, anyone eavesdropping on your 
internet connection will be able to collect vast amounts 
of data about you just by watching your connection to 
the network. This is true regardless of the type of internet 
connection, whether it’s from a mobile phone, or a fixed 
line to your residence or office, or the Wi-Fi available at 
your favourite coffee shop.
Onion routing works by wrapping your communications 
in layers of encryption and routing them around the 
world. The Tor Browser uses the Tor Network to 
accomplish this encryption and global routing. The 
following figures will help you to visualise how this 
happens behind the scenes. Alice wishes to privately 
browse the websites of Bob and then Jane. Perhaps Bob 
is her favourite news website, and Jane is her favourite 
social networking website.
CHAPTER 3
Tor and links with cryptomarkets
Andrew Lewman
FIGURE 3.1
The first stage of the Tor Browser as started on your 
computer
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client obtains a list
of  Tor nodes from
a directory server.
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data over a computer network in such a way that it 
appears as though there is a dedicated physical layer link 
between the source and destination end systems of these 
data. Relays run the Tor software, which enables them to 
talk to you, other relays or destinations on the Internet. 
Circuits are connections through the relays on which your 
traffic flows from start to finish. Circuits in Tor are typically 
active for 10 minutes before being pulled down and 
created with a different set of relays.
Let’s extend the postal service analogy to how Tor works. 
Alice wants to send a letter to Bob, but because of the 
sensitivity of the materials, she wants to keep it private. 
Alice writes out three envelopes: one to Alfred, one to 
Barbara and one to Charles. She puts her materials for 
Bob into the envelope for Charles. She then puts the 
envelope for Charles into the envelope for Barbara. 
Finally, she puts the Barbara envelope into the Alfred 
envelope. Alice takes this stuffed envelope to the post 
office. It’s then sent to Alfred. Upon receiving the 
envelope, Alfred opens it up and drops the envelope for 
Barbara in the post to her. The post office then delivers 
this envelope to Barbara. When it arrives, she opens the 
envelope and sees a letter for Charles. Barbara hands 
this letter to the postal service, which then delivers it to 
Charles. Charles receives the letter and sends it off to 
Bob. Finally, after having the materials delivered through 
Alfred, Barbara and Charles, Bob opens his envelope and 
views the materials from Alice. Imagine Alfred, Barbara 
and Charles are in different countries. Someone 
watching each individual postal system could learn 
about each individual point, but not that the original 
message went from Alice to Bob.
I Hidden services with Tor
The Tor Browser also provides a feature known as hidden 
services (5). This is the ability to anonymously host and 
browse content and services within a vast address 
space. A hidden service needs to advertise its existence 
in the Tor Network before clients will be able to contact 
it. Therefore, the service randomly picks some relays, 
builds circuits to them and asks them to act as 
introduction points by telling them its public key. Note 
that in Figures 3.1–3.3 the green links are circuits rather 
than direct connections. By using a full Tor circuit, it is 
hard for anyone to associate an introduction point with 
the onion server’s IP address. Although the introduction 
points and others are told the hidden service’s identity 
(public key), they do not discover the onion server’s 
location (IP address).
(5) http://www.theonionrouter.com/docs/hidden-services.html.en
FIGURE 3.2
The Tor Browser makes a connection through the Tor 
Network
Step 2: Alice's Tor client 
picks a random path to 
destination server.  Green 
links are encrypted, red 
links are in the clear.
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What happens behind the scenes is that the Tor  
Browser contacts special relays, known as directory 
authorities, in the Tor Network; directory authorities 
maintain a list of all possible relays at any given moment. 
The Tor Browser downloads this information and builds a 
list of plausible relays for selection. Figure 3.1 shows the 
basic setup. The Tor Browser software then chooses 
three relays and builds a series of circuits directly from 
your machine to each relay. Figure 3.2 shows how this 
works. If, after browsing Bob’s website, Alice then wants 
to browse Jane’s website, her Tor Browser easily 
accommodates this request. It simply builds a new set of 
circuits through the Tor Network and, following the same 
logic as the first request, allows access to the new 
destination, in this case Jane’s website. Figure 3.3 
shows how this occurs.
Relays are merely computers that switch traffic from one 
computer to another. The computers can be your own 
computer, one of the 7 000 computers comprising the Tor 
Network, or the destination you’re trying to reach through 
the Tor Browser. A virtual circuit is a means of transporting 
FIGURE 3.3
The Tor Browser then browses another website using 
the same circuit as before
Step 3: If  the user wants
access to another site, 
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I The current state of hidden services
Hidden services have attracted the attention of the 
research community. The research community has tried 
to both challenge (Murdoch, 2006; Øverlier and 
Syverson, 2006a) and enhance (Øverlier and Syverson, 
2006b) the anonymity provided by hidden services. 
Further research aims to gather basic data on the 
content hosted in a set of published hidden services 
(Biryukov et al., 2013). The Memex project by the US 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been 
working to identify all available hidden services 
published over time (7). The goal is to develop a search 
engine-like interface to the automatically indexed data 
set. This will allow for easier demographic determination 
of content and services available in ‘onion land’.
A recent blog post by the Tor Project (8) looks at the 
volume of hidden services traffic. It estimates that there 
are around 30 000 active hidden services serving 
around 5 terabytes of information daily. Compared with 
the 268 million available domains (9), this is a small 
number.
Independently of Tor, there is a general-purpose search 
engine for hidden services at Ahmia (10). Its ‘mission is to 
create a working search engine for indexing, searching 
and cataloguing content’ in the Tor onion space. The 
website provides some data suggesting that, as of 12 
February 2015, around 2 274 hidden services 
existed (11). Much like Google, Yahoo and Bing all have 
different counts of how many websites exist on the clear 
internet, so do Tor and Ahmia for the hidden internet. 
One difference that accounts for Tor Project’s and 
Ahmia’s differing numbers is that Ahmia only counts 
websites that are available to be indexed. Tor Project 
counts total hidden services available, which includes 
non-website addresses.
I Cryptomarkets
I The first iteration
A certain type of hidden service website has gained 
notoriety through the attention of the global media. The 
most written about and well-known website is the Silk 
(7) C. White on http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/Memex.
aspx
(8) https://blog.torproject.org/blog/somo-statistics-about-onions
(9) http://www.domaintools.com/statistics/tld-counts/ (retrieved 
12/2/2015)
(10) https://ahmia.fi/search/
(11) https://ahmia.fi/stats/viewer
The hidden service then assembles a descriptor, 
containing its public key and a summary of each 
introduction point, and signs this descriptor with its 
private key. It uploads that descriptor to a distributed 
hash table (6). The descriptor will be found by clients 
requesting XYZ.onion, where XYZ is a 16-character 
name derived from the service’s public key. After this 
step, the hidden service is set up.
A client that wants to contact a hidden service needs to 
learn its onion address first. After that, the client can 
initiate connection establishment by downloading the 
descriptor from the distributed hash table. If there is a 
descriptor for XYZ.onion (the hidden service could be 
offline or have left long ago, or there could be a typo in 
the onion address), the client now knows the set of 
introduction points and the right public key to use. At this 
point, the client also creates a circuit to another 
randomly picked relay and asks it to act as rendezvous 
point by telling it a one-time secret.
When the descriptor is present and the rendezvous point 
is ready, the client assembles an introduce message 
(encrypted to the hidden service’s public key) including 
the address of the rendezvous point and the one-time 
secret. The client sends this message to one of the 
introduction points, requesting that it be delivered to the 
hidden service. Again, communication takes place via a 
Tor circuit: nobody can relate the introduce message to 
the client’s IP address, so the client remains anonymous.
The hidden service decrypts the client’s introduce 
message and finds the address of the rendezvous point 
and the one-time secret in it. The service creates a 
circuit to the rendezvous point and sends the one-time 
secret to it in a rendezvous message.
In the last step, the rendezvous point notifies the client 
about successful connection establishment. After that, 
both client and hidden service can use their circuits to 
the rendezvous point for communicating with each 
other. The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end 
encrypted) messages from client to service and vice 
versa.
In general, the complete connection between client and 
hidden service consists of six relays, three of them 
picked by the client (the third being the rendezvous 
point) and the other three picked by the hidden service. 
The details of these messages and hidden service 
protocols are further described in the rendezvous 
specification (Lewman, 2015).
(6) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_hash_table
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The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) (15) is an alternative to 
Tor hidden services. It is an overlay network based on 
passing messages between routers using ‘garlic routing’ 
with a distributed hash table for a global directory of 
available routers. All users of I2P are also running routers 
to pass encrypted traffic between other routers. A few 
cryptomarkets have recently started to use I2P as an 
alternative to Tor hidden services (O’Neill, 2013). 
Websites hosted via I2P are referred to as ‘eepsites’.
I Organised crime and cryptomarkets
As cryptomarkets become easier to set up and use, it’s 
natural for them to attract more customers and sellers of 
a less technically inclined mindset. As sellers realise the 
potential to generate profits with less risk of physical 
violence and no need for face-to-face contact with their 
buyers, more organised groups move in. Groups already 
accustomed to trafficking illegal materials can adapt to 
the internet and cryptomarkets very easily. Local street 
dealers can attract more clients and increase their sales 
to move up the hierarchy in criminal organisations. The 
‘Dread Pirate Roberts’ of Silk Road allegedly interacted 
with the Hells Angels organisation while running the site 
(Paul, 2015). Through his trial, it came to light that a 
Canadian chapter of the Hells Angels organisation was 
the supplier to a seller on Silk Road. This provides a 
concrete example of how organised crime can be 
involved with cryptomarkets.
It is likely that the Canadian Hells Angels were part of a 
larger transnational organised crime (TOC) network 
(Albanese and Reichel, 2014). A TOC network may be 
engaged in sourcing illegal narcotics, transporting them 
across national borders and ultimately selling them to 
local clients or expanding to international clients through 
the internet and cryptomarkets. The ‘surface web’ is still 
far more commonly used to sell drugs than esoteric ‘dark 
web’ marketplaces (EMCDDA, 2015). However, the 
increasing ease of use of cryptomarket websites and the 
Tor Browser is attracting a larger user base for these 
markets, in terms of both buyers and sellers. As an 
example, a former IT professional became one of Silk 
Road’s largest heroin dealers within a year (O’Neill, 2014).
TOC networks exist in several operational models, or 
typologies, as defined by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2002). The five models are 
rigid hierarchy, devolved hierarchy, hierarchical 
conglomerate, core criminal group and organised 
criminal network. The box on p.37 defines each model in 
(15) https://geti2p.net/en/
Road marketplace. Silk Road was a unique black market 
created as a hidden service with a custom-generated 
domain name, now defunct, silkroad6ownowfk.onion. 
What helped Silk Road, and the now many clones of it, 
work and survive for years was a combination of Tor 
hidden services and the digital currency bitcoin (12). The 
heavy use of cryptography in both products, which were 
the basic building blocks of the market, spawned the 
term ‘cryptomarket’. In essence, a cryptomarket is similar 
to Amazon, eBay and many other internet-based 
commerce websites. For example, eBay is run by a 
company in the United States, hosted at the domain 
name www.ebay.com, and works with known vendors 
and suppliers around the world to provide a large variety 
of products for global consumers to purchase. What 
makes eBay work is the software and financial 
management processes behind the scenes, allowing 
both consumers and vendors to purchase and sell goods 
through their site. EBay receives a small percentage of 
every sale resulting from a listing or advertisement on its 
websites, as well as charging some other fees. The first 
iteration of cryptomarkets are nothing more than similar 
software and financial logistics hosted on an onion 
domain using the bitcoin cryptocurrency. The largest 
difference is that the customers and vendors are 
knowingly participating in a global black market. 
Cryptomarkets also differ in that they allow the purchase 
and sale of both digital and non-digital goods to a global 
customer base with the goal of providing private 
transactions through the use of a hidden service and 
digital currency. Deep Dot Web maintains a directory of 
cryptomarkets (13).
I Architecture of a cryptomarket
The technology involved in running this type of 
cryptomarket is pretty basic. Tor’s hidden services allow 
anyone with a running Tor client to configure and host a 
service on any device, from a laptop, desktop computer 
or mobile phone to a large and powerful dedicated 
computer, commonly called a server, located in a 
dedicated, well-connected and reliable data centre. The 
commoditisation of software and hardware lets anyone 
build such a cryptomarket infrastructure for very little 
money. It requires only hardware (such as a laptop), an 
operating system, e-commerce software, integration 
with a bitcoin payment processor, and installation and 
configuration of Tor to provide a hidden service address 
at the web server. If a market grows and the hardware 
starts to fail, all the software and the hidden service can 
be migrated to a dedicated hosting service (14).
(12) https://bitcoin.org/en/
(13) http://www.deepdotweb.com/marketplace-directory/listing/
(14) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dedicated_hosting_service
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I The next generation of cryptomarkets
The basic design for establishing a cryptomarket is still a 
single computer somewhere on the internet. This model 
cannot sustain much more than a small business. It also 
opens up the single machine to a variety of investigative 
and technical approaches to de-anonymising the traffic 
and the patrons, and exposing the entire operation. As a 
result of this reality and the success of the bitcoin block 
chain, a new generation of cryptomarkets are beginning 
to appear. The leading candidate for identification as 
such a next-generation cryptomarket is OpenBazaar (17). 
OpenBazaar works by distributing the transactions of 
the e-commerce software among all participants of the 
market. The market itself is based not on a single 
instance of e-commerce software running on a single 
server somewhere on the internet, but rather on the 
software running on all the computers participating in 
the market. This is accomplished using the basics of the 
bitcoin block chain. The bitcoin block chain is a 
distributed audit log of all transactions (18). OpenBazaar 
applies this block chain logic to all transactions in the 
marketplace. Therefore, when someone runs the 
OpenBazaar software on their computer, it immediately 
becomes part of the marketplace itself. This creates the 
potential for a fully distributed marketplace spread 
across millions of computers around the globe. Each 
computer handles only a part of the marketplace, rather 
than everything being handled on one single computer. 
Tor hidden services or I2P eepsites could be used with 
this model to further protect the identity and privacy of 
users involved in the marketplace.
I  Positive consequences of cryptomarkets
The coverage of Silk Road in the mainstream media and 
the moderated and open format of the forums attracted 
people from all walks of life. Silk Road was the most 
popular cryptomarket to offer discussion forums. There 
were forums dedicated to testing the purity of the 
product, to safe shipping methods, to safe bitcoin 
practices and, most interestingly, to harm reduction 
strategies and ending addiction to illicit drugs. It’s easy to 
understand why someone involved in an illegal trade 
might want to share best practices and tips on many 
topics. However, what wasn’t expected was that users 
would use the forums to discuss ending their 
dependencies on illicit drugs or reducing the harm caused 
(17) https://openbazaar.org/
(18) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin#The_block_chain
more detail. In each organisational type, there is a 
common series of seven steps (Lavorgna, 2014): (1) 
preparatory activities, (2) cultivation/production, (3) 
intermediate passage, (4) trafficking, (5) intermediate 
passage, (6) distribution, and (7) consequential 
activities.
The internet is currently involved in aspects of each step. 
Cryptomarkets have generally only been involved in the 
sixth step: distribution of the product (16). The individuals 
involved in such cryptomarket operations have generally 
been opportunistic entrepreneurs at the distribution 
level of any of the TOC typologies. The technical 
sophistication of cryptomarkets and the complexity of 
setting up and running one, or a shop in one, has, to date, 
limited the population of available candidates to those 
with more advanced technology skills.
(16) Personal communications, (2014, 2015), Netherlands National Police, 
Europol and Team Cymru staff.
Rigid hierarchy: single boss. Organisation or 
division into several cells reporting to the centre. 
Strong internal systems of discipline.
Devolved hierarchy: hierarchical structure and line 
of command. However, regional structures, with 
their own leadership hierarchy, have a degree of 
autonomy over day-to-day functioning.
Hierarchical conglomerate: an association of 
organised crime groups with a single governing 
body. The latter can range from an organised 
umbrella type body to more flexible and loose 
oversight arrangements.
Core criminal group: ranging from relatively loose to 
a cohesive group of core individuals who generally 
regard themselves as working for the same 
organisation. Horizontal rather than vertical 
structure.
Organised criminal network: defined by the 
activities of key individuals who engage in illicit 
activity together in often shifting alliances. They do 
not necessary regard themselves as an organised 
criminal entity. Individuals are active in the network 
through the skills and capital that they may bring.
Source: UNODC (2010).
United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime transnational organised crime 
typologies
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The operational security of the criminals is another area 
for law enforcement agencies to target, as was the case 
with the takedowns of Silk Road (Greenberg, 2013) and 
Silk Road 2.0 (Rushe, 2014). In both cases, law 
enforcement agencies were able to follow financial trails 
to put together a list of suspects. The suspects were 
then easily placed under surveillance and further 
information leaks and patterns were discovered as a 
result of weak operational security practices. These 
information leaks were then used to further target the 
suspects, and eventually enough data were gathered for 
a conviction (Mullin, 2015a, 2015b).
I The future of cryptomarkets
The first iteration of cryptomarkets still has a long life 
ahead of it. At the time of writing, there are a number of 
cryptomarkets still running after years of operations 
against them. They prove that strict operational security 
and operational focus can enable markets to continue 
despite many law enforcement investigations. The 
current weakness in all of these markets is the single-
server model. Whether running Tor or I2P, essentially 
there is marketplace/e-commerce software located on a 
single computer in an encrypted address space. Having 
a single computer running the marketplace software 
opens the market up to computer attacks, which can 
start to place the server within various network 
locations. A fully distributed cryptomarket increases the 
difficulty and economic costs of removing such markets 
from the internet. This is expensive from a law 
enforcement perspective, but possibly desirable from a 
user perspective.
The next generation of cryptomarkets provides a glimpse 
into the future. The actual exchange of currency, 
especially from virtual (such as bitcoin) to fiat (such as 
euros), will always be a vulnerable boundary. This 
boundary, virtual world to real world, can be used by law 
enforcement to watch for transactions that may be 
traceable from the marketplace through to conversion to 
fiat currency. This boundary can also be a point of 
security for users looking to participate in forums or 
transactions not tied to their real-world identity.
As both citizens and law enforcement learn about, 
exploit and use cryptomarkets, they may usher in a new 
age of e-commerce. As with any new technology, 
criminals and opportunistic businesses will be early 
adopters of cryptomarket technology. These early 
adopters, and their customers, will work out the issues in 
the systems while simultaneously helping to improve the 
systems for future users.
to themselves and others by their use of them. Dr 
Fernando Caudevilla, aka ‘DoctorX’, was the first to realise 
the potential of the privacy and anonymity these hidden 
services and cryptomarkets can provide (Cox, 2014).
I  Law enforcement approaches to cryptomarkets
As criminals and criminal activity move to cryptomarkets, 
so do the law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement 
agencies have the added challenge of learning about the 
entire range of technologies that may be used by a 
criminal. Criminals have the advantage of having to learn 
only one technology at a time, and use it well, to be 
successful in both profit generation and avoiding legal 
consequences. Law enforcement agencies also have to 
consider a diversity of products, some digital and some 
physical. Laws on digital products are, by the nature of 
these products, more difficult to enforce. They can be 
easily copied, distributed, bought and sold, both online 
and offline. Physical products are easier to investigate 
and control, as they have to be delivered somewhere and 
to someone.
Essers (2014) provides an example: the National Police 
of the Netherlands (Politie) ran a sting operation where 
they posed as buyers in a cryptomarket. They targeted 
vendors selling to restricted markets, such as within the 
Netherlands or to Dutch speakers only. They purchased 
the drugs from the cryptomarket and arranged a 
rendezvous with the seller or the seller’s delivery person. 
The Politie then arrested the person who arrived at the 
rendezvous point and subsequently used this person as 
an informant. The Politie further infiltrated the sellers 
and the cryptomarket until they were able to take down 
the cryptomarket itself (Essers, 2014).
Another approach to locating and taking down 
cryptomarkets is attacking the software itself. There are 
many layers of software involved in the operation: the 
operating system, the web server software, the Tor 
software and the e-commerce software. Any one of 
these parts of the cryptomarket can have vulnerabilities 
that may be exploited. In the case of a cryptomarket 
selling child pornography, the Politie was reportedly able 
to execute a warrant by breaking the software behind the 
cryptomarket (Dingledine, 2011). It has been suggested 
that Europol was able to break into Tor, watching the 
distributed hash table of hidden services in order to take 
down 414 hidden service addresses pointing to 28 
individual cryptomarkets (Deutsch and Raymond, 2014).
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I Introduction
There are two essential technologies that have given 
birth to cryptomarkets. The first is anonymity networks, 
which allow users to browse the web without revealing 
their location, and which also disguise where a site’s 
servers are located. This allows cryptomarkets to sell 
illegal products in an open fashion while remaining 
relatively safe from law enforcement. Most commonly, 
cryptomarkets use Tor’s hidden service model, as 
explained in the previous chapter, although there are 
markets on other networks, such as the Invisible Internet 
Project (I2P). The second technology deals with the 
financial side, and ensures that online transactions can 
be carried out with a substantial level of anonymity. 
Bitcoin, and other currencies that have been inspired by 
it, are used to purchase items rather than using a PayPal 
account or credit card, both of which can be easily linked 
to a user’s identity.
Other technologies have been adopted by the users, 
vendors and administrators of cryptomarkets, but they 
aren’t strictly necessary for a site to function. These 
include message encryption, which hides the contents 
of a message so that only the intended recipient can 
read it, and hard-drive encryption, which protects the 
files on a user’s computer from access by an 
unauthorised party.
This chapter explains the fundamentals of bitcoin, the 
commonly used forms of encryption and how they are 
used within cryptomarkets.
I Bitcoin
I The problem for digital currencies
When someone sends a digital item across the internet, 
they haven’t lost the original: when a user sends an email 
attachment, the file is still on their computer; when they 
upload a picture to Facebook, the photo doesn’t 
disappear from their hard drive, and it’s still there for 
them to view, delete or share over and over again. This is 
a problem for digital currency. When Alice sends Bob a 
digital coin, how can anyone be sure that Alice didn’t 
simply send a copy? Usually, with financial transactions, 
a bank or other body makes sure that this doesn’t 
happen, by keeping a record of their transactions, but 
this isn’t the case for files sent between computers. This 
is commonly known as the ‘double-spending problem’ 
(Bonadonna, 2013).
Bitcoin’s answer comes in the form of the ‘block chain’: a 
public ledger that records all successful transactions 
made with the currency, meaning that no one can spend 
their coins twice. It’s similar to a bank statement, except 
it keeps track of the whole currency, rather than just an 
individual’s account. With the block chain, it is easy to 
see which addresses, analogous to a bank account, hold 
what amount of bitcoins.
A ‘block’ is a series of updates of the transfers between 
addresses, and can be thought of as a fresh page in the 
ledger. As well as these transactions, a block also 
includes information that refers directly to the block that 
preceded it. This ongoing connection, from each block to 
the next, is why the collection of blocks is called the 
block chain.
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three parties involved — the buyer, the seller and the 
market — need to sign off the transaction.
I Buying bitcoins
The vast majority of those using bitcoin to buy products 
on cryptomarkets will not have mined the bitcoins 
themselves. Instead, they are likely to have purchased 
them with fiat currency. One option for this is buying the 
coins in person or through cash deposits. Although this 
may take slightly longer than other methods, buying 
coins in this way allows for a high degree of anonymity. A 
user will find a suitable bitcoin trader on a site such as 
localbitcoins.com, be given the vendor’s bank details and 
then make a cash deposit at a local bank branch. This 
can usually be done without the buyer presenting any 
form of identification. So when the purchased bitcoins 
arrive in their wallet, and as long as the wallet itself does 
not give away their name or personal information, the 
buyer will have bitcoins that are in no way linked to their 
identity, and they can therefore spend their bitcoins 
anonymously.
However, many users buy their bitcoins via means that 
link their bitcoin wallet to their real-world identity. For 
example, many of the most popular websites for buying 
bitcoins require a form of identification, such as a 
passport or driver’s licence, to be presented. Even if the 
exchange doesn’t require identification, the coins may 
still be bought with a credit or debit card, which is in turn 
linked to a user’s personal information. Once the link has 
been made, a persistent and resourceful observer can 
trace bitcoin transactions back to a wallet, a pseudonym 
and possibly a user’s real identity.
I Reasons for bitcoin anonymity
There are a number of reasons why someone might want 
to buy their bitcoins anonymously and not have their 
identity linked to any transactions. The most obvious 
reason when it comes to cryptomarkets is because many 
of the items available are illegal to possess. A user may 
be worried that their purchase of drugs or weapons, for 
example, may be traced back to them, and that they 
could face criminal charges.
Theoretically, a law enforcement agent could track a 
buyer’s transactions back to the point when the bitcoins 
were purchased online, a practice known as ‘block chain 
analysis’ (Simonite, 2013). Thus, the buyer’s identity has 
been revealed, or the law enforcement agency at least 
has enough information to issue the bitcoin exchange 
with a subpoena, forcing them to hand over the identity 
I Mining bitcoins
Each block also contains a very difficult mathematical 
problem that needs to be solved before the block can 
permanently join the block chain. There are multiple 
solutions to any of the block’s mathematical problems, 
but only one needs to be discovered, although these 
problems intentionally become more difficult over time 
and require more computing power to solve. The 
computer that finds the solution for a block first is given 
additional bitcoins as a reward for helping to maintain 
the block chain. This process is known as ‘mining’. 
Importantly, this updating of the ledger is not controlled 
by a third party, be that a bank, a formal financial 
institution or a government, who might, for whatever 
reason, tamper with it or let records go astray. Instead, 
the bitcoin network regulates itself.
I Using bitcoins on cryptomarkets
If a user wishes to start storing bitcoins, they will first 
need a bitcoin ‘wallet’. One of these can either be 
downloaded locally onto the user’s computer or 
smartphone, or be hosted by an online service. The 
former is a piece of software, opened like any other 
computer programme. The latter functions in very much 
the same style as internet banking: a user logs in via 
their internet browser, and can view their balance and 
send bitcoins to other people. Included with the wallet 
will be a user’s bitcoin address. This string of 25–36 
characters is what somebody else needs to send 
bitcoins to the user, for example: 
3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy.
Cryptomarket user accounts usually include a bitcoin 
wallet address too, and it is possible to send purchased 
coins to it straight away. However, since cryptomarkets 
are under constant threat of being shut down by law 
enforcement and having all of their coins seized, users 
tend to avoid storing a significant number of bitcoins in a 
market address.
When trading on a cryptomarket, a buyer and a seller will 
both use addresses that are built into the market. This is 
to take advantage of any escrow system that the market 
might use. Escrow gives the buyer financial security 
when purchasing an item on the cryptomarket. In a basic 
system, a buyer will order an item, and the fee will be 
provided to the seller only once the buyer has confirmed 
that they have received their order. More advanced 
escrow systems, such as that on the now-defunct 
market Evolution, use multi-signature transactions. This 
means that, instead of just the buyer confirming their 
successful order and releasing the funds, two out of the 
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support site (1). From here, a user can schedule a series 
of withdrawals, all of which will have variables of them 
randomised: the size of each payout, the time at which 
they occur and also the destination address, of which 
there can be several. ‘This way there is no practically 
reliable way to do statistical analysis on the block chain 
and link your deposits to your withdrawals,’ states the 
support site.
Bitcoin Fog does require the user to be thoughtful: the 
amount withdrawn should be different from that 
originally deposited. The reason for this is given by an 
example on the support site: ’If you transfer 1.382 to us, 
and the next day you withdraw ~1.38 bitcoins to another 
account, those amounts will be visible in the block chain, 
and unless there were 10 other people that day that also 
withdrew just 1.38 bitcoins, the link between your 
deposit and your withdrawal will be obvious.’
Another method for obfuscating bitcoin transactions is 
the use of CoinJoin. For instance, Alice wants to transfer 
1 bitcoin from address A to address B, and Bob wants to 
transfer 1 bitcoin from address C to address D (2). In 
essence, CoinJoin allows Alice and Bob to combine their 
trades into a single transaction, with two inputs (A and 
C) and two outputs (B and D). Anyone observing the 
block chain will not be able to determine which of the 
outputs is Alice’s and which is Bob’s. This can be done 
with more than two people, and although it doesn’t 
disguise that a transaction took place (as all transactions 
are recorded in the block chain), it does obscure who is 
behind each transaction. In addition, because a user’s 
coins aren’t being stored by a third party, as in the case 
of Bitcoin Fog, there isn’t the possibility of a user having 
their coins stolen by the service. The CoinJoin method 
has been adopted by popular bitcoin wallet services, 
including Blockchain.info, which has incorporated it into 
its online wallet service, under the name ‘SharedCoin’ (3).
A third method for ensuring bitcoin privacy is the use of a 
dedicated wallet that incorporates many different 
technologies together. One of those is DarkWallet, a 
project led by the computer programmer Amir Taaki. 
DarkWallet can be used without providing any identifying 
information, and it includes the technology behind 
CoinJoin. It also uses ‘stealth addresses’, which are 
generated on demand by the user, ’without anyone 
watching the block chain knowing the receiver is the 
owner of the original stealth address,’ according to the 
DarkWallet Wiki (4). DarkWallet is currently available as a 
(1) The support site can be found at http://www.bitcoinfog.com/
(2) This example was taken from a post on Stack Exchange (Rami, 2013).
(3) The company’s explanation of this service can be found at 
https://sharedcoin.com/
(4) https://wiki.unsystem.net/en/index.php/DarkWallet/Alpha#Stealth
of their customer. By way of illustration, Forbes magazine 
asked Sarah Meiklejohn, a computer science researcher 
at the University of California, San Diego, to attempt to 
map what transactions Forbes had made, with 
knowledge only of its bitcoin address. Meiklejohn 
managed to ‘identify every transaction we had made, 
including deposits to Silk Road, [and] to competitor sites 
Atlantis and Black Market Reloaded’ (Greenberg, 2013). 
In fact, anybody with an internet connection can 
examine the block chain: it is available through a number 
of web services.
Another reason for wanting to use bitcoin anonymously 
is less obvious. Once a bitcoin wallet has been linked to 
a real-world identity, and personal details such as name, 
email address and other information have been 
discovered, it is possible for a hacker to attempt to steal 
the user’s coins. Armed with that kind of information, an 
attacker can write a ‘phishing email’. These are emails 
that coerce the user into replying with sensitive 
information, such as their banking details, or trick the 
user into entering their login details or password into a 
spoofed web page (Cluley, 2014).
I Unlinking bitcoins
To conceal their identity, to avoid either prosecution or 
hacking attacks, a bitcoin user may wish to separate any 
transactions from their identity. Some cryptomarkets 
have obfuscation systems built into their infrastructure. 
For example, the original Silk Road would disguise the 
path of its users’ coins to make it difficult to identify by 
whom each transaction was made. ‘Silk Road also used 
a so-called “tumbler” which, as the site explained, “sen[t] 
all payments through a complex, semi-random series of 
dummy transactions … making it nearly impossible to 
link your payment with any coins leaving the site,”’ 
according to an FBI press release posted after the site’s 
closure (New York Field Office, 2013). However, users 
may wish to unlink their identity from any transactions 
they make themselves, either because the cryptomarket 
they are using doesn’t provide such a service or to build 
in an added layer of security.
One popular site for doing this is Bitcoin Fog, which 
obfuscates the destination of a user’s coins to the point 
where block chain analysis becomes exceptionally 
difficult. Users sign up for a free account on Bitcoin Fog, 
accessible only via Tor, and then deposit an amount of 
bitcoins at an address randomly generated by the 
service. ‘Since it is just a bitcoin address like any other, 
there is no way to even see that you have deposited 
money to Bitcoin Fog, and not to a random account you 
have generated yourself,’ according to the Bitcoin Fog 
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sending coins to whom. So rather than having to buy an 
amount of currency and then process the coins through 
a separate service, the currency itself has these 
anonymity features built in.
Other privacy-focused cryptocurrencies do exist, but 
their uptake has been limited, even by the 
cryptomarkets. At the moment, it is likely that bitcoin will 
remain the primary cryptocurrency used by the markets.
I Encryption
Due to the illicit nature of the business conducted on 
cryptomarkets, or just to ensure their own privacy, many 
users decide to encrypt their communications. This 
behaviour isn’t required for the use of cryptomarkets, but 
is generally recommended by staff, with sections of 
forums dedicated to teaching new users how to use 
encryption. The most common message encryption 
programme is PGP, used by cryptomarket 
administration, vendors and buyers. PGP stands for 
‘Pretty Good Privacy’. Created in 1991 by Phil 
Zimmermann, it is a computer programme that allows a 
user to encrypt text and files so that only the intended 
recipient is able to decrypt it. PGP also allows a user to 
digitally ‘sign’ messages, in order for the interlocutor to 
feel reasonably confident that the messages are coming 
from who they say they are. In his essay, ‘Why I Wrote 
PGP’, Zimmermann summed up the various possible 
uses of the programme (Zimmermann, 1999):
It’s personal. It’s private. And it’s no one’s business but 
yours. You may be planning a political campaign, 
discussing your taxes, or having a secret romance. Or 
you may be communicating with a political dissident in 
a repressive country. Whatever it is, you don’t want your 
private electronic mail (email) or confidential 
documents read by anyone else. There’s nothing wrong 
with asserting your privacy. Privacy is as apple-pie as 
the Constitution.
Zimmermann distributed this software as ‘shareware’, 
meaning that it could be spread freely as long as it 
wasn’t used for commercial purposes (Spectacle, 1995). 
However, when PGP ended up in the hands of non-US 
citizens, Zimmerman faced a government investigation 
for exporting munitions without a licence, because, at 
the time, cryptography of a certain strength was 
considered a weapon (Zimmermann, 1995). This 
investigation was eventually dropped with no charges 
being brought, but it spurred Zimmerman to release the 
source code for PGP in the novel form of a book 
published by The MIT Press, as ‘it would be politically 
browser plugin for Chrome; it will also be released for 
use with Firefox.
Recently, DarkWallet released a feature allowing its 
users to anonymously convert and withdraw funds from 
their wallet through an ATM. At the moment, this feature 
extends across thousands of ATMs in Europe, and 
requires a user to enter a code sent to their mobile 
phone, rather than using a bank card (Rogers, 2015). 
DarkWallet also hosts an independent bitcoin exchange, 
where users can purchase bitcoins anonymously.
The research community investigating bitcoin anonymity 
is a vibrant one, and the subject is likely to become more 
relevant as it becomes harder to purchase bitcoins 
anonymously in the first place. For example, 
localbitcoins.com, the previously mentioned platform 
used to meet bitcoin merchants in person or obtain their 
bank deposit details, had to cease operations in 
Germany after being approached by the country’s 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Rizzo, 2014).
I Anonymity-focused cryptocurrencies
Some programmers and bitcoin enthusiasts have 
developed other cryptocurrencies. The method of 
acquiring these coins is essentially the same as bitcoin 
— computers solve increasingly complex equations with 
their processing power — and the way they are spent is 
indistinguishable from bitcoin. But many of these newer 
coins have different features. Naturally, those of most 
interest to cryptomarkets are the coins that push for 
greater anonymity: those that mitigate the problems of 
bitcoin trading being linked to a real-world identity, and 
which bypass the need to be cleaned using another 
service. Very few of these cryptocurrencies have gained 
any sort of wider use, and even those that have been 
given more attention make up a tiny part of the overall 
trade of cryptocurrencies. Nevertheless, use of 
anonymity-focused cryptocurrencies is an important 
development, because it indicates that people are keen 
to make the trade in illegal substances and other items 
even more secure. Furthermore, the purpose of these 
privacy-focused coins isn’t necessarily to gain value 
when traded for a fiat currency, but to allow more 
anonymous trade.
One of those cryptocurrencies is the aptly named ‘Dark 
Coin’. Described by Wired as ‘Bitcoin’s stealthier cousin’, 
Dark Coin became an acceptable form of payment on 
the Nucleus and Diabolus markets in November 2014 
(Greenberg, 2014). It is also used for buying web hosting 
and virtual private network services. Dark Coin’s appeal 
is that it incorporates technologies that obfuscate who is 
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user will typically interact with, with simple buttons for 
‘Encrypt’, ‘Save’ and other common functions. For 
example, a commonly used version for Windows 
machines is GPG4Win, which uses GPG as its basis. 
Below is a message before it has been encrypted with 
the PGP protocol.
Hello,
This is a message that I would like to have encrypted.
Thanks,
A user
The user will then select which public keys they wish to 
encrypt the message for. After being encrypted, the 
result is either a new file or a body of text, depending on 
the programme. Either way, its contents will be 
unintelligible: a mixture of seemingly random digits, 
symbols, and upper- and lower-case letters. Below is the 
earlier message after being encrypted.
–----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
hQIMA3mulckJMVeCARAAoliWbrv6tYyXcA2tMs16Avp 
Ng37bt/eLsX3EdYS5YWMCl3Cictc8y93lMhOJNWRDL 
mt1Zrj9kDcEThysCFePrRLUzxQQdFqsWh29VTa7vfKT 
pYCSXhsgUft0bPu62ISl+sYR51CWaE/bAtSwF7fqtKI4 
AYUG3jeedHF8QScTtcCM15eNmp7TWZvURZT3kq6rW 
AVoSt938XN3JZhHd2SvX1qhOwqjoHGaQE+Kl2ejaZ8jr 
u7Javwq3ix3/NF+b7EXBdM7eBbI0Z1/sLEcgkyp1vEO8 
RJ8HtXEf1g/TE+u+JHl1IfcUxxafPZFNKp8AJhAvEe/r/ 
x5qABKEPBYxDOxBT84i+aWgGSN5X1nx0Z2j8VyqWh 
xdmkugok/XNL0KbuH2sHlBAWsAByNTfbzm612WihhN 
akEbyP5V719VvFBRIvr1bOP4RTj35xCi/V838V8cUku0 
+U1YuWd+24avMHivRlLodZqLhe5K9C/JyP22E/m4Ww 
sa0ZPemm4g7vCKQWUDWRaa/OaBu4N1q37hVp83dj 
ED5dqSDmt15DU/eC65a7Mb3aKxajqQqwk7ivq0cBme 
YfbWlekREZU2QTe6Vq6P5Tz94MfwJGNxOiDooEMGv 
82AqPBjyYArF50znAcqU9raqUMpH4EY1x+mUlJWir+a 
6adimIEg1wXhje5LG0lc63SqwFxoXD8m+Swdo2jbGLll 
HaSnNJH0VQE15KS5JkbHm9M3qtd27vGxqKGlnnrWf 
eeuc2ljsqmdtjwatCL7CQNRqSOC+g8OPowfd6unDF3 
mIMOW9CjIGik89FTJPeyy6XCPd7vBezAstsdplQ43W 
THucHtIy4ezScEy36hqKtSe28P40ZBVplw6MXH65ZG 
hLKiffc4MlJTS3qXVrGZL4THn5dRF1osIjGMoELIA==
=iJXY
–----END PGP MESSAGE-----
This message can then be pasted into the body of an 
email or sent using the messaging service of a 
cryptomarket. This way, even if the message is 
difficult for the Government to prohibit the export of a 
book that anyone may find in a public library or a 
bookstore,’ Zimmermann wrote in its preface.
Since its launch, PGP has seen many updates and 
improvements to ease of use, and the company PGP 
Incorporated was formed and subsequently acquired by 
a number of different corporations. The software PGP is 
now maintained by Symantec, but many alternatives of 
the software have sprung up, with one of the most 
popular being GnuPG (GPG). However, when talking 
about message encryption generally, the acronyms GPG 
and PGP are typically used interchangeably, as the two 
pieces of software serve essentially the same purpose. 
Today, PGP is still considered the standard for message 
encryption; Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor 
who blew the whistle on the agency’s mass surveillance 
programmes, used it to communicate with journalists 
(Lee, 2014).
I How PGP works
PGP works through the use of pairs of ‘keys’, with each 
pair of keys comprising a ‘public’ key and a ‘private’ or 
‘secret’ key. These keys are simply files stored on a user’s 
computer or USB stick. The ‘public’ key, as the name 
suggests, is one that should be used in the public 
domain for others to see. This may be on a user’s 
personal website, in his or her forum profile or on a site 
or server that hosts the public keys of other people. It is 
what people use to encrypt a message to a user. The 
‘private’ key is one that, ideally, should never be shared 
with anyone else. This key is used to decrypt any 
messages or files encrypted for a user, as well as signing 
any messages the user sends, to assure the recipient 
that they are indeed communicating with the correct 
person. If a third party is in possession of a user’s secret 
key, they may be able to read encrypted messages sent 
to the user, or the third party could impersonate the user 
and sign messages with their key. It is worth mentioning 
that some users do share their secret keys. For example, 
the secret key of ‘Heroin Vendor’ may be accessible by 
more than one person, if ‘Heroin Vendor’ is actually a 
team of people working to sell product on a 
cryptomarket. However, in the majority of cases each 
individual using a cryptomarket is likely to have their own 
secret key.
PGP is the protocol used to encrypt messages, but the 
actual process of applying these protocols to messages 
is done either by the user via the command line of their 
computer — a process that requires some technical 
knowledge — or by another programme that makes the 
process easier for the user. This programme is what the 
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someone with physical access to a computer, such as a 
law enforcement officer once an arrest has been made, 
accessing certain files or the entire contents of the 
computer. In order to decrypt the hard drive, a password 
needs to be entered, and some encryption software 
allows users to set up two different passwords: one to be 
entered if they are under duress, which reveals one set 
of files, and another, genuine, password that protects the 
sensitive information in another set of files.
I Conclusion
Cryptomarkets use several different pieces of 
technology: as well as Tor, covered in the previous 
chapter, they also use bitcoin for fairly anonymous 
financial transactions; message encryption for 
communicating securely; and other forms of security for 
keeping sensitive information hidden. As law 
enforcement agencies continue to crack down on these 
markets, it seems that advances in these technologies 
are likely to be adopted by cryptomarkets and their 
users.
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I Introduction
Cryptomarkets rely heavily on trust. Because a drug 
vendor in any cryptomarket transaction is 
pseudonymous, and does not have to deal with the 
buyer in any sort of close proximity, it is theoretically 
easy for them to deliver a product that is of a lesser 
quality than advertised — or not to deliver the item at all 
— and not be held to account.
Within cryptomarkets, this problem has been mitigated by 
the use of various reputation systems, such as ratings, 
feedback and reviews of products and vendors, which are 
posted on the cryptomarkets themselves, in their forums 
or on social media. These reputation systems provide 
buyers with a fairly reliable account of a vendor’s previous 
transactions and track record, as well as of the quality of 
individual products, and can help them to build up an 
overall picture of whether a drug vendor is trustworthy or 
not. These systems ensure that dealers who do provide a 
low-quality service are shunned by the cryptomarket 
community. In turn, this insight allows buyers to make 
informed decisions on what to purchase and from whom, 
and to avoid more dangerous batches of drugs, so that 
these reputation systems potentially offer, in this respect, 
certain harm reduction benefits.
This chapter describes the main features of reputation 
systems and their role in cryptomarkets.
I Ratings and feedback
One type of reputation system is the use of ratings for 
individual products. After a buyer has ordered and paid 
for an item, they are prompted to leave a rating. These 
ratings are typically a number between one and five, in 
the same style as traditional ‘five star’ ratings. Naturally, 
these ratings have often been compared to those used 
on eBay, Amazon and Yelp. Indeed, cryptomarkets in 
general are often described as being similar to these 
sites, which also allow users to rate products and 
services (Harris, 2013; Kopstein, 2013).
Along with the numbered rating, customers are also 
encouraged to leave a short piece of feedback about 
their particular order. These snippets of feedback focus 
on a variety of different aspects of the customer’s drug 
purchase. Some talk about the quality of the product: 
‘half gram weight out to 0.3, gear was decent, expected 
better,’ was one piece of feedback left on a listing for 
Afghan heroin on Silk Road 2.0.
Other users report on the packaging used and how 
effectively shipped the item was. ‘Very safe and original 
packaging!’ one piece of feedback left on an MDMA listing 
on the AlphaBay market reads. ‘stealth was good it almost 
fooled me,’ was another left on the same listing, with 
‘stealth’ here referring to how likely a drug is to remain 
undetected owing to the way it has been packaged.
Others focus on the speed of delivery. ‘I ordered 11:30 
AM yesterday and my package was in my mail box in 
literally 25 hours. Quality is up there with the best tar I’ve 
ever had. I’ll definitely be back for more in the future,’ 
was one comment left on Silk Road 2.0.
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FIGURE 5.1
A screenshot of feedback list on a listing for MDMA on 
the cryptomarket AlphaBay
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cryptomarket. This in turn may mean that users feel 
comfortable enough to ‘finalise early’; that is, send their 
full payment for the product to the vendor before it has 
been shipped (vendors sometimes ask for this payment 
method when the value of bitcoin is fluctuating wildly). 
However, a vendor can abuse this trust to accept as 
many payments as possible without shipping any drugs 
until users start to notice the discrepancy. The vendor 
will then close their account and disappear with the 
stockpiled bitcoins. This is commonly known as an ‘exit 
scam’ (Christian, 2014).
One example is the vendor ‘Tony76’ from the original Silk 
Road, who used his reputation, built up through the 
rating system, to lull users into a false sense of security. 
During a sale to celebrate 4/20 (20 April, a date popular 
in the United States for recreational drug use), Tony76 
offered large discounts on his products, as well as 
allowing orders from outside the United States for the 
first time (O’Neill, 2014). Tony76 even went so far as to 
offer prizes to random customers as part of the sale.
Some buyers started to complain that their packages 
weren’t arriving. In response, Tony76 started issuing 
partial refunds to unsatisfied customers. However, 
vendors cannot comprehensively check these claims of 
failed deliveries, so Tony76 instead switched to the 
‘finalise early’ system, meaning that customers had to 
pay the full product price in advance. Because users 
believed him to be trustworthy, they agreed to send their 
bitcoins to Tony76 before the product had been shipped. 
Tony76 then reportedly failed to deliver the items and 
disappeared with the funds. This is a case of the rating 
system working disproportionately in the vendor’s favour 
(Ormsby, 2012).
Another, more recent, case involved ‘9THWonder’, a 
cannabis vendor from the now closed Evolution 
cryptomarket (Christian, 2015). However, these scams, 
and abuse of the rating and feedback systems in 
general, are reportedly relatively rare.
I Reviews
As well as ratings and their accompanying short pieces 
of feedback, some users write much longer, in-depth 
reviews of a particular product or batch of drugs. These 
can appear on the forums of cryptomarkets or on other 
social media.
The feedback isn’t always positive, however. ‘This seller 
is a f***ing scammer, i payed for hashish and now i have 
40 grams of f***ing paraffin. DON’T BUY FROM THIS 
**** 1/5,’ is one example from Silk Road 2.0 (Bartlett, 
2015).
These negative pieces of feedback are often based on 
the same aspects discussed above with respect to 
positive feedback: the stealth, the quality of the product 
and its delivery time. If the item doesn’t arrive at all, a 
buyer can also leave feedback saying so.
Overall, however, the ratings left by buyers seem to be 
positive, or at least that was the case on Silk Road 2.0. 
Over three months, 120 000 pieces of feedback were 
left on the site, with the average rating attached to the 
corresponding listings being 4.85 out of 5 and ‘great’ 
‘fast’ and ‘good’ being the most common words left on 
the written feedback section (Bartlett, 2015).
On top of these individual product ratings, some markets 
employ vendor ratings. On the now-defunct Evolution 
market, vendors were given a ‘level’, ranging from one to 
five (one being the lowest and five being the highest). As 
for how this helps buyers, it is reasonable to assume that 
a Level 5 heroin dealer, for example, is experienced and 
perhaps also offers a good-quality product, because 
presumably the vendor’s items have been popular in the 
past.
The rating and feedback system is not infallible, however, 
and it can be abused, as has also been the case with 
legitimate marketplaces.
I Abuse of ratings and feedback
One scam involves the drug vendor generating only the 
appearance that they are trustworthy and have served 
customers in the past. ‘Padding’ feedback, as the 
practice is known, is when a vendor purchases drugs 
from themselves using a series of buyer accounts that 
they have created. To anyone else using the 
cryptomarket and looking at the ratings and feedback, it 
appears that the customers are legitimate, when in fact 
they are simply aliases of the vendor.
Another way the rating system can be abused is by 
vendors building up a reputation for being reliable, and 
then deliberately making an unexpected switch in 
behaviour and scamming users out of their bitcoins.
Over time, a vendor with consistently high ratings is likely 
to be deemed generally trustworthy by users of the 
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Other reviews are much more personal, and detail the 
user’s experience with the drug rather than strictly the 
quality of the product itself. One dark web forum, The 
Majestic Garden, provides a section for users to submit 
their own ‘trip reports’. These vary in length, from a few 
short sentences to pages’ worth of content, but they 
often pay great attention to detail, describing the dosage 
consumed, which vendor the drugs were brought from 
and the user’s subjective experience of the drug.
The report continues, detailing what music the user 
listened to, how the trip progressed into the comedown 
and how it ended.
At the time of writing, there have been over 45 replies to 
this forum thread, although not all of those are trip 
reports, as some are supportive messages or thanks 
from other users.
One particular group stands out when it comes to 
providing reviews of drugs sourced from cryptomarkets. 
The ‘LSD Avengers’, as the name suggests, focused on 
the use of psychedelic drugs, although they also 
provided reviews for MDMA. When they started, they 
were based on the original Silk Road. According to 
Jeffries (2014), ‘the Avengers began ordering from 
different vendors on the site, subjecting their wares to a 
chemical reagent test and a gas chromatography 
mass-spectrometry machine. If the drug was in fact 
FIGURE 5.3
A screenshot of a trip report from ‘The Majestic Garden’, 
a dark web forum
Transcript of above: Trip report for Blueviking House 
Xtal 100ug tab one such report starts. I took 2 of the 
100ug tabs at 4:00 pm at the 30 min mark I felt a very 
strong electrical feeling in the back of my head and 
butterfly’s in my stomach,I then start laughing like a 
MadWomen for 10 min,when that was over I started to 
get some crazy leg tremors, Kinda freaked me out for a 
bit, after about 30 min of tremors it subsided into pure 
bliss, like an old friend come home to see you.
FIGURE 5.2
Example of a template from Reddit
Information Details
_Vendor: [EmeraldTriangle]
_Market: [Abraxas]
_Product: [1/2oz Blue Dream]
_Shipped from: [USA]
_Shipped to: [USA]
_Required FE: [NO]
_Vacuum Sealed: [Yes]
_Decoy: [No]
_Handwriting: [No]
Rating
_Communication: [10]/10
_Stealth: [10]/10
_Shipping time: [10]/10
_Price value: [10]/10
_Aesthetics: [10]/10
_Weight: [10]/10
_Quality: [10]/10
_Transaction: [10]/10
_Vendor: [10]/10
_Drug: [10]/10
Total score: [100]/100
Extremely potent when turned into butter. A quarter oz was turned into a 
stick of butter, which made 16 1x1" brownies. One brownie sent a 200lb 
muscly man into a wild trip. Be careful. (Gosh-Damit, 2015).
One of the popular hubs for this activity is the 
DarkNetMarkets sub-Reddit. Reddit is a social media site 
that allows users to create sections of the site dedicated 
to certain topics, or ‘sub-Reddits’. Naturally, the 
DarkNetMarkets sub-Reddit deals in cryptomarket news, 
as well as being a space where users can post reviews of 
vendors and their products.
Many of these reviews follow a template that has been 
uploaded by a user. It includes a wide array of 
information, including where the drug was shipped from, 
the quality of the product, its value for money, the 
communication between the buyer and seller, and the 
level of the seller’s security (whether or not they used 
their own handwriting for the packaging labels, or 
whether or not the package containing the drugs was 
vacuum-sealed, for example). These are presented in a 
clear, easy to digest format, along with any additional 
comments from the reviewer. Below is an example of a 
completed template uploaded to Reddit.
Guides on how to write more helpful reviews have also 
been posted on the DarkNetMarkets sub-Reddit 
(entactoBob, 2015). Advice includes covering the main 
areas of interest to users (‘communication, product and 
price, and market’), as well as including images and 
making sure that the review is clearly formatted.
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along with efforts by unofficial groups like the Avengers, 
created a system that rewarded dealers who sold good 
stuff’ (Jeffries, 2014). Indeed, to be successful as a 
vendor on the cryptomarkets, ‘it turns out the key to their 
success is not clever encryption, or bitcoin, or even Tor. 
It’s good old-fashioned customer service’ (Bartlett, 2015).
In a way, thanks to reputation systems, the 
cryptomarkets have developed an organic method of 
self-regulation: vendors who sell low-quality products or 
who provide poor customer service will simply not 
receive good ratings, feedback or reviews, so arguably 
only those providing high-quality products will survive.
Reputation systems can also provide information to 
users about product quality and potential risks. 
According to ‘Harry’, a pseudonymous heroin and crack 
cocaine addict who purchased drugs from the first and 
second Silk Road sites, the rating systems were 
especially useful for ensuring that he received a 
consistent quality of product (Cox, 2014). When 
purchasing drugs from a street dealer, there is ‘no way of 
knowing how strong any given batch is, [making] it near 
impossible to manage dosage properly,’ according to 
Harry. On cryptomarkets, however, a consistent product 
is likely to be labelled as such thanks to the reviews and 
ratings left by other users. If there is a sudden dip or 
increase in drug quality, this will probably be highlighted 
by the community.
The cryptomarket community can also use these 
reputation systems to flag vendors who sell one 
substance under the pretence that it is something else 
entirely. In one post on the DarkNetMarkets sub-Reddit, 
a user accused a vendor of selling PMA, or 
paramethoxyamphetamine, as MDMA (SilentRaider3, 
2015). Although the drugs have similar effects, it takes 
longer for the user to feel PMA’s effects, meaning that, 
thinking that they haven’t take enough, they may ingest 
more and overdose. ‘If we had taken MDMA dosages, we 
would all be [f******] dead now,’ the complaining user 
wrote.
This harm reduction element is reflected in the 
motivation of those who encourage reviewing or write 
reviews themselves. According to the Reddit user who 
constructed one of the commonly used templates for 
reviews, ‘I do this to encourage vendor reviews, because 
it helps keep our markets safer than they would be 
otherwise and adds some degree of accountability’ 
(entactoBob, 2015).
The primary motivation of the LSD Avengers was 
reportedly to expose dealers who were selling research 
chemicals as traditional hallucinogens, as well as to 
LSD, the Avengers consumed it and posted Yelp-like 
reviews.’
These reviews were similar to those carried out by 
individual users of cryptomarkets, but, thanks to the 
tests performed by the LSD Avengers, were generally 
considered more detailed. They also primarily reviewed 
vendors rather than individual products. Some examples 
provided by Jeffries (2014) include:
3JANE — Canada to International. Known fondly as the 
Queen of SR. Quality LSD with appropriate dosages 
advertised. Extreme Ninja-Spy stealth shipping with 
friendly communication.
HAIZENBERG — Czech to International. Extremely 
friendly and personable customer service with 
consistent product and regular stock. Currently selling: 
Hofmann, Dancing Bears and Strawberrys (advertising 
110ug) Trip Test Hofmann: ~100ug.
MARIJUANAISMYMUSE/GOINGPOSTAL — Canada to 
International. Vials and some other shit. Last time we 
tried to test them they packaged the acid so badly that 
it was seized in transit. A few past selective scamming 
claims from trusted members, so be absolutely sure to 
read their FE [finalise early] and refund policies. We still 
don’t know the quality/consistency of the acid because 
it was taken by LE [law enforcement] and will not be 
able to test them for safety reasons.
In all, the LSD Avengers reviewed 60 vendors, and 
ranked 14 ‘star’ sellers, 19 vendors who were ‘OK’ and 
27 ‘bad’ sellers (Jeffries, 2014). The group entered 
retirement in October 2014, but a few months later they 
re-emerged on their own forum, the previously 
mentioned The Majestic Garden.
I Why reputation matters
Reputation systems appear to instil buyers with greater 
confidence in using cryptomarkets. Surveys have 
indicated that vendor ratings are one of the main 
reasons that users are attracted to cryptomarkets, with 
60–65 % of respondents saying that the existence of 
ratings was a motivation for using the original Silk Road, 
and that they were more comfortable purchasing drugs 
from vendors with a higher rating (Barratt et al., 2014).
So when reputation systems are in place, it creates an 
environment where the best dealers, or at least those with 
the highest ratings, may be rewarded with more 
customers. ‘The seller-rating system built into the site, 
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I Conclusion
Reputation systems, rather than being a tacked-on 
feature, are essential for the functioning of 
cryptomarkets. They are important in enabling buyers to 
make informed decisions, they are used by vendors to 
build up trust over time and they also regulate vendors 
on cryptomarkets. Scams and abuse still exist, but it 
appears that they are carried out by a minority of 
vendors.
As well as supporting the smooth functioning of 
cryptomarkets, reputation systems may also have a 
protective role in contributing to stamping out vendors 
who sell dangerous batches of drugs or those who sell 
something other than what they advertise.
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discover the best-quality LSD available on the deep web. 
Specifically, they were searching for ‘needlepoint acid’, a 
particularly potent variation of LSD (Jeffries, 2014).
I Recent developments
More recently, some cryptomarkets have experimented 
with ‘contracts’, in various forms. AlphaBay, a market that 
launched in December 2014, and was still up and 
running at the time of writing, implemented a feature the 
administrators of the site dubbed ‘digital contracts’. 
Each contract costs USD 5, which is payable to the 
administrators, and can contain anything that two 
contracting parties desire. This is as long as it relates to 
products already traded on the market: the owners of 
AlphaBay made it explicit that they would not tolerate 
contracts being used to hire hit men, for example.
Vendors can already create custom listings for buyers if 
they desire, if they wish to purchase a bulk amount that 
isn’t already listed, for example. But these new contracts 
‘are for more long term business,’ according to the owner 
of AlphaBay (Cox, 2015). The terms of the contract are 
then signed by the AlphaBay administrators with a PGP 
key. If one of the parties involved feels they’ve been 
cheated, they can raise a dispute with the site’s 
administrators; in this way, the market is similar to 
PayPal or other e-commerce services. A decision will be 
made about whether or not one of the parties should be 
stated to have ‘failed’ the contract. This failure will then 
be added to the offending user’s profile, for everybody to 
see, and if a user is deemed to be particularly 
untrustworthy, they may be banned from the site all 
together. If the contract is successful, and both parties 
are satisfied with the result, then a ‘completed’ note will 
be added to the users’ profiles.
These contracts, however, will not stop people scamming 
other users outright. It is perfectly possible for a user to 
repeatedly fail their contracts, or to make multiple 
accounts with the sole purpose of scamming while 
avoiding detection. There is also the problem of possible 
bias in a site administrator: the person enforcing the 
contract may have made another deal with one of the 
involved parties, perhaps to take their side in any 
dispute.
There have been other developments in the area of 
digital contracts, notably from OpenBazaar, a 
decentralised platform for trading goods (drwasho, 
2014).
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I Overview
This section explores internet drug markets from the perspectives of a 
number of central protagonists in dark net markets, the experiences of Silk 
Road users, a ‘frontline’ health professional working in cryptomarkets and a 
law enforcement representative are presented. 
In Chapter 6, Eileen Ormsby, who has been following Silk Road and 
blogging on the topic from its inception, presents findings from her 
interviews with a variety of Silk Road users, including sellers, buyers and 
administrators. She provides insight into the social profiles of Silk Road 
users and their motives for engaging in this cryptomarket. She also 
explores the ideology and sense of community central to the early Silk 
Road marketplace and forums. She concludes her chapter with user 
feedback on the closure of Silk Road marketplace and the consequences of 
its disappearance.
For Fernando Caudevilla, dark net marketplaces offer opportunities and a 
setting for targeted actions aimed at reducing risks associated with drug 
use. As he explains in Chapter 7, cryptomarkets can be a virtual setting for 
harm reduction interventions. As a physician, Fernando has been providing 
information and advice from a risk reduction perspective to drug users in 
dark net marketplaces since 2013 through his own forum thread (‘Ask a 
Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’). In this chapter, Dr 
Caudevilla shares his experiences of providing health advice in these 
forums and presents results from drug testing of samples purchased 
online.
In Chapter 8, Joost van Slobbe introduces the law enforcement approach 
to combatting online drug supply via dark net markets. He explores the 
similarities and differences between actual and digital market places, the 
key market players, law enforcement strategies, as well as intended and 
actual effects.
In Chapter 9, Anita Lavorgna presents a criminological analysis of drug 
supply and trafficking covering both the deep and the surface web. She 
explores the different levels at which the internet is used for drug supply 
and distribution purposes, the new criminal opportunities offered through 
online markets and the need for proactive online policing.
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I Introduction
Between January 2011 and October 2013, Silk Road, 
dubbed the ‘eBay’ or ‘Amazon’ of illicit drugs, grew from 
an underground black market known by few, to a slick 
commercial enterprise that had been accessed by over a 
million people. It is estimated that, in a little under three 
years, the site’s users spent around USD 200 million 
(Flitter, 2015) on a range of drugs: cannabis, prescription 
drugs, MDMA, LSD, heroin, crystal meth; in fact, every 
illicit drug.
Silk Road was the first of the contemporary dark net 
markets to provide a mainstream clientele with an 
anonymous, accessible method of purchasing drugs. 
This chapter presents the findings from interviews with 
hundreds of users of Silk Road carried out over three 
years. It gives an overview of the types of people using 
Silk Road, what they purchased and their reasons for 
preferring the online model over traditional methods of 
procuring drugs.
Interviews and the collection of individual stories were 
carried out by an investigative journalist over a number 
of years. Participants included Australian-based buyers, 
who provided their stories in person or by telephone, and 
active members of the Silk Road marketplace and 
forums from around the world, who provided their stories 
by email, private forum messages or encrypted chat. 
Those participants usually remained anonymous. Any 
who claimed to be prominent members of Silk Road 
(staff or vendors) could verify their pseudonyms in a 
variety of ways, most often using PGP encryption and 
signatures. Some participants responded to requests for 
interviews and case studies for mainstream and 
independent news stories and blog posts or for inclusion 
in a book. Others contacted the journalist independently 
to tell their stories.
It is accepted that there is a self-reporting bias in the 
stories, as certain people may be more inclined to agree 
to an interview. In particular, those who proactively 
sought out the opportunity to tell their stories were keen 
to dispel common notions of drug users as junkies and 
thieves and may have presented an incomplete or 
one-sided version of their drug habits.
I The Silk Road user
Believe it or not I am pretty much as technically 
unsavvy as they come but I had heard someone 
talking about getting drugs online from a little place 
called Silk Road. Did a little searching, a little 
researching, and next thing I know I find myself 
amongst a very different community. — ‘Dan’ (1)
Drug users come from all backgrounds and 
demographics. Computer use is no longer the domain of 
the young and technologically advanced. Thus, there is 
no truly ‘typical’ Silk Road user. However, several key 
themes came up repeatedly among the users who 
provided interviews.1
I Who?
I work hard, I pay my taxes. I’d never hurt anyone on 
purpose. If I choose to wind down with something I 
enjoy more than alcohol, why does that bother 
anyone else? — ‘Malcolm’
According to the prosecution case against Ross Ulbricht 
(who has been convicted of being the founder and 
owner-operator of Silk Road), Silk Road users were 
almost exclusively based in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, other parts of Europe, and Australia and New 
(1) All names have been changed or online pseudonyms used.
CHAPTER 6
Silk Road: insights from interviews 
with users and vendors
Eileen Ormsby
The internet and drug markets
62
There were those who ‘rediscovered’ drugs through Silk 
Road: people in their 50s and 60s who had used 
cannabis and LSD in their youth but who no longer had 
or wanted contact with drug scenes. Some of these 
users also discovered new drugs as a result of 
participating in Silk Road.
I came for the drugs. I stayed for the revolution. 
— anonymous Silk Road member
Although the majority of Silk Road users were interested 
solely in buying quality drugs in a safe and convenient 
setting, some were attracted by the ideals and 
philosophies espoused by the site’s owner, Dread Pirate 
Roberts.
Silk Road was built on a platform of agorism (2) and 
anarcho-capitalism, with the stated intention of building 
a free-market system that would eradicate coercive force 
by the state. Few users interviewed subscribed wholly to 
the hardline free-market position of the site’s leader, but 
all had libertarian views when it came to the right to 
choose what to put in one’s own body.
Those interviewed had both left- and right-wing political 
views. Many did not believe an unregulated illicit drug 
market was an ideal manner of acquiring drugs; it just 
happened to be the best way available while their drugs 
of choice were illegal. Most of those interviewed would 
have preferred to see an end to prohibition and the ‘War 
on Drugs’, something that would put markets such as 
Silk Road out of business altogether.
I saw the relative ease that came with it. There was 
a personal level of safety [from law enforcement], 
as well as anonymity. — heroin dealer Michael 
Duch, aka ‘Deezletime’ (United States District 
Court Southern District of New York, 2015)
The dealers interviewed invariably shared characteristics 
with many of their street-dealing counterparts. They were 
males in their 20s to 40s (or at least that was what they 
claimed; most dealers were reluctant to meet face to 
face and interviews were conducted via encrypted 
message). Many of them were former small-time street 
dealers who had found a new, lucrative market.
(2) Founded by Samuel Edward Konkin III, agorism is a libertarian 
philosophy based on market anarchism with the ultimate goal of bringing 
about a society in which all relations between people are voluntary 
exchanges. Konkin believed in a totally free market devoid of violence or 
coercion by either market participants or the state.
Zealand (United States District Court Southern District 
of New York, 2013).
Although coming from a broad demographic, the 
majority of those Silk Road users who agreed to be 
interviewed were employed with disposable income, 
technologically literate and aged in their 20s to 40s. 
However, the site’s users ranged from teens to one 
member who claimed to be in his 70s. Some used Silk 
Road to purchase medicinal cannabis, others to feed 
addictions, but most were recreational users.
Every buyer interviewed had used drugs prior to finding 
Silk Road. None reported deciding to try drugs only 
because they had discovered the marketplace. Most 
heard about Silk Road through friends; many found it 
after reading a media story. A few discovered it through 
the early online equivalent of word of mouth, niche 
internet discussion forums, where news of the site first 
spread in January 2011.
‘Stacey’ was in her late 30s when first interviewed in 
2011, professionally employed and a heavy recreational 
drug user. Her drug use began in her mid-teens and she 
never considered herself a problem user, occasionally 
abstaining for several months with no ill effects.
The drugs she used changed over time. In her teens, it 
was cannabis and speed (amphetamine), but as she got 
older she settled on MDMA and psychedelics as her 
drugs of choice, with cocaine a special treat when she 
could afford it. Before Silk Road, her pattern of 
purchasing was typical of many recreational users. She 
bought from friends of friends, or from small-time 
dealers to whom she was introduced by acquaintances. 
‘Most of them didn’t last long,’ she said. She would find a 
trustworthy and reliable dealer and they would stop 
dealing, or become less reliable, for a variety of reasons, 
most often a dearth of product.
A number of Stacey’s friendship circle also agreed to be 
interviewed. All were within a similar demographic: late 
30s to early 40s, employed and with disposable income. 
More than half had children. They ranged from 
occasional to regular recreational drug users. None 
considered themselves criminals. All felt that Silk Road 
provided a more sophisticated and convenient method 
for purchasing drugs that was more congruent with their 
lifestyles than sourcing from the street.
It was like being a kid in a candy store. — ‘John’
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harmful use and chaotic lifestyles (heroin, 
methamphetamine and crack cocaine) do not appear 
much on Silk Road, and generate very little revenue’ 
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014).
This is not to say that there were no problem users on 
Silk Road. One heroin user claimed Silk Road had been ‘a 
godsend’. He credited it with providing him with a 
regular, affordable supply of consistent quality that 
allowed him to function and hold down his job while 
maintaining his addiction. However, he also said that the 
necessary delay between ordering and receiving the 
heroin was helping him get off the drug: ‘learning to have 
to wait till next day, made me finally realise that I could 
wait … delay, delay … it’s given me a last chance at life’ 
(‘Paul’, October 2013).
The group I am in charge of wholesales MDMA here 
in the UK and I had originally considered vending 
that on the road, but at the time, nobody bought 
more than a few hundred dollars’ worth of products. 
— ‘StExo’
Silk Road was designed to bring together buyers and 
sellers of small personal quantities of drugs. The creator 
of the site, when first advertising it, described it as ‘kind 
of like an anonymous amazon.com’ (Bitcointalk.org, 
2011), suggesting that, as with Amazon, the purchaser 
would be the end-user of the product. Interviews with 
Silk Road purchasers supported this. All who agreed to 
be interviewed bought drugs from the website for their 
personal use.
Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2014) challenged this notion, 
stating that their research led them to believe that ‘Silk 
Road was an online marketplace catering primarily to 
those making purchases for resale; that is, to street drug 
dealers buying stock to sell offline’.
They recognised that some of their data included people 
who ‘may have been buying for personal use over a 
longer term, or perhaps making “social supply” 
purchases on behalf of a group of friends’, but stated 
that they thought these accounted for only a small 
number of the larger purchases.
Interviews with users suggested stockpiling and social 
supply to be the norm, rather than the exception. Most 
buyers were more concerned about having a high 
quantity of envelopes delivered than about receiving a 
high volume of drugs in one delivery. ‘The charge is the 
same whether I buy one gram or ten [grams of MDMA],’ 
said ‘Joel’, ‘so why risk a bunch of deliveries where one 
However, interviews with vendors also suggested that a 
new breed of drug dealer was emerging. While most had 
experience of procuring and supplying drugs to their 
friends, some had never dreamed of dealing on a more 
professional level. They were ill equipped to become part 
of the drug trade that included contact with hardened 
criminals. Dark net markets provided them with an 
opportunity to sell drugs anonymously and safely.
Although many Silk Road dealers were one-man 
operations, the more popular vendors required a team of 
staff to keep up with demand. They would split tasks 
across the team, so that those who ran the computer 
side of the business were never in possession of drugs.
I What?
Silk Road was a marketplace from which any illicit drug 
could be purchased. The majority of users who granted 
interviews were recreational users of MDMA, 
psychedelics and cannabis. Few of those interviewed 
were purchasers of heroin or methamphetamine, 
although whether or not this was a result of self-
selection bias is difficult to determine. However, reading 
through the forums and viewing the most popular 
listings on the marketplace seemed to confirm that the 
most popular purchases were ‘soft’ or ‘party’ drugs.
Such anecdotal evidence was bolstered by the results of 
a global drug survey conducted by dance and clubbing 
magazine Mixmag in conjunction with The Guardian in 
2012. Over 15 000 people from around the world filled in 
the online survey, which posed a wide range of questions 
about drug use. It included questions about Silk Road 
(Winstock et al., 2012–2014).
The findings from this survey relating to Silk Road were 
published in the academic journal Addiction (Barratt et 
al., 2014). MDMA was the most popular drug purchased 
by Silk Road users in the three countries that made up 
the bulk of Silk Road’s customers (the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia). This was followed by 
cannabis, LSD and cocaine. Heroin and 
methamphetamine did not feature in the top 10.
These statistics, which were self-reporting by survey 
respondents, were empirically backed up some time 
later by researchers Judith Aldridge and David Décary-
Hétu in a 2014 academic study. They collected data by 
crawling the visible listings on the Silk Road website. 
They estimated that ‘in annual revenue terms, the vast 
majority of sales were for cannabis (USD 24.8 million), 
MDMA (USD 19.9 million) and psychedelics (USD 
8.6 million)’. ‘Drugs associated with drug dependence, 
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Australian purchasers of bulk quantities often bought in 
order to re-sell to Australian Silk Road customers. They 
would buy large amounts of (most often) MDMA from the 
United States or Europe, which would then be divided 
into capsules and sold to Australian users who did not 
want to risk a customs seizure or wanted overnight 
delivery. The dealer’s profit in this situation would be 
around 400 %.
I Why?
Several key themes emerged consistently from the 
interviews when exploring why drug users chose to buy 
from Silk Road rather than using traditional methods. 
These were price (in some regions), availability and 
convenience, quality, eradication of violence and 
libertarian ideals. Vendors cited similar reasons for 
choosing to sell online, although profitability was 
paramount.
I Price and availability
The number one reason users gave for buying online was 
the price and availability of their drug of choice. For the 
geographically isolated Australians and New Zealanders, 
recreational drugs — particularly the most popular, 
MDMA and LSD — cost a quarter of the normal price 
when ordered overseas on Silk Road. Users in most parts 
of the United States and Europe were also happy with 
the prices, although these were not as dramatically 
different as in Australia and New Zealand.
The range of products on offer was also a factor. 
Different strains of cannabis, designer psychedelics that 
were otherwise hard to come by and prescription drugs 
were easily available. Those interviewed who had tried 
new drugs as a result of participating in Silk Road 
invariably stuck to similar types of substances to those 
they already favoured. Thus, someone who enjoyed LSD 
and mushrooms might try psychedelics in the 2C family, 
the most popular of which was 2C-B.
Some users found that Silk Road meant they could order 
their preferred drugs for use on holiday. Users would 
arrange a delivery to their overseas hotel from a vendor 
near their destination. They felt that this involved less 
risk than smuggling drugs on an airplane, arguing that 
good hotels are protective of their customers’ privacy 
and would not question the arrival of a package’.
For vendors, the overwhelming motivation for selling on 
Silk Road was profitability. One vendor interviewed in 
might get picked up and tip off my address to 
customs?’
Ten grams of MDMA — a quantity that is considered by 
law enforcement to be for supply rather than personal 
use — was a typical order for a regular user or festival-
goer. Stacey claimed that 10 g would last ‘maybe four 
weeks’, although she did admit that having such 
quantities easily available made her more likely to ‘top 
up’ as soon as the effects started diminishing, and also 
made her more generous in sharing the drugs with 
friends than she otherwise might have been.
In the old days, when you’d buy five pills for around 
the same amount as you can buy five grams of 
MDMA on Silk Road [equivalent to around 30–40 
capsules, depending on strength], you’d be more 
likely to keep them all to yourself.
As with recreational users in real life, social supply was 
also common. A group of friends would pool resources 
and the one member of the group who had access to Silk 
Road would place the order. Risk was shared by rotating 
the address to which the order would be mailed. This 
would enable the group to receive discounts for larger 
orders and to build up strong buyer statistics. Because 
they gave vendors access to quantity and volume of 
purchases, accounts with good buyer stats were given 
certain advantages. They might receive promotional 
freebies or overweight orders and were more likely to be 
offered a no-questions-asked re-ship if they claimed that 
items had gone missing, rather than having to go to Silk 
Road to resolve a dispute.
Many people here purchase in bulk as well as retail 
quantities. — Dread Pirate Roberts
Although information gathered from interviews 
suggested that it was only end-users who purchased 
from Silk Road, it is likely that those who bought to make 
offline sales locally were less inclined to be interviewed. 
StExo, who found that there was not enough demand for 
bulk MDMA in early 2012, went on to run a money 
laundering business instead. However, Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu’s findings that the quantities sold indicated 
that dealers were purchasing to sell offline resulted from 
analysis after Silk Road had been operational for a 
couple of years. By then, it had enough of a customer 
and vendor base to attract bulk purchases.
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‘ecstasy’ and discovered that, instead of MDMA, the 
main ingredient in their pills was inferior piperazines or 
PMA. Similarly, purchasers of LSD had found themselves 
imbibing 25i, which has a toxicity not found in LSD. 
Users reported few, if any, substitutions when 
purchasing from Silk Road.
I Eradication of violence
It’s cheaper, it’s higher quality and I don’t have to 
meet some guy in an alley or a dodgy apartment 
— it comes to me. What’s not to like? — ‘Stacey’
Buyers and sellers alike expressed the desire to be able 
to make drug transactions without the fear of violence or 
other problems often associated with traditional drug 
deals. An online model, where both parties remained 
anonymous and were probably geographically 
separated, removed any possibility of an aggressive 
resolution to a dispute between buyer and seller.
Female interviewees in particular perceived Silk Road as 
providing them with a safe alternative to purchasing 
drugs in person. Many had faced requests for sexual 
favours in lieu of payment for drugs. Even when there 
had been no repercussions to a refusal, female users 
often felt frightened and intimidated by male sellers in 
person.
The best thing about selling online is not having to 
deal with people knocking on my door or ringing me 
at all hours. — AussieDomesticDrugs
Vendors were equally enthusiastic about not having to 
deal with their customers face-to-face. Not only did 
dealers have to be wary of customers, who might use 
violence to rob them of their wares, many found that 
habitual drug users could become irritating when looking 
for drugs at short notice. They knew their dealers’ 
addresses and their phone numbers and demanded that 
they be available day and night. Silk Road provided them 
with the opportunity to deal with orders at times 
convenient to them, and to ensure their best customers’ 
orders were prioritised.
Low-end street dealers might find that they need to 
compete with other sellers nearby for local trade. Prolific 
vendor JesusOfRave said that, rather than compete for 
turf, the vendors of Silk Road collaborated and assisted 
early 2012 claimed a turnover of more than USD 4 000 
per day, 75 % of which was profit. Another, who sold a 
variety of drugs, said that his profit on cocaine alone was 
USD 20 000 per month. All of the vendors agreed that 
the commission structure charged by Silk Road (6–12 % 
per transaction) was fair and reasonable.
A seller who had built up a solid reputation could expect 
hundreds of orders a day. ‘I made it into the Top Ten, and 
let me just say, the money is GOOD!’ said one vendor. 
‘[Silk Road] could take 50 % tax and I’d still be making a 
killing.’
Some markets were particularly lucrative. ‘Personally I 
am completely financially motivated in what I do … I 
went through the local Australian listings, did a bit of 
maths and thought “Wow, these guys are paying 
ridiculous prices for their drugs, there’s definitely profit 
to be made here!” ’ said AussieDomesticDrugs, who sold 
exclusively to Australian and New Zealand buyers.
I Quality and harm reduction
Samples of these purchases have been laboratory 
tested and have typically shown high purity levels 
of the drug the item was advertised to be on Silk 
Road. — FBI (United States District Court Southern 
District of New York, 2013)
More importantly, users felt they were getting value for 
money. The user feedback model that works so well on 
sites such as eBay was just as effective on the black 
market. Sellers had the incentive of repeat business to 
ensure their product was as described. Regular online 
black market users were sophisticated when it came to 
spotting padded or faked feedback.
Occasional drug users invariably find that the quality of 
their purchases is variable. Even those with ‘reliable’ 
small-time dealers have to rely on a long supply chain, 
along which drugs may be cut or substituted. In addition 
to the system of feedback, Silk Road spawned groups 
such as the ‘LSD Avengers’, who tested and provided 
detailed analyses of various vendors’ products. Like 
restaurant reviewers, the LSD Avengers made purchases 
anonymously and reported their findings, although they 
soon found that vendors began to send them free 
samples for review.
The tested quality of Silk Road’s drugs assisted in harm 
reduction. Many users had previously purchased 
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really isn’t recognising, as best as I try to explain it to 
them, what I am actually going through.’
There is a great deal of cooperation and skill 
sharing amongst vendors. — JesusOfRave
JesusOfRave claimed that their team did not start selling 
on Silk Road only because it was a new means of doing 
what they were already doing — selling drugs at a profit 
— but also because the team fully subscribed to the 
philosophy of the site. ‘This has a large part to do with 
DPR’s [Dread Pirate Roberts’] writings. We feel we share 
complementary ethics,’ said a representative. 
JesusOfRave regularly engaged with customers and 
other members in the forums.
I  Silk Road seizure and law enforcement 
efforts
Now I’ve got to go back to associating with 
criminals and the dregs of society to get my drug of 
choice. And if that’s not bad enough the quality of 
the H [heroin] that I get in real life is sub-par to the 
stuff I was getting on Silk Road. — ‘Paul’
On 2 October 2013, Silk Road was seized; the site was 
shut down and its owner arrested. The shutdown 
apparently did nothing to stop drug users purchasing 
their wares online, with a clone site appearing five weeks 
later and several new, more technically robust, markets 
opening and vying for market share.
Interviews conducted with users immediately after the 
shutdown revealed that, for some, the seizure of Silk 
Road was a catastrophe, but, for most, it was little more 
than a temporary inconvenience. By the time Silk Road 
was closed, many vendors were already active on two 
other active black markets, Sheep and Black Market 
Reloaded. Able to verify that they were dealing with the 
same seller by use of encrypted signatures, users simply 
migrated to the alternative websites.
Other users had by that time formed relationships with 
their favourite suppliers, enabling them to make private 
transactions via secured email, bypassing the black 
markets altogether.
However, some were unnerved by the shutdown, 
particularly in the weeks afterwards, when it was unclear 
each other: ‘There are more buyers than sellers can 
stock. There was no sense of competition for us during 
our time on Silk Road.’
Despite the fear of violence being an oft-quoted reason 
for purchasing online rather than by traditional means, 
the majority of interviewees admitted that they had 
never faced any violent behaviour in their real-life 
dealings. However, they were all acutely aware of the 
potential for a deal to go sour, and the fear itself created 
high levels of anxiety.
I Community and ideals
It really is more than a place to buy drugs. It’s a 
place to hang out, make friends and just talk shit. 
— ‘Zach’
For many, Silk Road was more than just a marketplace. 
For them, the website had become a close-knit 
community of people from all around the world with one 
thing in common: illicit drugs. Although less than half of 
those interviewed actively engaged in the Silk Road 
discussion forums, many of those who did cited their 
value as a source of advice, information and friendship.
In 1.2 million posts on over 70 000 topics, discussions 
on the site’s forums covered everything from 
sophisticated methods of evading law enforcement to 
favourite movies to watch when stoned. But they 
covered much more than that. Dread Pirate Roberts 
fostered a community that was active and highly 
engaged. He encouraged philosophical discussions and 
sharing of knowledge. The online community was 
particularly important to those whose drug-taking was a 
solitary pursuit.
Professionals shared their knowledge of chemistry, the 
law in various jurisdictions and harm reduction. The drug 
safety forum was one of the most popular; there, 
members could receive useful, realistic advice on harm 
reduction and the dangers of drugs, and assistance with 
giving up highly addictive drugs. Silk Road member 
‘DoctorX’ (see Chapter 7) was a family physician who 
provided a service, dispensing advice aimed at 
minimising potential harm from drug use.
‘The SR [Silk Road] community has probably been the 
best support and advice I’ve got actually,’ said former 
methamphetamine user Ben. ‘The mental health system 
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peer technology that is similar to that used to pirate 
music, movies and software.
Notably absent in the current markets is the strong 
community feeling fostered by Silk Road. The trial of 
Ross Ulbricht in January and February 2015 was not a 
major topic of conversation in the forums of Agora or 
Evolution, the leading dark net markets at the time of 
writing (3). Discussions concentrated on the quality of 
the drugs, the best suppliers, avoiding scams and 
evading law enforcement efforts.
Although some dark net market users lament the loss of 
Silk Road, many have found it a relief. ‘Silk Road courted 
publicity at the end, putting a major target on their back,’ 
said Sam. ‘All these noobs stumbling their way in without 
any sense of self-preservation became really annoying. 
We’re back to where we were supposed to be — flying 
under the radar.’
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if the technology that enabled anonymous buying and 
selling had been compromised. Those users said they 
would return to traditional methods of buying for the 
time being, but expressed frustration that they would 
have to go back to a system that had more inherent 
dangers and flaws than the online model. No one 
indicated that closure of the site would stop them using 
drugs.
The damage was going to be considerable, I had a 
lot in escrow on all of my buying and selling 
accounts. Once I had calculated the damage it was 
over $60,000 worth of BTC [bitcoins]. A lot less than 
I had made in the time I’d been selling there but a 
considerable loss regardless. — AussieDomesticDrugs
Vendors complained of losses of bitcoins held in escrow 
that had yet to be released from orders dispatched in the 
weeks before the shutdown, but most had already 
signed on with the alternative markets. Their customers 
soon followed them.
Overall, for vendors and buyers alike, the shutdown of 
Silk Road was inconvenient but appeared to have little 
effect in the medium term.
I Conclusion
Users of Silk Road and other dark net markets are a 
varied group, but several themes came through 
repeatedly: the beliefs that drug use was not morally 
wrong and that people had the right to take drugs 
without interference from government or law 
enforcement; relief at the opportunity to purchase drugs 
in a safer environment (i.e. dealing with criminals 
virtually rather than in person); a belief that the market 
supported harm reduction by providing information on 
the quality and contents of purchases; and a feeling that 
Silk Road offered a sense of community.
The shutdown of Silk Road and the arrest of its owner 
has seen the emergence of over 20 similar markets. 
Some are single-item markets. Most are small. Two — 
Evolution and Agora — grew to be bigger than the 
original Silk Road. New markets seek to combat rogue 
operators by offering multi-signature escrow, which 
means the marketplace cannot access funds in escrow 
without a second ‘key’, that of either buyer or seller. 
Emerging markets plan to fight law enforcement 
infiltration by becoming decentralised, using peer-to-
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I Introduction
Deep web marketplaces (DWMs) represent a major 
change in online drug trading. Although they are 
currently a limited phenomenon, their operational 
characteristics offer significant advantages for both 
buyers and sellers, and it is likely that their importance 
will grow. The structure of DWMs facilitates 
communication, exchange and dissemination of 
information. This provides opportunities for health 
professionals to engage with users. This chapter 
discusses some aspects of DWMs from a health 
perspective and describes harm reduction strategies 
developed specifically for DWMs.
I The internet, drugs and health
The internet has changed many aspects of healthcare. 
Health professionals have traditionally been considered 
an undisputed and unique source of knowledge, and the 
role of patients has been to passively accept medical 
advice. However, this relationship has been transformed 
by the democratic access to information and the 
interactivity provided by the internet. Virtual 
communities, chats, discussion forums, online social 
networking services and virtual libraries are tools that 
change the balance of knowledge between health 
professionals and the public, empowering patients to 
become more involved in decisions related to their 
health. The internet is also a powerful tool for 
professionals, and clinicians and researchers have 
increased access to scientific publications, guidelines 
and professional tools that facilitate research and 
improve knowledge and abilities. On the other hand, 
dissemination of inaccurate or inadequate messages 
can have negative health consequences and is a growing 
concern, given that it is sometimes difficult to evaluate 
the quality of information online.
In relation to illegal or recreational drugs, these changes 
have been even more dramatic. Drug information 
provided through traditional media has tended to focus 
on universal prevention, encouraging people to reject 
any use of illegal psychoactive substances, not 
differentiating between use, abuse and dependence, 
and often exaggerating the negative aspects and 
consequences of drug use. In the age of the internet, 
however, resources focused on harm reduction, 
including more information about risks and harms, have 
gained popularity.
Alexa Internet (1) is a company that provides web traffic 
data analysis, classifies websites according to their 
global popularity and generates a score (Alexa ranking 
(AR)) that is considered the ‘gold standard’ for 
estimating the importance of websites on the internet, 
with lower AR scores denoting greater popularity. 
Websites aimed at providing harm reduction information, 
such as Bluelight (2), Drugs Forum (3) and Erowid (4), 
have higher Alexa rankings (Bluelight, 16 356; Drugs-
forum, 19.965; Erowid, 20.670) than official prevention 
web pages such as the US National Institute of Drug 
Abuse (5) (28 686) or the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) (6) (50 942). It is also important to 
note that harm reduction websites are generally run by 
volunteers or small non-governmental organisations with 
limited technical and economic resources compared 
with official government prevention websites. It is likely 
that these virtual communities of individuals using the 
internet all over the world are having an impact on social 
perceptions about illicit drugs.
(1) http://www.alexa.com
(2) http://www.bluelight.org
(3) http://www.drugs-forum.com
(4) http://www.erowid.org
(5) http://www.drugabuse.gov/
(6) http://www.unodc.org/
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and transaction reviews. Some of these markets sell only 
psychoactive substances and support or integrate a 
harm reduction philosophy. In other cases, DWMs offer 
not only drugs but also counterfeit goods, stolen credit 
cards or weapons. However, offering child pornography, 
services of ‘murder for hire’, traffic of persons or human 
organs are strictly forbidden activities in these kinds of 
markets.
DWMs can also provide a virtual setting for harm 
reduction. The structure of DWMs allows the creation of 
virtual communities that share information, knowledge 
and experiences. For many individuals, it is not a matter 
simply of ‘buying drugs’, but a question of belonging to a 
community that shares similar interests. The implications 
of these aspects for prevention deserve further and 
more detailed research. Feedback from other users, 
posts in forums and control by site administrators allow 
users to be relatively well informed about the quality of 
products. Many vendors state that their products have 
been ‘lab-tested’ and offer information about purity. 
Users can leave their opinions about the quality of 
products and experiences with vendors. Many vendors 
communicate directly with users in forums, announce 
when a new batch of a substance is available, provide 
and share advice about safer use and openly discuss 
quality, purity, adulterants and advertisements. This 
system is imperfect, but it offers users more reliable 
information than that provided in the traditional street 
drug dealing system. So, in general, DWMs provide some 
advantages for both buyers and sellers compared with 
street-level distribution.
Technical difficulties in accessing and operating DWMs 
and the fact that a real postal address must be provided 
to receive the product are currently the main drawbacks 
for many users. There is no clear estimate about the 
market share of DWMs in relation to the whole global 
trade in illicit drugs, but it is likely to be very limited at 
present. Nevertheless, there are signs that suggest there 
may be increased interest in the future.
I  ‘Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’
Internet forums are online discussion sites where people 
can hold conversations in the form of posted messages. 
Their structure is hierarchical: a forum can contain 
different sub-forums dedicated to different themes 
covering several topics or threads. In forums, 
administrators manage the technical running of the site 
and can give privileges to some users. Moderators are 
I  Online drug trading: from research chemicals to deep web marketplaces
As with any other consumer goods, illicit drugs have 
been offered online since the internet began. However, 
until recently, their illegal status has made this business 
extremely difficult in practice. Purchasing illicit drugs 
through an internet website or forum on the surface web 
gives no guarantee about the quality of the product or 
that the product will actually arrive. Payment and 
shipping allows the purchaser to be physically identified 
and there is no possibility of lodging a complaint. 
Nevertheless, small closed-access websites and forums 
have always existed where select individuals can 
purchase illicit drugs by invitation; their impact, however, 
has been limited.
From the mid-90s to 2003, a limited selection of 
psychoactive substances were offered online as 
‘research chemicals’. In general, they were 
phenethylamine and tryptamine derivatives, coming 
from discreet websites offering high-purity products. 
Consumers were, in general, individuals with an interest 
in psychoactive substances (so-called psychonauts); the 
phenomenon didn’t attract the attention of the media 
and was of very limited significance. The US Drug 
Enforcement Administration closed most of these 
websites in July 2004.
The phenomenon re-emerged around 2007 in the form of 
‘legal highs’, with visually attractive websites employing 
well-known marketing strategies such as special offers 
and discounts (‘product of the week’, ‘buy 3 pay for 2’, 
etc.) and offering a wide variety of drugs (synthetic 
cannabinoids, cathinone derivatives, pyrovalerones, 
NBOMe series, methoxetamine, etc.) marketed as herbal 
blends, incense, fertilisers, and so on. The main purpose 
of this market was to sell non-controlled substances. 
Most of the substances had not been studied in animals 
and there was a lack of data about human toxicology or 
psychoactivity from basic science studies. In many 
cases, product samples contained a mixture of different 
substances and, sometimes, products with identical 
labels contained different active substances (Caudevilla 
et al., 2013). There was high availability of these 
substances, some of which have much potential for harm 
(Johnson et al., 2013).
DWMs represent a significant change in the online drug 
trade. Relations between vendors and consumers are 
largely based on trust and professionalism, and are 
supported by user feedback and resolution models (Van 
Hout and Bingham, 2013). Forums linked to these 
markets provide user advice, ‘trip reports’, and product 
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forum (9) and moved to the Silk Road 2.0 forum (10) when 
Silk Road was closed by the FBI. Silk Road 2.0 was shut 
down in November 2014 and, since then, its forum has 
not been accessible. For this reason, the service was 
moved to Evolution (11).
Most DWM users remain anonymous and do not give any 
clues about their identity in the real world. The author 
uses the nickname ‘DoctorX’ in the deep web, but, in 
order to gain credibility, DoctorX’s real identity has been 
revealed, with a link in the forum profile to a professional 
web page with complete information about his profession 
and skills. The service is free of charge, but supported by 
anonymous and volunteer donations in bitcoins.
‘Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’ 
(threads in Silk Road, Silk Road 2.0 and Evolution during 
a 22-month period) had received 136 407 visits on 
3 February 2015 and 1 146 questions had been 
answered, 931 in the public forum, accessible to any 
visitor, and 215 as private messages from people who, 
for whatever reason, wanted to ask their questions 
privately. Data are summarised in Table 7.1.
Although a structured qualitative analysis has not been 
performed, the general impression is that the reception 
of this service in the community has been very positive. 
All the threads received many messages from users 
expressing support, appreciation and gratitude. Some 
users have offered collaboration, for example editing in 
English, gathering similar answers to create a ‘Frequently 
Asked Questions’ section or referring users to DoctorX’s 
thread when questions about health are asked in 
different posts or forums. Some vendors have also asked 
questions aimed at improving safety of the products 
(9) The original forum was closed by the FBI in October 2013. A complete 
backup can be downloaded from http://antilop.cc/sr/download/
stexo_sr_forum.zip
(10) The forum was closed by the FBI/Europol in November 2014. No 
copies have been found.
(11) ‘Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’, Evolution 
forum, http://i25c62nvu4cgeqyz.onion/viewtopic.php?id=35190 
(available only through Tor).
users or employees of the forum who have been granted 
access to the posts and threads of all members for the 
purpose of moderating discussions and managing 
day-to-day affairs in the forum. The characteristics of 
organisation, structure, classification of information, 
democratic participation and simplicity of use make 
these online forums very popular, and they are often 
used as sources of information and sites where 
discussion can take place.
Online drugs forums have been used for scientific, 
medical and prevention research in different ways. 
Analysing information contained in them is a simple way 
to obtain some data (patterns of use of emerging drugs, 
motivations, harm, etc.) that would be very difficult to 
collect using other methods (Lefèvre and Simioni, 1999; 
Kjellgren et al., 2013; Månsson, 2014). The use of internet 
forums to recruit participants for studies can be very 
helpful when the subject of the study has a low 
prevalence or when it involves hard-to-reach populations 
(González et al., 2013; Caudevilla-Gálligo et al., 2014). 
The role of internet-based treatments using forums, 
chats or mobile phone applications has also recently 
been studied in fields such as smoking cessation (Civljak 
et al., 2013), social anxiety disorder (Schulz et al., 2014) 
and anxiety and depressive disorders (Schulz et al., 
2014). Online drug forums can also be an environment 
where strategies for risk and harm reduction can be 
provided to drug users.
Most DWMs have associated forums, usually 
administrated or moderated by the same staff who run 
the marketplace. Nine of the eleven popular DWMs 
operating in February 2015 had an associated forum. At 
this time, the forums in Evolution (7) and Agora (8) were 
the most popular, with thousands of registered users 
and hundreds of new posts and messages every day. 
Forums in DWMs have a similar structure to those in the 
surface web: there is a general section for discussion 
about the market, and also sub-sections where users 
can discuss the quality of products, reviews of vendors, 
security, packaging, legal aspects, bitcoin, and so on. In 
most forums, there is also a sub-section dedicated to 
‘drug safety’ where users discuss topics directly related 
to drugs and health (patterns of use, intoxication, 
adulterants, dosage, etc.).
The author of this chapter has been running threads 
(entitled ‘Ask a Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and 
Health’) in DWM forums providing information and 
advice to drug users from a risk reduction perspective. 
This service started in April 2013 in the original Silk Road 
(7) http://i25c62nvu4cgeqyz.onion
(8) http://lacbzxobeprssrfx.onion
TABLE 7.1
Summary of activity in an online health service for deep 
web drug users
Market Dates
Number of 
questions 
(public)
Number of 
questions
(private)
Total 
visits
Silk Road Apr. to 
Oct. 2013
321  67 36 438
Silk 
Road 2.0
Dec. 2013 to 
Nov.  2014
352 103 52 725
Evolution Dec. 2014 to 
Feb. 2015
258  45 47 244 (1)
(1) Thread active; data up to 2/2/15.
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In order to better understand the nature and 
characteristics of questions asked in the ‘Ask a Drug 
Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’, some 
examples are shown in the box on p.73. Case 1 is 
particularly notable. The questioner asked about 
long-lasting symptoms that he attributed to opiate 
abstinence. However, fever, profuse sweating, 
enlargement of the lymph nodes and pain during the 
night suggested the need for a complete medical 
evaluation. A week later, the user posted in the forum 
that he had this done after reading the answer and that 
blood test results had revealed that he was suffering 
from leukaemia (Ormsby, 2014).
A drug information and counselling service in a DWM 
forum provided by a professional physician who 
specialises in drugs and harm reduction is an 
opportunity to reach drug users where they are. This 
‘virtual outreach’ technique is perceived as reliable, 
effective and able to provide useful information and skills 
to drug users, although many aspects deserve further 
and deeper evaluation. It also has its own limitations and 
disadvantages, as messages in an internet forum 
provide very limited information compared with a real, 
face-to-face interview and intervention. It is important to 
remember that many drug users are reluctant to ask their 
questions of traditional health services because they 
feel they will be judged, or are afraid of professionals’ 
moral prejudices. In many parts of the world, services 
aimed at drug users are simply non-existent.
I  Testing drugs purchased through deep web marketplaces: the International Drug Testing Service (IDTS)
Drug checking services are useful tools for reducing 
numbers of drug-related incidents, monitoring new 
substances or patterns of use, and providing information 
and assessment to drug users. In Spain, the non-
governmental organisation Energy Control has been 
offering its drug-checking service since 1999 as part of 
an integrated harm reduction service for recreational 
drug users. Recreational users, who do not usually seek 
help or advice from substance abuse organisations, can 
test their drugs at checking points (in clubs, raves, etc.) 
or in Energy Control’s offices in Spain. This service is 
supported and financed by the Spanish Government 
Delegation to the National Plan on Drugs and the 
regional authorities. It is part of the EU Early Warning 
System operated by the EMCDDA and Europol. Between 
2010 and 2013, a total of 8 348 samples were analysed.
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they are selling. The attitude of DWM administrators and 
moderators has also been very collaborative: the thread 
has always been highlighted, and technical or general 
support has been offered in all cases. The popularity of 
the thread has increased, as shown in Figure 7.1, where 
the number of questions answered each month in the 
three markets during a 22-month period is presented.
Questions in the thread have been categorised using a 
qualitative analysis technique that involves coding the 
posts and collating them into meaningful and distinct 
themes. The main themes that emerged are summarised 
in the box below.
n  Drug effects, patterns of use, dosage
n Adverse effects
n Medical contraindications
n  Pharmacological interactions with prescription 
drugs
n  Pharmacological interactions with other illicit 
drugs
n Patterns for detoxification
n Therapeutic use of cannabis
n Neurotoxicity
n Long-term effects of drugs
n Urine detection of drugs
n Use of drugs during pregnancy and lactation
Themes of frequently asked questions in 
an online health service for deep web 
drug users
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CASE 1: Silk Road original forum, private message, 
15 September 2013
After several years of using injected and smoked 
daily heroin I decided to quit this spring. I live in an 
Eastern Europe country where detoxification 
programs are unavailable. Doctors do not pay 
attention to heroin users and see them as scum, 
vicious people and not as ill persons. So I bought 
some methadone on Silk Road and read in some 
online books how to do this.
After several weeks I managed to detox completely 
methadone. I had read that it is normal to have 
abstinence symptoms during weeks, but it is two 
months since I finished and I have pain in all my body, 
changes of mood, sometimes diarrhea. This has not 
been improving and it is getting worse. In the last two 
weeks pain is extreme in the night and fever and 
sweating are extreme. Even I have some swollen 
nodes down my armpits and neck.
I have gone to the hospital but they discharged me 
even without doing tests and saying that this was 
abstinence from heroin (they didn’t know that I had 
used methadone and I didn’t say, but in fact I did not 
have the time to explain …). I don’t like to take more 
opiates but I can’t continue with this pain. I am 
thinking about taking methadone again, maybe 5–10 
mg/daily. Will this be enough to quit these symptoms? 
Maybe oxycodone or codeine are better options? 
Thank you in advance.
CASE 2: Silk Road original forum, 14 April 2013
Hey doctor thanks so much for offering your advice! I 
have type 1 diabetes and I am wondering if there is 
any information connected to MDMA and its effect on 
blood sugar? I have never done MDMA but am 
interested in exploring it. Would I have enough control 
over myself to realize ‘I need to test’ or should a trip 
sitter be there to remind me? Secondly, I have tripped 
in the past on LSD and mushrooms but that was 
before my diagnosis … now that I know I have to 
monitor my sugar levels to avoid issues I’m afraid I 
might become afraid or paranoid of my glucometer or 
my insulin injections under the influence … any 
recommendations on how to deal with this?
CASE 3: Silk Road 2.0 forum, 3 January 2014
I have a question about amphetamine usage.
I am in the age bracket of 20–40 and in good health. I 
use pure amphetamine between 15–70mg, 
depending on what I am using it for.
Is 70mg of pure amphetamine safe to use in one go? I 
have low tolerance and I do not go on ‘binges.’ 
Sometimes I may have a small top up, but I never go 
for more than 12–16 hours at a time.
Also, how frequently can I use it without causing harm 
to myself? I don’t normally use it more than once a 
fortnight, but sometimes I do and I was wondering if it 
is damaging to use it weekly, or even more than that?
Thanks for your time and effort.
CASE 4: Evolution forum, 12 December 2014
When taking NBomes my girlfriend gets red splotches 
on her face, legs, neck, back, an stomach 
(vasoconstriction.) It usually happens toward the end 
of the trip and gets worse when we stay up and trip all 
night. Usually redosing once. The tabs are no more 
than 1200ug each. Is there a reason this happens to 
her and not me? Is there any way to help with this? I 
know it is not life threatening unless it gets really bad 
and she gets stuck in her pants or something. (…) But 
for real. She is also anemic, does this have anything to 
do with it? Now that I think about it, it has happened 
with MDMA, and it happened on M1 as well I think 
(which was sent to me as MDMA.)
Some sample questions from an online health service for deep web drug users
At the end of 2012 and during 2013, the Energy Control 
team was aware of the growing popularity of DWMs 
through information provided by recreational drug users. 
An exploratory search of the available markets at that 
time (Silk Road, Black Market Reloaded and Sheep) 
prompted the development of the IDTS provided by 
Energy Control and focusing on DWMs.
During the first quarter of 2014, a specific protocol with 
objectives, procedures, methods and techniques was 
elaborated using TEDI (Transnational European Drug 
Information: TEDI, 2014) guidelines as a reference. All 
samples were analysed by gas chromatography–mass 
spectrometry. The fee for a simple analysis was EUR 50 
(to be paid in bitcoins). All funds raised were put back 
into running the project.
A one-year pilot project started in April 2014; drug users 
who purchase drugs in DWMs were the target 
population. Several threads in the main DWM forums 
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50 % of samples were adulterated. Levamisole was the 
adulterant most frequently detected, in 43 % (23 out of 
54) of samples. Other adulterants detected in cocaine 
samples were phenacetin in 9 % (5 out of 54), caffeine 
(1 sample) and lidocaine (1 sample). MDMA samples 
(in both pill and crystallised forms) showed high levels of 
purity, and no adulterants or other active ingredients 
were detected.
Other samples analysed were MDA and 
methamphetamine (n = 3), 2C-E, alprazolam, 
mephedrone, 2C-B, butyrfentanyl, synthetic 
cannabinoids (n = 2), clonazepam, DOB, DOET, DOM, 
DON, DXM, kratom, mescaline, methylone, midazolam, 
modafinil and pentobarbital (n = 1).
Results for MDMA pills, showing very high dosages of 
MDMA that can lead to significant adverse or toxic 
effects, are similar to those reported by other harm 
reduction groups offering drug testing programmes 
(TEDI, 2014). The high frequency of non-adulterated 
cocaine samples is also notable, although levamisole 
contamination seems to be a widespread problem, as 
reported in the rest of the global drug market.
were opened offering general information about the 
IDTS with links to a specific IDTS page on Energy 
Control’s website (12). An email address for users to 
contact the service for detailed information about the 
process was made available. After submitting samples 
for analysis, users receive a detailed report with drug 
test results and specific and individualised harm 
reduction information. Users were encouraged to engage 
with Energy Control experts by emails or in DWM forums 
in order to resolve their questions.
It is worth mentioning that this service is aimed at 
end-users and that IDTS does not accept samples from 
vendors. During the whole process, the service 
emphasises that a test result is representative of the 
analysed sample only and cannot be considered a 
quality control for any product or vendor. The use of the 
test results in DWMs as a ‘guarantee of quality’ for 
products or vendors is forbidden. Both DWMs and DWM 
forums are periodically monitored to check that test 
results have not been used in this way, but so far no 
instances of this have been found.
Between April and December 2014, a total of 342 users 
contacted IDTS asking for information about submitting 
samples for analysis. A total of 129 samples were 
analysed over this period, as shown in Figure 7.2.
Users are asked about the type of substance they 
believe they have purchased. In 120 of 129 samples 
(93 %), the main result of the analysis was consistent 
with the information provided by the user. In the 
remaining 9, the sample contained another drug, a 
mixture of substances was detected or it was not 
possible to determine the composition of the sample 
with the analytical techniques employed. The main 
results of the drug testing are shown in Table 7.2.
Cocaine was the substance most frequently submitted 
for analysis. Purity levels were high, although more than 
(12) http://energycontrol.org/noticias/528-international.html
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TABLE 7.2
Test results for samples analysed by the Energy Control International Drug Testing Service (1)
Sample n Only main compound detected Purity (m ± SD) Range
Cocaine 54 48.1 % (26/54) 70.3 ± 19.9 % 5–99 %
MDMA (crystal) 9 100 % (9/9) 91.1 ± 8.0 % 78–99 %
MDMA (pills) 8 100 % (8/8) 142.1 ± 40.2 mg 94–188 mg
Amphetamine (speed) 8 37.5 % (3/8) 51.6 ± 34.6 % 10–98 %
LSD 8 100 % (8/8) 129.7 ± 12.1 µg 107–140 µg
Cannabis resin 5 100 % (5/5) THC: 16.5 ± 7.5 %
CBD: 3.4 ± 1.5 %
THC: 9.1–16.4 %
CBD: 1.6–5.3 %
Ketamine 5 40 % (2/5) 71.3 ± 38.4% 27–95 %
(1) Samples analysed between April and December 2014. Categories with n < 5 samples not included.
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drug taken from a drug test service in Spain (2010–2012)’, 
Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical and Experimental, 
pp. 341–344.
I  Caudevilla-Gálligo, F., Riba, J., Ventura, M., et al. (2014), 
‘4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine (2C-B): presence in 
the recreational drug market in Spain, pattern of use and 
subjective effects’, Journal of Psychopharmacology 26, 
pp. 1026–1035. Published online before print 9/1/2012, 
doi: 10.1177/0269881111431752
I  Civljak, M., Stead, L. F., Hartmann-Boyce, J., Sheikh, A. and Car, 
J. (2013), ‘Internet-based interventions for smoking cessation’, 
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M. (2013), ‘Consumption of new psychoactive substances in a 
Spanish sample of research chemical users’, Human 
Psychopharmacology  28, pp. 332–340.
I  Johnson, L. A., Johnson, R. L. and Portier, R. B. (2013), ‘Current 
“legal highs” ’, Journal of Emergency Medicine 44, pp. 1108–
1115.
I  Kjellgren, A.I., Henningsson, H. and Soussan, C. (2013), 
‘Fascination and social togetherness: discussions about spice 
smoking on a Swedish Internet forum’, Substance Abuse 1, 
pp. 191–198.
I  Lefèvre, F. and Simioni, A. M. (1999), ‘Marijuana, health, 
disease, and freedom: analysis of an Internet forum’, Cadernos 
de Saúde Pública 2, pp. 161–168.
I  Månsson, J. (2014), ‘A dawning demand for a new cannabis 
policy: a study of Swedish online drug discussions’, 
International Journal of Drug Policy 25, pp. 673–681.
I  Ormsby, E. (2014), ‘The Doctor’, in Silk Road, Macmillan 
Australia, pp. 183–191.
I  Schulz, A., Stolz, T. and Berger, T. (2014), ‘Internet-based 
individually versus group guided self-help treatment for social 
anxiety disorder: protocol of a randomized controlled trial’, 
BMC Psychiatry 14, p. 115.
I  TEDI (Transnational European Drug Information) (2014), 
Fourth TEDI trend report, http://www.tediproject.org/uploads/
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I  Van Hout, M. C. and Bingham, T. (2013), ‘“Silk Road”, the virtual 
drug marketplace: a single case study of user experiences’, 
International Journal of Drug Policy 24, pp. 385–391.
Another interesting aspect is the low frequency of ‘legal 
highs’ in samples submitted for analysis. Although these 
substances are widely offered in DWMs, demand for and 
sales of these drugs are limited (Caudevilla, 2014). It is 
possible that users of ‘legal highs’ choose to buy them 
outside DWMs, owing to their easy availability via the 
surface web. An alternative explanation is that, in the 
free-market conditions provided by DWMs, users prefer 
‘established’ drugs to substitutes.
The data from IDTS support the hypothesis that 
substance purity is much higher in DWMs than in the 
global illicit drug markets. However, results from IDTS 
are not necessarily representative of the market as a 
whole and there are methodological biases derived from 
sample selection.
I Conclusion
It seems likely that DWMs will continue to exist in the 
future and that their importance will probably increase. 
At the time of writing, there are at least 10 fully operative 
active markets with similar characteristics to Silk Road. 
DWMs are developing, and are now available using 
software other than Tor, such as I2P, or as open 
decentralised markets, such as OpenBazaar. DWMs 
seem to be a rapidly evolving, complex phenomenon 
with the potential to bring about major changes in drug 
markets. This new reality requires harm reduction 
strategies to be adapted if they are to successfully meet 
their objectives.
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I Introduction
Cybercrime has been an issue for law enforcement 
services in Europe since the early 1970s. Traditionally, a 
distinction has been made between cybercrime in a 
broad sense (computer-assisted crime) and cybercrime 
in a narrower sense (computer-focused crime) (Furnell, 
2002). The first category includes crimes in which 
computers are used in the criminal process: fraud, theft 
or threats over the internet, for example, but also spying, 
or distributing child pornography. The second category, 
cybercrime in the narrow sense, comprises crimes such 
as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or 
hacking, in which the computer or software itself is 
targeted.
The category of cybercrime in a broad sense also 
includes drug trafficking on cryptomarkets. There is 
considerable variation in the extent to which law 
enforcement services in Europe perceive the necessity 
of tackling the drug trade on the deep web. The question 
of how best to combat this phenomenon has not been 
discussed extensively at international events.
This chapter compares the cryptomarket drug trade with 
the conventional drug trade, describes how the various 
law enforcement services are combating the drug trade 
and assesses the effectiveness of their approach. 
Finally, it indicates on the basis of these findings how the 
approach to the drug trade on the dark web might look in 
the future.
I  The drug problem in Europe
From a law enforcement perspective, Europe’s drug 
problem can be characterised as the trafficking and use 
of cocaine, opioids (e.g. heroin), cannabis, and synthetic 
drugs and new psychoactive substances. Europe is a 
major destination for controlled substances and also 
plays a more limited role as a transit point for drugs en 
route to other regions. In addition, Europe is also a 
producing region for cannabis and synthetic drugs. 
Whereas virtually all the cannabis produced in Europe is 
intended for local consumption, synthetic drugs 
(including new psychoactive substances) are also 
manufactured for export to other regions (EMCDDA, 
2014).
In Europe, the law enforcement approach to drug-related 
problems has traditionally focused on large-scale trading 
by organised criminal groups operating at the 
international level, on the one hand, and on street 
dealing that causes public nuisance and health risks, on 
the other. In most national drugs legislation in the 
European Union, the emphasis is on the difference 
between offences related to possession of drugs for 
personal use and those related to the production and 
trafficking of drugs.
The trade in drugs over the dark net through 
cryptomarkets started in 2009 with a handful of 
websites that operated quietly, such as The Drug Store 
and Farmer’s Market (Heintz, 2012). Their successors, 
such as Silk Road, were less discreet and seemed not to 
regard the risk of intervention by the authorities as a 
serious threat. Today, the turnover of the internet drug 
trade is considerable. It has been estimated that Dutch 
drug traders alone have an annual turnover of almost 
EUR 30 million from cryptomarkets (Kooistra, 2014). It is 
not surprising then, that the authorities, particularly in 
Europe, the United States and Australia, feel the need to 
intervene.
I  Similarities and differences between actual and digital marketplaces
The business of drug trading can be subdivided into 
the component processes of production, wholesale 
trade, transport, intermediary trade and retail trade. In 
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The transportation of the drugs, too, has seen few 
changes at the level of wholesale consignments. 
Shipping containers, air freight and couriers all remain 
popular methods of transporting drugs. The customs 
authorities in Western Europe and Australia do, however, 
estimate from the numbers of drug shipments they have 
intercepted in parcels that the use of parcel post for 
transporting drugs has increased sharply as a result of 
sales through cryptomarkets.
At the level of brokering, cryptomarkets increasingly 
seem to be playing a role. This can be deduced from the 
fact that many drugs vendors actively draw attention to 
the possibility of buying large quantities from 
cryptomarkets. Examples are also known from criminal 
investigations in the Netherlands and other countries, of 
buyers first purchasing small quantities of drugs and 
then, once a degree of trust has been established 
between the vendor and the purchaser, proceeding to 
purchase a large consignment for trade. In one of these 
cases, the purchaser drove from Scandinavia to the 
Netherlands to collect the drugs from the vendor by car.
The interaction between the retail trader and the 
purchaser or user does differ significantly from 
conventional street dealing. In many cases, there is no 
longer any face-to-face contact when the user receives 
the drugs. The retailer receives an order over the dark 
web and then sends off the drugs by post. His or her 
activities mainly consist in checking the orders, 
packaging the goods and delivering the parcel to a 
carrier. The buyer receives the parcel at home or has it 
delivered to a different address and collects it there. 
Payment generally takes place in bitcoins. As yet, 
criminal investigations have seldom, if ever, encountered 
the use of another cryptocurrency. Incidentally, there has 
also been a case of a buyer from the United States 
ordering a whole series of synthetic drug consignments 
from a supplier in the Netherlands over the dark web and 
paying with cash. The money was posted in envelopes to 
various addresses in the Netherlands and then collected 
by the supplier. Using a cryptocurrency is an obvious way 
to make payments in the drug trade over the dark web, 
but it is not a prerequisite.
One important advantage of buying and selling drugs via 
a cryptomarket is that the buyer and seller remain 
anonymous and thus do not have to worry about 
violence, extortion or robbery. Whereas the conventional 
drug trade is built on power and violent force, in the 
anonymous world of the deep web this is not an issue. 
However, there is another side to this anonymity: 
potential newcomers to these markets may feel 
extremely uncomfortable about not knowing who they 
are dealing with and who they are entrusting their 
order to serve as a hub, or ‘governal node’, within this 
process, an organisation must have the following four 
elements at its disposal: mentalities, technologies, 
resources and institutions (Burris et al., 2005). This 
applies to both conventional criminal organisations 
and players in the cryptomarkets, although they are 
very different in nature. Where the conventional 
organisations are characterised by collective attitudes 
and predisposition, the cryptomarkets often pride 
themselves on organisational charters of an idealistic 
bent, which even allude to universal human rights and 
libertarian values. The court proceedings against Ross 
Ulbricht, founder of Silk Road, show a rather less 
attractive picture. Ulbricht stands accused of accruing 
the sum of USD 60 million from drug trading through 
Silk Road and of subsequently laundering this money. 
He is also alleged to have offered a contract killer 
USD 80 000 to deal with one of his enemies. However, 
the supposed contract killer turned out to be an 
undercover officer. Unexpectedly, at the trial in 
January 2015, Ulbricht tried to palm off responsibility 
for managing Silk Road onto Mark Karpless, CEO of Mt 
Gox, the company that owned 70 % of the bitcoin 
trade in 2014. In a separate court case, Karpless is 
accused of ‘disappearing’ USD 450 million worth of 
bitcoins. Thus, the trade on cryptomarkets involves 
not only the illicit drug trade itself, but also other 
criminal behaviour characteristic of the conventional 
drug trade.
The rise of internet sales, and more specifically 
cryptomarkets, has entailed only limited changes to the 
criminal business process. The production end of the 
process — whether of cocaine in South America, opiates 
in countries such as Afghanistan, or MDMA and 
cannabis in Western Europe — has, as yet, not really 
been affected by the introduction of cryptomarkets to 
the chain. If a European organised criminal group wishes 
to order a large consignment of heroin or cocaine in the 
source country, there is face-to-face contact between 
mandated representatives of the supplying and receiving 
criminal organisations. The basis for this trade is trust 
and creditworthiness, coupled with a ruthless system of 
sanctions if the purchasing party does not keep its side 
of the agreement. Numerous gangland killings occur in 
Europe as a result of drug transports that have gone 
wrong. Owing to these mores and the enormous 
financial interests that hinge on the success of each 
transaction, it is not likely that the primary negotiations 
will take place over the deep web. What we do see 
increasingly in European police investigations into 
criminal organisations, including those involved in the 
drug trade, is that communication between and within 
the organisations is carried out using encrypted internet 
facilities.
CHAPTER 8 I The drug trade on the deep web: a law enforcement perspective
79
The buyer or consumer who buys goods on a 
cryptomarket can browse various seller pages to 
compare products. The buyer sets up a buyer account, 
free of charge, from which cryptocurrency can be 
transferred. After the purchase transaction, the buyer 
can indicate on the site whether the product and/or 
service met expectations.
Other, less prominent, players in the field of 
cryptomarkets include internet service providers, which 
host cryptomarkets, and web design companies, which 
may be called on to design professional cryptomarket 
sites for vendors. There also seems to be a deep web 
marketing organisation that offers expert marketing and 
advertising services for vendors (DeepDotWeb, 2014).
Payment can take two forms. The buyer can transfer the 
money owed directly to the vendor or can transfer it to 
the administrator (in escrow), who then releases the sum 
to the vendor once authorised by the buyer (after he or 
she has received the drugs). In the case of a large 
website, the sums the administrator holds in escrow can 
mount up. As in the traditional criminal world, here too it 
is a relatively common occurrence for third parties to 
steal the money (by hacking, for example) or for 
administrators to make off with the cryptocurrency 
themselves.
Some users of cryptomarkets view themselves as 
defending civil liberties and opposing government 
meddling. The terms ‘crypto-libertarian’ and ‘crypto-
anarchist’ are used in this context (Curran and Gibson, 
2013). These users see themselves as upstanding, 
law-abiding citizens who do not agree with the 
criminalisation of drug use and believe it should be a 
matter of individual choice. For this reason, they find it 
legitimate to use crypto-techniques to evade the 
‘meddlesome’ authorities. The players on the 
cryptomarket go to great lengths to distinguish 
themselves from the conventional drug trade. In their 
communications, they emphasise their strong norms 
and values to justify their actions. In this vein, several 
vendors espouse harm reduction programmes and fair 
trade principles. However, the big money involved is a 
significant pull factor, and this market, like all trade 
markets, is attractive for criminals with less noble 
objectives.
One reason cryptomarkets can operate so ‘successfully’ 
is that they employ strict self-regulation. Both the 
cryptomarket administrators and moderators ensure that 
buyers and sellers comply with the rules imposed on 
them. This is reinforced by the application of sanctions, 
such as withdrawal of a user account.
bitcoins or drugs to. From this point of view, street 
dealing, in which drugs and money change hands 
simultaneously, is easier to keep track of. A related issue 
is that if a buyer or seller is duped by fraud or theft on a 
cryptomarket, it is virtually impossible to call the 
perpetrator to account. Another disadvantage of 
anonymity is that there is always a reasonable chance 
that a buyer is actually selling to an undercover police 
officer.
I Differences in the key players
If we are to devise an effective European law 
enforcement strategy in this area, it is important to 
thoroughly understand the workings of the criminal 
business process. As stated above, virtual marketplaces 
where buyers and vendors meet and do business 
together are an established forum, alongside the regular 
marketplaces that street dealers have been using for 
decades. In order to develop an effective strategy that 
will enable us to influence the sale of drugs, and the 
safety and security problems generated by the drug 
trade, it is important to know the profiles of the key 
players and what motivates them.
Let us examine the most important players within 
cryptomarkets.
The administrator is the manager of the website and 
determines what takes place on the site. He or she is 
responsible for authorising accounts, making new 
product categories, and permitting or forbidding the sale 
of certain products. One of the administrator’s most 
important tasks is to ensure effective shielding. The 
administrator also fulfils the role of treasurer with regard 
to cryptocurrency. If approached by the police, the 
administrator is likely to take the stance that he or she 
facilitates the marketplace but is not responsible for the 
trade that takes place.
The moderator operates under the administrator. He or 
she has limited access to the website infrastructure and 
user information. The moderator’s most important tasks 
are to answer questions from users and to scan for 
fraudulent deals.
The vendor registers with a website to be permitted to 
sell illegal goods through it. For this purpose, the vendor 
designs a seller page to offer the goods to prospective 
buyers. The vendor pays the administrator a fee of a few 
hundred euros for this service. In addition, the vendor 
pays the administrator a small percentage commission 
on each sale.
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arrested by the FBI as the suspected owner of the 
website. During Ulbricht’s trial in January 2015, the US 
prosecutor estimated the total turnover of Silk Road 
since it was set up at 9.5 million bitcoins (the equivalent 
of approximately EUR 1 billion). A month after Silk Road 
was shut down, Silk Road 2.0 was launched.
In February 2014, the Dutch police arrested five Dutch 
citizens after an undercover operation, Operation 
Commodore. Undercover agents managed to establish 
online contact with the main suspect behind Ruud.nl 
and subsequently arranged a meeting with him. The 
police took down the website Black Market Reloaded 
and put another website, Utopia, offline after just a week. 
The German police seized servers in Bochum and 
Düsseldorf. In the course of this operation, it emerged 
that, in addition to his online contacts, the main suspect 
also approached potential clients in the traditional 
manner. In Operation Commodore, there was little sign 
of the strict distinction between players on the 
cryptomarkets and drugs dealers in the ‘regular’ drug 
trade.
On 6 November 2014, Europol reported that an 
internationally coordinated police operation had taken 
place, Operation Onymous, in which law enforcement 
agencies all over the world worked together under the 
leadership of the FBI. In Europe, the network that existed 
as a result of Project ITOM (Illegal Trade on Online 
Marketplaces) (Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, 
2014) was used to organise this operation. Hundreds of 
web domains were seized, according to Europol. 
Seventeen arrests were made, in seventeen countries, 
and more than a dozen black market websites were 
taken down, including Silk Road 2.0, Cloud 9, Hydra, 
Pandora, Blue Sky and Black Market. A total of 414 onion 
domains were seized.
The most important objective of these interventions, 
which focused on the largest cryptomarkets, was to put 
specific marketplaces out of action for good and to 
arrest and prosecute those responsible for drug trading. 
As in the fight against conventional drug trafficking, in 
tackling cryptomarkets the police attempt to confiscate 
the greatest possible proportion of assets obtained in 
the drug trade. In the case of Silk Road, they confiscated 
26 000 bitcoins, worth EUR 2.5 million, and in Operation 
Commodore, 900 bitcoins, worth EUR 400 000. 
Operation Onymous included takedowns of money 
laundering websites such as Cash Machine, Cash Flow, 
Golden Nugget and Fast Cash. The police also 
confiscated USD 1 million in bitcoin, and USD 250 000 
in cash.
One important question that occupies police and judicial 
authorities is whether the individuals who sell on the 
cryptomarket fit the same profile as that of street 
dealers. Have street dealers switched to the 
cryptomarket, and, if so, what advantages did they 
expect from this switch? Or are drug sellers on the deep 
web completely different from street dealers? Do they 
form a new group on the criminal market? What are the 
characteristics of these people, and what are their 
motives?
We can ask similar questions about the buyers. Did the 
people who are now buying drugs over the deep web 
previously buy drugs in the traditional way, or did they 
start buying drugs because of the ease of buying them 
over the deep web, which entails fewer risks? Is the 
profile of these buyers similar to the profile of drugs 
buyers in the traditional market? When it comes to 
combating this phenomenon, and particularly in 
determining priorities, it is relevant to know if there are 
differences between these two types of buyers from the 
point of view of problem drug use. European law 
enforcement has little expertise in profiling of this kind. It 
will be necessary to carry out further criminological and 
other research in this area to obtain a more thorough 
understanding of the phenomenon.
I  Strategy thus far in combating drug trading over the deep web
From an international perspective, until now law 
enforcement has focused its efforts in combating the 
drug trade over the deep web on dismantling websites 
that offer drugs for sale and on apprehending buyers 
with a higher than average turnover. The underlying 
assumption is that the website is indispensable as a 
sales platform and is difficult to replace because of the 
shielding requirements. The thinking is also that if the 
authorities take down a website, this may remove the 
anonymity of buyers and sellers, and thus make the 
marketplace less attractive to use. Although parcels 
containing drugs are intercepted and confiscated daily 
during customs checks, criminal prosecution of sellers 
has as yet been extremely limited in Europe.
The first website to sell drugs on a large scale was Silk 
Road. This online black market began its operations in 
February 2011. In March 2013, The Guardian counted 
10 000 articles for sale on Silk Road, of which an 
estimated 70 % were drugs. In October 2013, Silk Road 
was ‘defaced’ (confiscated and stamped with a law 
enforcement notice), and Ross William Ulbricht was 
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It is no longer enough for vendors to deposit a sum of 
money with the site administrator. The newer sites 
require potential new vendors to be introduced by 
someone the administrator already knows in order to be 
admitted. The prospective seller’s history on the deep 
web is also considered.
Administrators have learned from the law enforcement 
operations that brought down Silk Road and Silk 
Road 2.0. Far from the impenetrable fortress it was once 
thought to be, the Tor Network has proved vulnerable. 
For this reason, investments in security measures to 
combat outside intervention have gone up (Van Buskirk 
et al., 2014).
The intended effect of removing a large proportion of the 
cryptomarkets available was not achieved, because a 
whole range of new drug supply sites popped up within 
no time. Even after Operation Onymous, major websites 
such as Agora, Evolution and Andromeda continued their 
activities. This does not mean, however, that the 
operations had no effect. Trust in the cryptomarkets took 
a hit, an effect that was only reinforced by the fact that 
newcomers to the market are not exactly known for their 
trustworthiness.
I  Recommendations for law enforcement
The issue of illicit drugs is multifaceted. At the global or 
even the European level, the approach to this complex 
issue varies widely from place to place. There is little 
disagreement on the need to tackle producers, major 
dealers and middlemen. The negative effects of their 
actions have such a strong impact that police 
crackdowns enjoy broad support. Policy on users is 
where the big differences are found. Some EU countries 
consider drug users criminals, while others treat the 
issue as a health problem. In the latter case, prevention, 
treatment and damage control take priority over tracking 
users down. Law enforcement is primarily charged with 
the repressive part of the approach.
Now that cryptomarkets are becoming popular forums 
for the drug trade, the question arises of whether or not 
they will edge out the brokers and street dealers. From a 
business perspective, a direct link between producers 
and users might mean more money and less risk for 
those involved.
Criminal groups that reap major profits from their 
position as brokers are accustomed to using violence to 
I  Intended effects and actual effects of law enforcement activities
The interventions described above were intended to 
break through the aura of anonymity and the associated 
sense of untouchability. In the case of illegal proceeds, 
the aim of the interventions was to confiscate assets 
obtained in the drug trade. With regard to 
cryptocurrency, the aim was to seize large quantities of 
bitcoins, thus making it less attractive to use 
cryptocurrency for purchases on cryptomarkets.
It was difficult for law enforcement to foresee what 
effects these interventions would have. In the 
conventional drug trade, the arrest of a street dealer 
usually results in a competitor moving in to take his 
place. If the arrest was combined with closing the café 
the dealer operated out of, for example, the arrest might 
have longer-lasting effects. If enforcement was stepped 
up in the area and prevention programmes implemented, 
then a long-term effect might be achieved. However, 
predicting how those involved would respond to 
intervention in the cryptomarkets was trickier. Would the 
current actors lose faith in this system to such an extent 
that cryptomarket activity would decline in favour of 
street dealing? The lack of any previous experience with 
this new system, combined with the absence of solid 
sociological and social science data on the actors 
involved, makes the effect difficult to gauge.
After the fall of Silk Road, numerous websites tried to 
take over its market share, but many of these were 
short-lived. Problems with site security and instances of 
fraud among key players meant that the online market 
was much less stable than in the Silk Road period. It is 
now clear what choices buyers and sellers have when a 
cryptomarket site is brought down by the authorities:
1.  they move to another, existing site on an individual 
basis;
2.  the group of buyers and sellers set up a new 
cryptomarket as soon as possible, where the same 
‘community’, or group of users, can continue to 
trade; or
3. they cease buying and selling on cryptomarkets.
The combined effects of mutual dependence, the risks 
involved in switching to an unknown cryptomarket, and 
the pressing need to buy drugs make option 2 the most 
appealing.
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 n Seize cryptocurrency wherever possible and 
dismantle cryptocurrency facilities that make it 
possible to make or receive payments for drugs.
 n Confiscate goods paid for with the proceeds of crime.
 n Invest in big data techniques, in order to link vendor 
nicknames and internet activity with certain IP 
addresses.
 n Convince internet service providers that unknowingly 
host cryptomarkets to stop, by entering into public–
private partnerships with ISPs. Tackle conscious 
facilitators (such as bulletproof hosts) by means of 
permit regulations or criminal prosecution, to ensure 
that providing this service is no longer profitable.
 n Professionalise checks on parcel post to greatly 
reduce the odds of successfully shipping drugs by 
mail, a move that would hit both the conventional and 
the internet drug trade.
 n Develop a strategy to diminish the trust of vendors 
and buyers in the reliability of cryptomarkets.
In selecting a law enforcement strategy, anticipating 
cryptomarket developments is key. A new challenge will 
be the decentralised marketplaces. In a decentralised 
set-up, no one owns the marketplace itself or is 
responsible for it; instead, it is a platform that individual 
vendors can use free of charge.
For libertarians with an idealised view of the 
cryptomarket drug trade, one can draw a parallel with 
cannabis in the Netherlands. An extremely liberal policy 
towards cannabis use led to a great number of 
‘coffeeshops’ springing up in the Netherlands, where, 
under certain government-determined conditions, 
cannabis could be sold in small quantities for personal 
use. These days, the vast majority of cannabis 
production has been taken over by organised crime. The 
relaxed atmosphere and 1960s sentiment has made way 
for contract killings, extortion, and human trafficking and 
slave labour associated with cannabis production. It is 
estimated that at least 85 % of the cannabis grown in the 
Netherlands is exported. Criminal groups that were once 
active in the ecstasy trade have moved into cannabis, 
have made millions in profits and consider themselves 
untouchable. Outlaw motorcycle gangs such as the Hells 
Angels have also managed to get their hands on a 
sizeable proportion of the market. Their behaviour 
undermines law-abiding society and sets a bad example 
for the new generation. The innocence of the late 20th 
century has vanished.
defend or expand their share of the market. The risk is 
that these groups will not accept ‘their’ livelihood being 
taken away. Ongoing investigations show that 
cryptomarket sales are not limited to quantities for 
personal use. One vendor, HollandBest, offers special 
prices for bulk orders of more than 5 000 ecstasy pills. 
Another vendor, Dutchmarket, states that it is ‘open to 
negotiations’ on orders involving more than 500 g of 
cannabis, or over 1 000 ecstasy pills (1).
Proponents of cryptomarkets for the drug trade claim 
that their growth has nothing but advantages. The buyer 
or user faces lower risks because the quality of drugs 
can be better assessed through the system of feedback. 
The sites provide data on each vendor, including the 
number of transactions made, product quality and the 
level of service provided. Vendors cannot block or edit 
comments posted by buyers. The fact that vendors 
strongly encourage customers to voice any complaints 
directly shows that they do indeed fear the impact that 
negative comments in the feedback system can have on 
their business. The feedback system is not immune to 
manipulation, however. Vendors cannot change 
feedback posted by their buyers, but competitors are 
free to post negative feedback. Furthermore, vendors 
themselves can post sham feedback on deals that never 
took place to boost their creditworthiness score.
Another frequently cited advantage of cryptomarket drug 
deals over conventional drug dealing involves the 
absence of the violence and public nuisance so endemic 
to street dealing. A third common argument made by 
proponents is that the drug trade on cryptomarkets does 
not involve physical confrontations. This may be true, but 
the illicit drug trade has considerable negative effects. 
Morris (2013) indicates that the proliferation of 
cryptomarkets is unlikely to reduce the most serious 
forms of systemic drug crime, such as political 
corruption and violence.
From a perspective of feasibility and broad-based public 
support, the following approach is recommended for law 
enforcement in the coming years:
 n Continue the current work of combating the main 
cryptomarkets, focusing on administrators and 
moderators.
 n Prosecute the main vendors who, judging from the 
quantities ordered, operate as middlemen on 
cryptomarkets.
(1) http://www.volskrant.nl/binnenland/hoe-online-coffeeshops-een-
milijoenenomzet-draaien~a3757208
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As long as the production of and trade in drugs continue 
to be considered criminal acts in most of the Western 
world, and as long as the proceeds remain sufficiently 
high in relation to production costs to secure immense 
profits, organised crime will continue to be involved in 
this market. The percentage of the total drug trade 
represented by cryptomarket trade is as yet too limited 
to affect the profits of the larger organised criminal 
groups. If cryptomarket turnover were to increase 
substantially, then organised crime could be expected to 
annex the marketplaces. The idea that far-reaching 
security techniques would be able to prevent the 
influence of organised crime strikes may be naive. Given 
that criminal groups already use private servers and 
protected networks for communicating within the group, 
it is not inconceivable that they might move into 
managing their own cryptomarkets. Those in control of 
production can — by waging a price war while 
manipulating the payment system and competitors’ 
feedback — squeeze other suppliers out of 
cryptomarkets. If the number of cryptomarket suppliers 
remains at current levels, or if the popularity of this form 
of drug trade declines, then the likelihood is that mafia-
type criminal organisations will not consider it worth 
their while to intervene. From a law enforcement 
perspective, this is the most important argument for 
combating the sale of drugs on cryptomarkets. That way, 
we could put a stop to online criminal refuges, as well as 
all the other negative fallout from conventional drug 
crime in the virtual domain, with its concomitant effects 
on upstanding virtual citizens.
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I Introduction
There is a consensus that the internet has expanded 
possibilities for drug supply and trafficking. The aim of 
this chapter is to present, from a criminological 
perspective, how the use of the internet has affected the 
different stages of drug trafficking (particularly the 
distribution stage) in relation to different types of 
recreational drugs. In particular, it will examine how the 
use of the internet is affecting the modus operandi of 
suppliers and their interactions with criminal peers and 
clients in numerous ways. Research indicates that drug 
markets have become — even if to a different extent — 
hybrid markets that combine the traditional social and 
economic opportunity structures with the new 
opportunities provided by the internet. Furthermore, not 
only has the internet opened the way for new criminal 
actors, but it has also reconfigured relations among 
suppliers, intermediaries and buyers.
I Going cyber? The state of the art
The commercialisation of the internet, like any other 
technological change, modifies the environment in which 
crime operates, the opportunity structures available to 
criminals and the dynamics of criminal activities. An 
increasing number of investigative reports underline that 
the internet is a tool exploited by criminals in 
transnational trafficking flows, first and foremost in drug 
trafficking. Europol’s EU serious and organised crime 
threat assessment (Europol, 2013) states that the 
internet has facilitated interaction between customers 
and suppliers and enabled the creation of a virtual 
subculture. Similarly, reports from the EMCDDA (2014) 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) (2014) emphasise the growing role of the 
internet and specifically of the deep web in the supply of 
drugs. The EMCDDA and Europol (2013) identified 
several features of online drug markets. In addition to 
pointing out the existence of various hotspots in the 
deep web where sellers can benefit from anonymous 
communication, the report underlines that the internet 
allows for different methods of payment, including virtual 
currencies. It also enables buyers to review the quality of 
drugs, sellers to build an online reputation and 
newcomers to access information that makes their 
entrance into the criminal market easier.
The use of the internet as a facilitator for drug supply and 
trafficking is also receiving increasing attention from the 
academic community. Over the last 15 years, the 
literature on internet-facilitated drug trafficking has 
highlighted the role of the internet as a facilitator of 
communications in the trafficking process owing to the 
enhanced possibilities for anonymity. Recent studies 
underline how suppliers at different levels are using new 
technologies not only to communicate through 
encrypted messages (hindering the work of law 
enforcement agencies), but also to deliver and distribute 
their products more effectively (Walsh, 2011; Christin, 
2012). Researchers have explored vendor accounts in 
online marketplaces and described the possibilities that 
the internet offers for operating in a high-profit and 
relatively secure infrastructure (van Hout and Bingham, 
2014). Potential changes to drug distribution networks 
have also been discussed (Martin, 2014). In a nutshell, in 
addition to facilitating the drug business, as any other 
communication tool could, the internet seems to have 
affected the drug market — as it has other commodity 
markets — in a deeper way, allowing buyers and sellers 
to exchange information and products very easily.
Most analyses focus on the use of the internet to reach 
clients in the deep web, and more and more research is 
being done on the use of cryptomarkets for trading drugs 
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014; Martin, 2014). Silk 
Road, a website housed on the Tor Network and taken 
down by the FBI in 2013, is the most studied online drug 
marketplace (see, among others, Barratt, 2012; Christin, 
2013). Although Silk Road has been described as ‘an 
eBay for drugs’ (Barratt, 2012), emphasising its 
popularity among drug consumers making personal 
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States, it was possible to identify nine major types of 
criminal opportunity that the internet, and specifically 
the surface web, provide for drug trafficking: 
communicative, informational, technical, managerial, 
organisational, promotional, persuasive, marketing/
loyalty-building, and countermeasure opportunities. It 
was possible to observe how the use of the internet 
affects all phases of the trafficking chain — namely 
production (cultivation of plant-based drugs and/or 
production of chemicals), transit (passage through local 
and/or international middlemen, criminal networks and 
local retailers) and distribution (to the end-user) — albeit 
to different extents.
Among other findings, it was clear that, especially with 
regard to the transit and distribution stages, the internet 
offered the possibility of making drug trafficking less risky 
by enabling several phases of the criminal activity to be 
managed without interacting with anyone. Before use of 
the internet became commonplace, for instance, a 
criminal network had to be sophisticated and organised 
enough to be able to employ large-scale corruption, 
particularly in the transit and distribution phases, where 
dubious operations could be spotted by law-abiding 
citizens who might alert authorities. Nowadays, by 
contrast, online booking and online parcel tracking 
systems provide a safer way for criminals to arrange and 
track the supply process and to advertise their products. 
Moreover, given that for drug traders operating online it is 
easier and less risky to contact potential customers in a 
wide range of cyber-hotspots (that is, places where 
interactions among different actors involved in drug 
trafficking are facilitated) without having to meet them in 
person, suppliers can take full advantage of the 
anonymity that the internet provides. In this way, their 
online reputation is unrelated to their identity in the 
physical world. Online payment systems and virtual 
currencies are used by customers to hinder police 
detection and to avoid direct contact with drug dealers.
Overall, as regards communicative opportunities, 
internet phone services such as Skype are heavily used 
to avoid wiretapping. The internet is also used by 
traffickers to set up counterstrategy measures. 
Offenders generally seem to be very aware of and 
cautious about taking risks while operating online. For 
instance, during recent investigations it emerged that IP 
addresses were verified by criminals to be sure that the 
person they were interacting with online was a real 
potential customer and not, for instance, an undercover 
law enforcement officer (Lavorgna, 2014, 2015b).
It is worth mentioning the persuasive and marketing/
loyalty-building opportunities offered by the internet. As 
explained by Lusthaus (2012), criminals operating on the 
use-sized purchases, Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2014) 
recently found that, although in most cases drugs were 
sold at prices consistent with purchases for personal 
use, a meaningful proportion of sales on Silk Road were 
best characterised as ‘business-to-business’ and key Silk 
Road customers were probably retail drug dealers 
sourcing stock for local street operations (see 
Chapter 2). Dolliver (2015) started looking at Silk 
Road 2.0, another online market that was launched soon 
after the Silk Road takedown (and which has recently 
also been seized). Specifically, she compared the 
metrics of Silk Road 2.0 to those of Silk Road to 
determine if there were signs of the presence of more 
sophisticated drug trafficking operations in the new 
marketplace. Findings, however, indicated not only that 
Silk Road 2.0 was smaller than the original one (with the 
United States being the number one origin and 
destination country for drug sales), but also that it was 
not intended as a drug market only: drug items 
constituted only 19 % of the total percentage of active 
items for sale, and, when considering the historical total 
number of transactions, drugs accounted for only 1 %. 
However, the growing popularity of other online 
marketplaces in the deep web (such as Agora, Abraxas 
and Outlaw to name just a few) suggests that the 
problem of the exploitation of the deep web for drug 
trafficking is ongoing and has certainly not been solved 
by the takedowns of the original Silk Road and Silk 
Road 2.0. Suffice to say that Silk Road Reloaded was 
subsequently released and made accessible through the 
I2P software.
The role of the surface web in drug trafficking and 
particularly the ways in which the internet is exploited 
throughout the trafficking chain have been seldom 
considered. As a consequence, although there is general 
agreement that online marketplaces for drugs have 
increasingly been used over recent years and will be 
used even more in the future, the extent to which the use 
of the internet is reconfiguring drug trafficking overall is 
still open to debate.
I  The internet as a facilitator: identifying criminal opportunities and their impact
In a recent study, the author aimed to gain an increased 
understanding of how the use of the internet is 
facilitating drug trafficking and the extent to which it is 
changing the criminal landscape (Lavorgna, 2014). By 
systematically analysing investigative cases of drug 
trafficking in some EU countries and in the United 
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exploit legal loopholes, as exemplified in what is 
probably the oldest investigation, carried out in Italy in 
2003, regarding internet-facilitated drug trafficking: 
various types of synthetic drugs, new psychoactive 
substances and chemical precursors were ordered 
online from four Dutch websites and delivered to Italian 
buyers by ordinary mail. In eight months of investigation, 
about 1 000 packages were intercepted at Milan post 
offices, ordered by a total of 235 Italians, many of whom 
were underage. The Dutch websites were adamant that 
they did not have responsibility for the legal 
consequences of their sales in other countries (Polizia di 
Stato, n.a.).
For new psychoactive substances, the surface web plays 
a major role. From a simple Google search, several 
websites and forums can be identified offering 
information on both offline and online places to buy 
drugs, prices, how to cultivate plant-based drugs and 
how to manufacture synthetic drugs. Information about 
legislation and law enforcement attitudes (for instance, 
whether or not it is safe to bribe agents and to what 
extent restrictive legislation is enforced in a certain 
country) can also be easily found (Lavorgna, 2014). 
Overall, offenders do not even bother to move to the 
deep web to advertise their products, as the risk of their 
being caught remains minimal, given the enormity of the 
environment to be controlled, and the impression is that 
law enforcement operations dealing with these types of 
illicit trade reach only the tip of the iceberg (Lavorgna, 
2015b). The need to contact potential clients seems to 
overcome the need to conceal trafficking activity where 
the drug trade is in a ‘grey area’ (as with new 
psychoactive substances) or is perceived by a relatively 
large part of the population as not socially reprehensible 
(as with cannabis).
I Different patterns for controlled drugs
Regarding drugs under international control, the internet 
has not affected the opportunity structure in the initial 
stages of the trade substantially, probably because 
producers and drug dealers generally rely on already 
established opportunity structures for their businesses. 
Specifically, most drug producers and dealers still rely 
on their existing networks rather than on the internet to 
get in contact with local middlemen and retailers. When 
it comes to the trafficking of controlled drugs, therefore, 
the internet is used as a facilitator, particularly for 
communication and in the final phases of the trafficking 
chain.
internet have developed a range of mechanisms to 
create and reinforce trust in their online activities. In the 
case of drug trafficking, the internet is used to reassure 
(potential) buyers about the anonymity and the secrecy 
of the sale, and as a retention tool for both new and old 
clients. For instance, membership discounts are offered 
to regular buyers to increase their loyalty, and new 
potential buyers are targeted by appealing to their sense 
of belonging to certain social communities online 
(Lavorgna, 2014, 2015a). Moreover, it should be kept in 
mind that the peculiarities of cyberspace are likely to 
have an impact also on users: ‘virtuality’ is considered to 
be a crime facilitator, since ‘the warning signals that 
might deter or frighten a young person in the real world 
are minimized, and the filtering process by which an 
individual moves into physical contact with a criminal 
organization disappears’ (INCB, 2011, p. 4).
To understand the effects the internet is having on drug 
trafficking in more detail, however, a distinction between 
cannabis and new psychoactive substances (new drugs, 
in pure form or in a preparation, that are not controlled 
under international drug control treaties but which may 
pose a public health threat comparable to that posed by 
controlled drugs), on the one hand, and drugs under 
international control, on the other, is necessary.
I  New psychoactive substances: hidden in plain sight
Generally speaking, although nowadays every type of 
drug can be found online, the internet seems to have 
boosted the market for new psychoactive substances in 
particular. For these substances, which have become 
more pervasive in the last few years than illicit drugs 
under international control (UNODC, 2013), the internet 
has become a major distribution point. As shown in 
Lavorgna (2014), the use of the internet has allowed 
criminals to arrange most phases of their activity directly 
from the destination country, from buying substances or 
chemicals online to selling the final products both in the 
deep web and in the surface web under the guise of licit 
products such as plant food and house deodorisers.
A major problem is that, in the case of new psychoactive 
substances, it is not always easy to draw a clear line 
between what is legal and what is not, given that some 
substances may also have a legitimate use, and some 
may even be legal in certain jurisdictions. In a context 
where each EU Member State has a different national 
approach to drug policies and advocates different 
solutions for tackling drug problems, offenders may 
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the possibility of managing almost all the phases of the 
trafficking activity efficiently from afar, can organise 
(almost) all stages of drug trafficking on their own, rather 
than relying on complex criminal networks. Moreover, if 
we consider how organised crime groups behave in 
cyberspace, we have to take into consideration that 
differences between the physical world and cyberspace 
could prevent criminal organisations that have proven 
successful in the real world being equally effective 
online (Lavorgna, 2015b). Indeed, the use of the internet 
has simplified the trafficking chain by reducing the 
organisational layers that are necessary: for instance, 
drugs ordered online are now delivered via mail, 
eliminating the need to rely on members of the criminal 
network. This is true especially when looser groups 
operate in areas where there is not a strong presence of 
endogenous sophisticated criminal networks already 
involved in the trafficking business.
At least potentially, in cyberspace criminal behaviour 
‘cuts across a wide spectrum of society’ (Jaishankar, 
2009, p. 289); in fact, offenders’ ages and skill levels can 
be very difficult to determine, and most average people 
could hypothetically join a criminal group or start a 
criminal career on their own. Moreover, because of the 
so-called ‘online disinhibition effect’ (Suler, 2004), 
people in cyberspace behave with less restraint than in 
the physical world. It has been hypothesised that there is 
a risk of ‘amateurisation’ of drug-related crime, meaning 
that ordinary people (both users and potential drug 
chemists) without specific criminal contacts can easily 
locate drug suppliers (INCB, 2011) and therefore enter 
the criminal market. Although there is not enough 
evidence to support this claim, recent research points in 
this direction. For instance, as regards recent 
marketplaces such as Silk Road 2.0, Dolliver’s analysis 
(2015) suggests that only a small minority of vendors 
had connections with more sophisticated criminal 
groups or upper-level retailers and that the majority were 
‘opportunistic’ vendors. However, it is worth noting that, 
even when internet-related criminal opportunities allow 
drug trafficking to become an individual business, this 
criminal activity is generally carried out by professional 
offenders, full-timers for whom the trafficking activity is 
their main source of income (Lavorgna, 2014). The 
potential to reach a larger customer base via the internet 
could also precipitate greater involvement of occasional 
drug dealers, who might become ‘professionals’.
Although many internet opportunities are exploited by 
looser gangs, couples and even individuals in the 
surface web, where more structured organised crime 
groups are involved there is greater use of the deep web. 
Since monitoring of and investigations into the deep web 
started only very recently, it is difficult to draw clear 
Online criminal markets for hard drugs are present 
particularly in the deep web. When the trade occurs 
there, drugs are generally delivered via mail services, 
without physical interaction between buyers and 
suppliers. In addition, the surface web plays a role, with 
cyber-hotspots being frequently used as an extension of 
traditional hotspots: when operating in the open web to 
reach potential clients, traffickers apparently prefer to 
avoid using the internet to conclude the deal. For 
instance, there is evidence that illicit drugs (including 
cocaine, heroin and ecstasy) and prescription medicines 
(mostly opioid painkillers) are sometimes advertised 
under the guise of study aids or painkillers on popular 
commercial websites. In these cases, the sale is 
generally finalised offline, usually in public places. In 
addition to creating new cyber-hotspots, use of the 
internet for drug trafficking seems to also affect offline 
hotspots, by moving part of the distribution chain from 
city centres to suburban areas: clients do not have to 
travel to purchase drugs, but can easily order them 
online and have them delivered to their home by a drug 
courier or by mail (for further details, see Lavorgna, 
2014).
Overall, as regards drugs under international control, 
cases of internet-facilitated trafficking still account for a 
small minority of drug trafficking cases, and generally 
criminals still seem to rely on traditional networks of 
contacts to enter and manage effectively their business. 
The impact of the massive use of the internet in Western 
countries seems to have had a major role, especially in 
relation to how criminals enter into contact with potential 
clients. Although the increasing role of new technologies 
in the everyday routines of all the actors involved in drug 
trafficking should be kept in mind, over-emphasising the 
cyber component in this criminal domain risks diverting 
attention from the traditional — but still prevalent — 
offline features of this complex criminal offence.
I Challenging rhetoric
Drug trafficking is generally framed in the ‘organised 
crime’ narrative: it is often associated with highly 
structured criminal organisations such as the Italian 
’Ndrangheta, as well as with more flexible and diffuse 
criminal networks such as Colombian gangs. However, 
when it comes to internet-facilitated drug trafficking, 
quite unexpectedly, evidence shows that individuals, 
couples and very loose networks are becoming key 
criminal actors thanks to the system of criminal 
opportunities provided by the internet. In particular, the 
use of the internet seems to have facilitated the entry 
into the market of smaller criminal groups that, owing to 
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therefore needed to take into consideration 
transformations in technology, society and crime caused 
by the internet, and to allow new preventative thinking on 
reducing criminal opportunities in cyberspace. A genuine 
and trusting partnership between the academic world, 
relevant public institutions and law enforcement is 
necessary to tackle the new challenges of drug 
trafficking in an effective way.
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I Overview
This section of the Insights includes three chapters which individually and 
from different perspectives explore virtual and online drug-related markets 
that operate primarily on the surface or clear web. The first two chapters 
examine the online supply of medicines and NPS, substances which in 
offline drug markets are increasingly supplied and used alongside 
established illicit drugs. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which 
the internet, particularly online pharmacies and legal high shops, represent 
a significant source of supply of these products when they are found on the 
illicit market. 
Chapter 10 addresses the burgeoning online market for the sale and 
distribution of NPS, including legal highs and research chemicals, which 
has developed over the last decade. Magali Martinez and Daniela 
Kmetonyová, describe the methodology used and the crawling software 
that has been developed for monitoring this market by researchers in five 
European countries participating in the I-Trend project. They present 
preliminary results on server locations and provide a typology of online 
shops based on the products sold as well as describing marketing 
practices based on their ethnographic research. 
In Chapter 11, Lynda Scammell and Alessandra Bo present what is 
currently known about the illicit online sale of medicinal products via online 
pharmacies, their possible role as a source for products such as 
benzodiazepines and opioids to supply illicit drug markets, and the 
responses implemented in Europe and internationally to tackle this 
problem. 
Chapter 12 addresses the role played by social media and apps in online 
and virtual drug markets. Danica Thanki and Brian Frederick suggest that 
social media generally has an indirect role in relation to the supply and sale 
of drugs. Most sites and apps appear to be primarily used to communicate 
about drugs — discuss, share opinions and experiences — as well as to 
make arrangements to meet up to use them. The use of location-based 
apps, web cams and discussion forums is presented, as are the range of 
potential responses to problems linked with drugs and social media 
including interventions implemented by policymakers and law enforcement.
10
97
I Introduction1
Since the late 2000s, new psychoactive substances (NPS) 
have attracted the attention of decision-makers, and 
several studies have explored the online supply of NPS 
through shops on the internet (Hillebrand et al., 2010; 
Schmidt et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2013). For example, the 
Psychonaut 2002 project devised a methodology using 
search engine queries to identify websites with drug-
related content, including those offering to supply 
psychoactive substances (Schifano et al., 2006). The 
methodology used in this study was labelled ‘snapshot’, 
because it produced a time-specific picture of the existing 
websites, which can rapidly change. The methodology was 
further developed by the EMCDDA to gather information 
about online sales of NPS’, and a study was carried out at 
European level (EMCDDA, 2011a). In addition to providing 
a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the online 
supply of NPS, studies also revealed the need for more 
information on how online markets are structured and for 
continuous monitoring over time.
Building on these earlier studies, the European 
Commission-funded the I-TREND  (Internet Tools for 
Research in Europe on New Drugs) project (2) aimed, 
among other things, to develop a software-automated 
tool for monitoring online shops using a less resource 
intensive method than had been available previously.
(1) And all those involved in this part of the I-TREND project: Martin 
Pažitný (CUNI), Agnès Cadet-Taïrou (OFDT), Amanda Atkinson (Liverpool 
John Moores University (LJMU)), Daan Van der Gouwe (Trimbos Institute), 
Damien Sainte-Croix (OFDT), Emma Begley (LJMU),  Michał Kidawa 
(University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw), Tibor Brunt 
(Trimbos Institute).
(2) European project JUST/2012/DPIP/AG/3641 co-financed by the Drug 
Prevention and Information Programme of the European Union.
This chapter focuses on the new methodology used to 
monitor online NPS shops and their characteristics. It 
contains a description of the semi-automated tools 
designed for this purpose, which aimed to (i) minimise 
the human input and maximise the automation of the 
data-gathering process (ii), allow periodical rather than 
one-off monitoring and (iii) gather more extensive data 
than had previously been collected on online shops and 
their popularity.
I  Overview of the I-TREND project and 
its workstream
The overall objective of the I-TREND project, which 
involved researchers from five European countries (3), 
was to help prevent health and social harms linked to 
NPS and to inform the response to the emerging risks. 
The principal activities of the project were monitoring 
online user forums and online shops, conducting an 
online survey targeting users of NPS, the analysis of 
samples and the exchange of reference standards 
among laboratories, and the production of a ‘top list’ of 
NPS at national level and of ‘technical folders’ informed 
by the project activities. The study comprised five 
different but interconnected project workstreams, each 
complementing the others (Figure 10.1) and, to an 
extent, influencing one another’s methodology.
(3) Department of Addictology, First Faculty of Medicine, CUNI and 
General University Hospital, Prague, the Czech Republic; OFDT, 
Saint-Denis, France; Centre for Public Health, LJMU, United Kingdom; 
Trimbos Institute, Utrecht, the Netherlands; SWPS, Warsaw, Poland.
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I  Monitoring online shops: a semi-automated software tool
A key aim of the project was to design computational 
tools to enable regular monitoring of NPS being offered 
for sale on the internet; these tools were to have the 
capacity to collect more data in a less time-consuming 
manner than had been possible in previous snapshot 
surveys.
The work comprised two main phases in establishing the 
semi-automated scraping process: first, development of 
Software I, ‘Shop Finder’, then development of 
Software II, ‘Product Scraper’. Both of these phases had 
three stages: developing the computational tool, setting 
it with national terms and testing it within a time period. 
The ‘Shop Finder’ was used from September 2013 until 
the end of the project and the ‘Product Scraper’ was 
used only between January and April 2015. 
Shop Finder had a number of roles, including running the 
snapshot, categorising the search outcomes and feeding 
the selected information about shops into an online 
database on a regular basis. This, in practice, meant that 
a collaborative online platform was created allowing the 
partners to indicate for the whole period of the project 
country-specific search phrases and search engines (e.g. 
google.nl, yahoo.nl). After the launch of the software at 
the first snapshot, a manual classification had to be 
carried out on all of the results in order to separate 
relevant from non-relevant results. However, for the 
subsequent snapshots, the already classified sites 
automatically fell into the categories previously assigned 
to them — even if the websites in question had 
temporarily closed and reopened. Only new sites have to 
be manually classified, which is the key advantage of this 
process: time-consuming classification has to be done 
only once, at the beginning, whereas previous 
methodologies required a manual analysis of all results 
each time.
The software then automatically collects structural 
information (4) for all relevant online shops periodically. 
The report, with up-to-date information, is available 
online for users to download and for further analysis. 
Manual sifting is then required to remove duplicate web 
shops, as this process cannot yet be automated.
(4) Structural information provides details about the physical identity of 
the site and its owner, as well as statistics about visit frequency for the 
site (e.g. the URL of the website, the site’s IP address and its country of 
origin, the contact information of the domain owner and the 
corresponding country, the domain registration date). These data were 
provided using sites specialising in analysing global internet traffic: whois.
com, websiteoutlook.com, alexa.com and websitetrafficspy.com.
FIGURE 10.1
I-TREND project workstream
Workstream 1
Qualitative work on
User Forums
Workstream 5
TOP LISTS
Technical folders
Workstream 2
Quantitative and 
qualitative works on
the online oer
Workstream 3
Online survey
Workstream 4
Chemical analysis 
done on samples 
bought on internet
I I-TREND methodology
Each project partner established a list of the substances 
considered to be used most frequently in their country (a 
‘top list’) based on Reitox data sources; customs and/or 
police seizures; toxicovigilance indicators 
(hospitalisations and deaths); and general population 
survey results. Each partner could complement these 
sources with country-specific data, such as results on 
chemical analyses performed as part of national 
psychoactive substance investigation measures (Brunt 
and Van Den Brink, 2012; Lahaie and Cadet-Taïrou, 
2012) or specific surveys. The substances included in 
the top list guided the implementation of other activities 
(i.e. for the snapshot, the core search terms were the 
substances included in the top list for the relevant 
country).
In addition to around 10 chemical names of substances 
selected per country, some commercial names (so-
called branded products) were also included. 
The online market for NPS consists of different segments 
targeting different user profiles (Lahaie et al., 2013). The 
so-called branded segment is that which offers branded 
products, with sophisticated packaging, in powder form 
and also as tablets or herbs. It aims to attract young 
people, who may be inexperienced and ill-informed 
about what they are consuming.  By contrast, the 
‘informed segment’ aims to reach experienced users, 
who have more knowledge about different types of NPS, 
their effects and dosages. In this segment, NPS are 
mostly referred to by their chemical names and by their 
chemical structure, and are often described as ‘research 
chemicals’.
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I Search phrases and query frequencies
Software I is designed to search the chosen national 
and international search engines once a week with the 
substances selected plus the term ‘purchase’ in  
the language of origin of each partner country 
(Table 10.1). The most popular search engines in the 
relevant country were used (Table 10.2) and there was 
a mean of approximately 12 search terms per partner. 
Names of substances and branded products were 
tested with different synonyms and spellings (e.g. 
‘NRG-3’ can also be written as ‘NRG3’ or ‘NRG 3’, etc.). 
Generic expressions (e.g. ‘party pills’) were added in 
case they returned a substantial number of relevant 
results.
Only web shops in the national language of the partner 
country in question were considered relevant results. 
There were exceptions where appropriate, for example 
for the Netherlands, where the majority of the population 
speaks English. In the United Kingdom, all sites in 
English were taken as relevant, although, in reality, some 
of these sites may target not the United Kingdom but 
other English-speaking countries.
I Classification of search results
The first 100 results for each search phrase are tracked 
by the software. This means, that for one search phrase 
and three search engines, the software tracks 300 
results. In the case of duplicate results (5) the software 
takes only one into account. At this stage, human input is 
required in order to separate relevant results from the 
rest. This activity is not connected to the software 
schedule; however, it is better to check the results on a 
regular basis in order to get structural information on 
newly identified web shops as soon as possible.
During this process, the results are classified into three 
subcategories:
 n ‘e-shops’ — all online shops selling NPS;
 n ‘fora’ (6) — online fora with NPS-related topics;
 n ‘small ads’ — websites where individuals or 
professionals post ads offering NPS for sale;
(5) ‘Duplicate results’ refers to websites that have the same URL and 
were found by different search engines.  
(6) The term ‘fora’ was taken in its broadest sense, designating all 
websites where supposedly there were no NPS sales, but rather 
information on these substances and written discussions between 
people (e.g. comment threads).
FIGURE 10.2
Flowchart — Software I, ‘Shop Finder 
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on May 2014 n=16 (FR), n=5 
(NL), n=17 (PL), n=65 (UK), 
n=3 (CZ). 
Number of duplicate web 
shops on 26/5/2014: n=33 
(FR), n=3 (NL), n=15 (PL), 
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1
2nd round of categorisation 
(Manual)
Manual check of all the 
relevant results, removal of 
duplicate/inactive websites 
and categorisation according 
to type of duplicity.
Number of inactive and 
duplicate web shops on 
November 2014: 
n = n/a (data not analysed 
at the time of writing).
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The most popular online shops were then identified 
among all the unique shops and selected for further 
analysis using Software II.
Product Scraper was developed in order to monitor 
prices and other characteristics of products marketed in 
those online shops. At the time of writing, only the 
outcomes from Software I were available; Software II 
was still in the testing phase.
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 n ‘herbal shops’ if the site offers primarily plant-related 
substances as well as commercial products;
 n ‘other’ if the sites offer products relating to sexual 
performance, health or general wellness.
These four categories aimed to differentiate sites aimed at 
informed users from those intended for a wider public, and 
also to determine the relative importance of each category.
I  Multi-criteria classification of the ‘popularity’ of 
online shops
For relevant online shops categorised as ‘unique shops’, 
a further analysis was undertaken to select the most 
popular online shops. The purpose of this was (i) so that 
these popular online shops could be scraped with 
 n ‘inadequate’ (7) — irrelevant results.
Before further categorisation of the validated online 
shops, the main automatically collected structural 
information (8) is manually checked to identify any 
duplicates (Figure 10.2, step 6, and Table 10.3).
After removing all duplicates, unique online shops are 
manually classified according to four different categories 
depending on the range of products offered. They are 
classified as:
 n ‘research chemical shops’ if the substances are 
displayed mostly with their chemical names, often 
with an image of their chemical structure;
 n ‘commercial/branded shops’ if the substances are 
mainly displayed with their trade names;
(7) For example, the abbreviation MMC, in addition to referring to a drug, 
can be used to refer to the thickness of protective gear for sporting 
activities, as well as having other meanings. 
(8) The site’s IP country of origin, the contact information of the domain 
owner and the corresponding country, the domain registration date and five 
indicators on popularity from  www.alexa.com. Since IP addresses are legally 
considered personal data, they were encrypted and stored on secure media. 
TABLE 10.1
Substances and search terms used for the first snapshot
Czech Republic France Netherlands Poland United Kingdom
‘3-MMC’ koupit ‘AM-2201’ acheter ‘25-I NBOME’ kopen ‘3,4-DMMC’ sklep ‘4-MEC’ buy 
‘4-FA‘ koupit ‘UR-144’ acheter ‘4-FA’ kopen ‘3-MMC’ sklep ‘5 APB’ buy 
‘4-MEC’ koupit ‘MDPV’ acheter ‘4-FMP’ kopen ‘AM-2201’ sklep ‘5 meo dalt’ buy 
‘6-APB’ koupit ‘4-MEC’ acheter ‘4-MEC’ kopen ‘Brefedron’ sklep ‘6 apb’ buy 
‘AMT’ koupit ‘25-I NBOME’ acheter ‘5-APB’ kopen ‘Etkatynon’ sklep ‘AKB48’ buy 
‘bk-MDMA’ koupit ‘5-MEO-DALT’ acheter ‘5-IT’ kopen ‘MDPBP’ sklep ‘AM-2201’ buy 
‘MDPBP’ koupit ‘6-APB’ acheter ‘5-MEO-DALT’ kopen ‘Mefedron’ sklep ‘ur-144’ buy 
‘methoxetamine‘ koupit ‘5-APB’ acheter ‘6-APB’ kopen ‘Pentedron’ sklep ‘Ethylphenidate’ buy 
‘ethcathinone’ koupit ‘Ethylphenidate’ acheter ‘aMT’ kopen ‘UR-144’ sklep ‘MPA’ buy
‘MPPP’ koupit ‘Methoxetamine’ acheter ‘Benzo Fury’ kopen ‘pMPPP’ sklep ‘Pentadrone’ buy 
‘Funky’ koupit ‘NRG3’ acheter ‘Flava’ kopen ‘alfa-PVP’ sklep ‘Phenazepam’ buy 
‘Cherry Cocolino’ koupit ’3-MMC’ acheter ‘Flux’ kopen ‘6-apb’ sklep ‘PMA’ buy 
’Ethylphenidate’ koupit ’Happy caps’ acheter ‘MDPV’ kopen ‘metoksetamina’ sklep ‘2-AI’ buy
’MPA’ koupit ‘Party pills’ acheter ‘MXE’ kopen ‘funky’ sklep ‘5-EAPB’ buy
’Wlodziu’ koupit ‘Bong bastic’ acheter ‘3-MMC’ kopen ‘mocarz’ sklep ‘Methoxphendine’ buy
’Ex’ koupit ‘sztywny misza’ sklep ‘Etizolam’ buy 
’El Magico’ koupit ‘kokolino’ sklep ‘methalone’ buy 
’DMX’ koupit ‘włodziu’ sklep ‘mdai’ buy 
’Pentedrone’ koupit ‘dopalacze’ sklep internetowy ‘amt’ buy 
TABLE 10.2
Search engines used by partner countries
Czech Republic France Netherlands Poland United Kingdom
Google.cz Google.fr Google.nl Google.pl  Google.com
Seznam.cz Bing.fr Yahoo.nl Bing.com  Bing.com
Centrum.cz Yahoo.fr Vvinden.nl  Yahoo.com
Bing.nl  
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I  Elimination of duplicates and exploring configuration
To improve their visibility, some sites deliberately create 
duplicates (Schmidt et al., 2011). These so-called 
spamdexing practices move the site in question up the list 
of results displayed by search engines. By using and 
cross-checking more structural information from up-to-
date snapshot surveys, a more precise estimation of the 
number of site operators can be achieved. For instance, 
the project found that it is not possible to identify all 
duplicates only on the basis of visual information available 
on the website, such as the URL. This suggests that sites 
may use rough spamdexing practices and also 
sophisticated means to increase their visibility. The 
structural information drawn from active online shops 
(total: 478) established that 18 % (86) of active websites 
were duplicate sites (Table 10.3 and Figure 10.3). 
Consequently, previous studies may have over-estimated 
the number of online shops.
The proportion of duplicates varies by country; for 
example, France has the biggest number of duplicates 
(33 %), where the biggest proportion is made up of 
identical web pages. The Netherlands, Poland and the 
United Kingdom have approximately the same portion 
of duplicates ranging from 14 to 16 %. The Czech 
Republic stands out for its lack of site duplication. It 
may be that, as the number of online shops identified 
for this country is small, duplicate retailers are less 
likely to be observed.
Software II and (ii) so that test purchases could be made 
from these sites.
For this purpose, nine additional categories of 
automatically collected structural information were 
used (9). Among them, five were given special 
consideration (10), but the global index ranking given by a 
website specialising in the supply of commercial web 
traffic data (11) was primarily used. To a certain extent, 
this index is a summary of other information on 
popularity and, unlike the other popularity indicators, it 
was available for most of the websites. In addition to 
these data, other criteria were used to rank the 
popularity of online shops, such as whether or not the 
site had been captured by the previous EMCDDA 
snapshot. In addition, the quality of the translation of the 
site was taken into account. For example, a real 
translation, and not an automatic one, was considered to 
constitute an effort by the site operator to make the site 
more accessible to users in the target country.
I  Preliminary findings from the monitoring of online shops
A total of 584 online shops were found by the project 
partners, with 15 % (88 shops) found identically for 
multiple countries. The data were gathered between 
5 November 2013 and 26 May 2014. Of the 584 
identified shops, 18 % (106 shops) were no longer active 
at the end of the monitoring period on 26 May 2014 
(Table 10.3).
(9) The daily revenue generated by the small ads on the site, the number 
of daily and monthly views of the pages, the global popularity ranking of 
the website, the number of external links bringing web users to the site, 
the number of monthly users, etc.
(10) The global index ranking on search engines, the number of monthly 
visitors, the number of monthly page views, the number of daily page 
views, the daily revenue generated by the small ads on the site. 
(11) www.alexa.com 
TABLE 10.3
Comparison of online shops collected between November 2013 and May 2014 and their status in May 2014 (1)
Czech Republic France Netherlands Poland United Kingdom
Number of shops identified between 
November 2013 and May 2014
33 112 27 103 309
Number of active shops remaining in 
May 2014
30 96 22 86 244
Number of active shops remaining in 
May 2014 with duplicates removed
30 64 19 72 207
(1) New online shops collected in November 2014 have not been included in this table.
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other countries, there is no tradition of ‘smart’, ‘herbal’ or 
‘head’ shops, or even of smoking paraphernalia shops.
FIGURE 10.4
Breakdown of active online shops by IP location in 
May 2014
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I Typology of online shops
The breakdown by site type differs from one surveyed 
country to another (Figure 10.5). The most popular web 
shops seem to be RC shops for all countries, although 
the Czech Republic and France have the same or similar 
numbers of RC shops and herbal shops. In France, in 
fact, there is an even distribution between the three 
main categories of online shops.
FIGURE 10.5
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I National breakdown of supply in a global market
The geographical information about sales sites (e.g. 
physical location of the sales team, site of the server) 
can refer to several countries at a time (EMCDDA, 2011). 
However, building internet search phrases from those 
substances most frequently present in a particular 
country can facilitate the understanding of the 
information collected in the context of national demand.
The unique sales sites intended for the Czech, Dutch and 
Polish markets are more likely to be locally based (CZ, 
42 %; NL, 52 %; PL, 48 %) than those intended for, for 
example, France, where sites are often located in the 
Netherlands (38 %) and the United States (24 %). This is 
also the case for the United Kingdom (44 % located in 
the United States) (12). This point is consistent with the 
breakdown of web shops by IP location (Figure 10.4).
For France, the servers for the sales sites taken into 
account are generally outside French territory and often in 
non-French-speaking countries. This observation may be 
explained by the fact that, in this country, unlike the four 
(12) Breakdown based on the country location of the IP address of the 
server hosting the online shop. 
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I Conclusion
During the period of the study, the semi-automated tool 
enabled us to follow the evolution of a number of online 
shops offering NPS for sale. It reinforces the existing 
picture of a market that is extremely dynamic and 
characterised by the closing and opening of new sites. 
The study shows the need to take duplicate sites into 
consideration to understand the reality of online supply. 
The collection and analysis of structural data illustrated 
the variety of techniques used by retailers to increase 
their visibility. The data also show notable differences 
between countries with respect to IP address location 
and types of site. The NPS phenomenon shows national 
variation, and continuous monitoring, plus greater efforts 
to take corresponding national markets into 
consideration, could help increase our understanding of 
how the online supply, targeting individual countries, is 
structured.
Although the process as a whole still requires a large 
amount of manual input, the main improvement is a 
reduction in the time needed to run the snapshot and 
create a preliminary list of online sites to approximately 
two days. These results could not have been obtained 
without the implementation of specific technical tools 
that did not previously exist on the e-reputation software 
market (13). The automation of data collection (including 
structural information, their indexation, and the 
establishment of an iterative system that documents a 
database at each loop) allow, researchers and 
institutions to take over the snapshot methodology. 
Whereas it has been used for one-off tasks, it can be 
now used for continuous monitoring.
The choice of substances used to establish the list of 
queries is the main limitation of this study, because the 
results of the snapshot depend on it. In particular, the 
choice of trade names is more difficult because there are 
many and, unlike the chemical names of the substances, 
they are not systematically reported by the Reitox data 
sources (e.g. customs seizures, health alerts). 
Nevertheless, taking them into account remains 
essential because this maintains the link between retail 
and supply.
Finally, part of the online supply of NPS on the surface 
web takes place in a grey area that cannot be 
quantitatively monitored, and there may, therefore, be a 
difference between measuring NPS accessibility and 
measuring NPS availability. Sites that are completely 
(13) E-reputation software performs surveillance of a given subject by 
cross-checking information automatically collected on sites that pertain 
to the subject (blogs, forms, media) and the reactions of internet users on 
these same sites or on related social networks. 
I Discussion
The collection of quantitative data and qualitative 
information, using ‘a convergent-parallel model’ 
(Condomines and Hennequin, 2014), allows a more 
meaningful analysis of the online market. At the 
beginning of the commercial NPS phenomenon, the 
market could have been seen as an open scene, where 
retailers were operating in plain sight (Power, 2013). It 
has, however, become more fragmented and there are 
different levels of visibility. Between public, private and 
underground spaces, some sales take place in interstices, 
between light and shadow. Suppliers use two types of 
strategies: either maximum internet visibility or a 
discreet, targeted presence. As they act as companies, 
they try to be more visible than their competitors, but at 
the same time, some of them prefer to maintain 
anonymity and offer specialised supply in spaces 
undetectable by snapshots. They organise the digital 
space with gateways, a sort of grey zone, between the 
surface web and the deep web.
Some online shops try to improve their visibility through 
spamdexing practices, which helps them to appear at 
the top of search engine results. In this way they are 
accessible to the largest possible population, even by 
people who are not accustomed to using the internet or 
who have no experience with drugs. At the same time, 
the qualitative study of user forums indicates that some 
site operators employ camouflage strategies. Not all 
websites on the surface internet are detectable by 
search engines or indeed by the snapshot methodology. 
Some sites remain invisible either by not using any 
keywords in their content or by designing their websites 
so that one part is not accessible on the internet.
The use of codenames to mask the sale of substances is 
a well-known practice; however, the practice of using 
legal products to create a diversion is not so well 
documented. The sites may display only legal products 
(such as catnip, car maintenance products or laboratory 
equipment), without mentioning that they can be used 
for recreational purposes (Giannasi et al., 2012). One 
finding is that, particularly in such cases, and even when 
online shops advertise NPS sales on their front page, the 
sites often don’t allow access to their product catalogue, 
or they restrict the visibility and accessibility of certain 
substances. NPS are visible only after a user is invited by 
a person who is already a site customer. The invitation 
takes the form of a guest code or a URL (e.g. for the deep 
web). In such cases, the online shop is hardly visible or 
invisible using the snapshot method.
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invisible on the surface web cannot be found using the 
snapshot methodology. Such an observation of the 
online NPS supply can only be made if some of the 
supply and demand remains on the surface web in 
visible spaces. As a result of the regulations and 
legislation that Member States adopt, both with respect 
to NPS (European Commission, 2013) and internet 
functioning, the ‘balloon effect’ (14) may lead to the NPS 
online market becoming increasingly less visible and 
more difficult to monitor.
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I Introduction
This chapter explores what is known about the online 
supply of medicines and medicinal products, with a 
focus on the sale of psychoactive medicines via online 
pharmacies and/or other virtual platforms and their 
potential role as a source for the illicit drug market. In 
Europe, the misuse of medicines such as methadone, 
buprenorphine, fentanyls and benzodiazepines among 
high-risk drug users has been reported more frequently 
in recent years, for example among clients entering drug 
treatment centres (EMCDDA, 2015). The source of 
supply of these drugs is not always clear, but it is likely to 
include diversion from legitimate medical sources, the 
global unregulated trade in medicines and illicit 
production (Griffiths et al., 2014). Whatever the source of 
production, or mechanism of diversion, recent years 
have witnessed an increase in the illicit online sale of 
medicines. What is less clear is whether the internet in 
general, and online pharmacies in particular, have a 
significant role as a source of supply of medicines to 
illicit drug markets in Europe.
The subject of illicit internet supply of medicines and 
responses to it is a complex one, and this chapter briefly 
addresses the broader topics of licit and illicit online 
pharmacies, as well as counterfeit and falsified 
medicines, before looking at the limited evidence of links 
with illicit drug markets. It finishes on the issue of policy 
and practice responses in the area. The lead author has 
many years of experience working in the United Kingdom 
in the field of medicines regulation, and includes here 
examples and case studies from this country for 
illustrative purposes.
I  Types of medicinal products sold online
The online sale of medicines took off in the early 2000s 
(Forman, 2006a) and, although various platforms have 
been used, online pharmacies have been a primary 
source of distribution. In the early days, the most popular 
products to be supplied on the web were natural and 
herbal medicinal products, smoking cessation aids, and 
beauty and sexual performance enhancement products 
(such as Viagra®) (Orizio et al., 2011). More recently, the 
market for enhancement drugs such as muscle builders, 
diet pills and sunless self-tanning sprays has been 
expanding (Evans-Browns et al., 2012) and there have 
been reports of cancer drugs and stem cells being 
marketed over the internet (Fittler et al., 2013).
Medicines sold online are typically categorised by 
national regulatory agencies into ‘over the counter’ (OTC) 
and ‘prescription-only medications’ (POMs). The legal 
position surrounding the online supply of medicines 
varies across the European Union. Some countries, such 
as the United Kingdom and Germany, allow all classes of 
medicines (POMs and OTC medicines) to be sold online. 
Others allow only OTC medicines to be supplied online, 
and some countries, such as Italy, prohibit the supply of 
medicines online altogether (see Figure 11.1). The 
advertising of a POMs is not permitted anywhere in the 
European Union and therefore any website advertising a 
POMs is in breach of legislative requirements and action 
can be taken to remove the website.
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facilitating and enhancing this global market is widely 
acknowledged, posing an increased threat to public 
health. According to WHO, around 50 % of the medicines 
sold online from illegal sites concealing their physical 
identity are counterfeits (WHO, 2010).
Finally, cases of online sales of food and dietary 
supplements such as phenibut have also been on the 
rise. Phenibut is an authorised medicine in Russia used 
for treating anxiety, alcohol withdrawal, OCD, 
FIGURE 11.1
Different legislative positions in the European Union on 
the online sale of medicines
Both over the counter
and prescription allowed
Only over the counter 
allowed
No online sales allowed
Source: L. Scammell, presentation at expert meeting held at the 
EMCDDA, 30–31 October 2014.
In addition to the sale of OTC medicines and POMs, 
increasing attention has been paid to the topic of 
counterfeit and falsified medicines in recent years. 
According to the European Medicines Agency, ‘falsified 
medicines are fake medicines that are designed to mimic 
real medicines’ — that is, a product that passes itself off 
as a real, authorised medicine — while ‘counterfeit 
medicines are medicines that do not comply with 
intellectual-property rights or that infringe trademark 
law’ — that is, a product made by someone other than 
the genuine manufacturer, by copying or imitating an 
original product without authority or rights (EMA, 2015). 
Internationally, there is not an agreed definition, and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) addresses the 
problem with a broader definition that encapsulates both 
concepts: ‘А counterfeit medicine is one which is 
deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to 
identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both 
branded and generic products and counterfeit products 
may include products with the correct ingredients or 
with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, 
with insufficient active ingredients or with fake 
packaging’ (1).
Counterfeit medicines include all types of medicinal 
product, both OTC medicines and POMs, as well as 
enhancement drugs, and the WHO called the problem of 
counterfeit medicines ‘a growing threat to public health 
around the world’ (WHO, 2010). The criminal market for 
counterfeit medicines was estimated to be worth 
GBP 55 billion (approximately EUR 78 billion) in 2010 
(Jackson, 2009). The central role of the internet in 
(1) See: http://www.who.int/medicines/regulation/ssffc/definitions/en/
The United Kingdom has strict legal controls on the 
sale, supply and advertisement of medicinal 
products. Under medicines legislation, it is unlawful 
for medicinal products for human use to be 
marketed, manufactured, imported from a third 
country, distributed and sold or supplied in the 
United Kingdom except in accordance with the 
appropriate licences or exemptions. The United 
Kingdom has three legal classes of authorised 
medicines:
n  General sale list (GSL) medicines are suitable 
for sale and normal use without supervision or 
advice from a pharmacist or doctor. 
n  Pharmacy (P) medicines can only be obtained 
from a pharmacy and are sold or supplied under 
the supervision of a pharmacist.
n  Prescription-only medicines (POMs) must be 
prescribed by an authorised healthcare 
professional, for example a doctor, dentist or 
independent prescriber.
A UK registered pharmacy may have a presence on 
the internet; however, the legislative requirements 
apply equally to UK internet pharmacies and 
bricks-and-mortar premises; for example, POMs 
cannot be advertised directly to the public. These 
legal controls also apply equally to medicines for 
human use sold or supplied via the internet or 
through email transactions. Some POMs are 
‘controlled drugs’ (such as benzodiazepines) and 
their availability to patients can be subject to 
additional control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1971, which is administered by the Home Office. 
The United Kingdom position on the 
online sale of medicines
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internet pharmacies and 33 579 (94.3 %) are not 
operating legitimately (LegitScript, 2015).
From a consumer safety perspective, online pharmacies 
can be classified into two main categories: (i) legitimate 
and (ii) illegitimate. Legitimate websites comply with 
national and international regulations and standards, 
guaranteeing the quality of the product, requiring a valid 
medical prescription when buying controlled medicines 
and ultimately assuring consumer safety. On the other 
hand, illegitimate online pharmacies are, often, not 
registered with any recognised accreditation system and 
do not abide by regulations and professional standards, 
and are therefore operating illegally. They typically sell 
medicines without prescriptions, or they market 
counterfeit or falsified products, putting consumer 
safety at risk. Illegitimate pharmacies can be further 
divided into sub-categories depending on the degree of 
compliance with national and international standards.
A recent systematic review by Orizio et al. (2011) 
outlined some of the major features of online 
pharmacies described in the literature (see Table 11.1). 
These include affiliation to any internationally recognised 
accreditation system; the disclosure of geographical 
location and contact details; the types of medicines 
available; the quality of the product (from the packaging 
and instructions to the chemical composition); the 
availability of information on the product; the 
requirement of a valid prescription for controlled 
medicines; and the availability of an online medical 
consultation.
As highlighted in the criminological research by 
Lavorgna (2014), the advent of Web 2.0 provided new 
stammering and insomnia, but it is not licensed as a 
medicine in Europe or approved as a pharmaceutical in 
the United States.
I Sales platforms
I Online pharmacies: legitimate and illegitimate
Online pharmacies, of varying degrees of legitimacy, are 
the major online market platform for medicines. Online 
(or internet) pharmacies are retail companies that 
operate partially or exclusively over the internet and sell 
medicinal preparations, including prescription-only 
drugs, via online ordering and mail delivery (Orizio et al., 
2011; Lavorgna, 2014).
Online pharmacies have been classified in several ways 
(Arruñada, 2004; Mäkinen et al., 2005; Jena et al., 2011; 
NABP, 2014b; LegitScript, 2015), but the different 
classification criteria all have a focus on consumer 
safety at their core. According to the latest US Internet 
Drug Outlet Identification Program progress report, of 
the 10 866 internet drug outlets selling prescription 
medications reviewed between April and September 
2014, ‘96.4 % (10 473) were found not to be in 
compliance with American State and Federal laws and/
or National Association of Boards of Pharmacy patient 
safety and pharmacy practice standards’ (NABP, 2014a). 
These data resonate with the information provided by 
LegitScript, a US-based initiative with the largest 
database of health-related websites; it monitors over 
331 430 websites, of which currently 35 610 are active 
TABLE 11.1
Selected features of online pharmacies — summary of analytical frameworks used in research
Legitimate sites Illegitimate sites
Affiliation to any internationally recognised 
accreditation system
Affiliation to internationally recognised 
accreditation systems are clear and visible
Usually no affiliation to internationally 
recognised accreditation system
Disclosure of the geographical location and 
contact details
Geographical location and contact details are 
disclosed
Typically concealment of both 
geographical location and contact 
details
Types of medicines available Any medical product available in a physical 
pharmacy
Anything, but usually specialising in 
prescription-only medicines
Quality of the product Product is genuine
Instructions included
Spectrometry analysis is more likely to 
indicate counterfeit products
Packaging and instructions can be 
problematic
Availability of information on the product Comprehensive information on the product Often limited information on the 
product
Requirement of a valid prescription for 
controlled medicines
Valid prescription required No valid prescription required
Availability of online medical consultation/
information
Optimal medical consultation/information Often sub-optimal medical 
consultation/information
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disappointingly few studies in this area (Forman et al., 
2006a; Nielsen and Barratt, 2009; Ghodse, 2010), and 
these are mostly from outside Europe. The scientific 
evidence on general population behaviour with regard to 
the online purchase of medicines relies on two types of 
data: surveys and clinical case studies. A systematic review 
by Orizio (2011) found that the percentage of people 
reporting that they had purchased medicines online, mostly 
from US studies, is generally low, at between 1 and 6 % of 
the population, and slightly higher in studies where the 
intention to buy online was also considered.
The misuse of controlled substances obtained online is a 
growing and well-documented concern in the United 
States (Forman et al., 2006b; Jena et al., 2011). One study 
used state-level data to investigate whether or not the rise 
in prescription drug abuse between 2000 and 2007 was 
associated with the growth in high-speed internet access. 
The regression analysis showed that for every 10 % 
growth of high-speed internet use there was a 1 % 
increase in substance abuse treatment admissions for 
drugs readily available on the internet, for example 
prescription opioids, benzodiazepines, sedative hypnotics 
and stimulants (including amphetamine), while the 
correlation was not there for substances not available 
online, such as alcohol, heroin or cocaine (Goldman and 
Jena, 2011). However, despite well-documented evidence 
of an increase in the misuse and abuse of prescription 
drugs (Lipman and Jackson, 2006; SAMSHA, 2012), there 
is a lack of evidence to suggest that the source of these 
drugs at the level of an individual user is the internet.
Although the use of prescription opioids has purportedly 
reached its peak in the United States, the average level 
of use in the European Union is currently 4.5 times lower 
(ALICE RAP, 2013). Several system-level factors have 
been hypothesised to contribute to this difference, such 
as the less severe regulatory systems operating in the 
United States and the different prescription and 
dispensing practices (Fischer et al., 2014). However, 
patterns are changing and also in Europe the misuse of 
opioid substitution treatment medicines has been 
reported more frequently in drug treatment centres 
(EMCDDA, 2015). The source of these drugs within the 
EU borders has been associated with the global 
unregulated trade of medicines as well as the complex 
market of new psychoactive substances (Griffiths et al., 
2014), yet no specific research is available on the role of 
the internet and online retailers.
Inciardi et al. (2010) carried out a specific study in the 
United States investigating who the end-users of 
prescription drugs purchased over the internet were. 
Five key datasets focusing on the potential populations 
of end-users (including national and college surveys and 
criminal opportunities in the online trade in counterfeit 
medicines and affected the market in a number of 
different ways. The internet not only affected 
communication and transportation, enhancing their 
efficiency, but also changed the modus operandi of 
criminal networks. For example, the internet has allowed 
more streamlined management of the distribution 
process and has opened up opportunities for new actors 
who are not affiliated to established criminal networks or 
organisations to enter the market. A new trend identified 
by Lavorgna (2014) is the online purchase of medicinal 
products in larger quantities than previously, for the 
purpose of resale, mainly in local, offline markets. The 
online market allows individuals to step easily into the 
trafficking chain, and to target sales at certain consumer 
segments, particularly in the area of lifestyle and doping 
products.
Furthermore, Lavorgna suggests that the internet has 
influenced interactions with clients and allowed 
suppliers to use promotional tactics, persuasive 
marketing and loyalty-building strategies to market their 
products to a larger potential customer base.
I Diversification of retail outlets: eBay, Amazon
Online pharmacies are not the only type of retail outlet 
selling medicines over the internet. Dedicated forums, 
social media and online magazines increasingly play a 
role in the sale and advertisement of medicines, 
particularly with regard to doping products, lifestyle 
products and ‘enhancement’ drugs (Lavorgna, 2014).
Trading platforms such as eBay and Amazon also run 
advertisements offering to supply medicines. In Europe, 
the legality of this will vary from Member State to 
Member State. POMs, medicines that are required to be 
dispensed by a pharmacist (or under their direct 
supervision) and unlicensed medicines cannot be legally 
sold and supplied in this way.
In the United Kingdom, the MHRA has arrangements in 
place with eBay and Amazon to ensure that 
advertisements and listings for medicines that legally 
should not be supplied in this way are removed (usually 
within 24 hours).
I A source for the illicit drug market?
Although there is increasing concern about the potential 
role of illegally operating online pharmacies in the supply of 
psychoactive medicines for misuse, there are 
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FIGURE 11.2
Promotional campaign for the EU logo for online 
retailers of medicines
Source: European Commission, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/health/
human-use/eu-logo/index_en.htm
Different international accreditation/verification systems 
already exist to ensure consumer safety, as they warrant 
that online retailers follow quality standards in their 
practice. One example is the HON-Code (Health on the 
Net Code), which is based on ethical standards in 
offering medical information on the web (2).
With regard to responses to counterfeit and falsified 
medicines, the US Food and Drug Administration has 
developed a dedicated section on its website for 
consumers on ‘Buying medicines over the Internet’ (FDA, 
2015). The European Medicines Agency has also 
developed dedicated resources to warn consumers 
about falsified medicines (EMA, 2015), and several 
pan-European initiatives, representing a broad range of 
interests, have been set up to inform patients on how to 
buy medicines safely online (e.g. the European Alliance 
for Access to Safe Medicines and the Alliance for Safe 
Online Pharmacies).
In terms of law enforcement responses, international 
efforts are led by Interpol through Operation Pangea. 
This initiative was started by the MHRA in the United 
Kingdom in 2004 and has expanded each year until 
Interpol took on a coordination role. The operation 
started in 2008 and runs for a week each year. It brings 
together several law enforcement bodies from countries 
around the world including customs, health regulators 
and national police, and includes the private sector. It 
tackles the online sale of counterfeit medicines and 
(2) The HON-Code is the most widely accepted reference for online 
health and medical publishers. Currently, the Code is used by over 7 300 
certified websites more than 10 million pages, covering 102 countries and 
translated in to 35 different languages. Health on the Net Foundation 
(HON) was granted non-governmental organisation status on 23 July 
2002 by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. HON also 
has a partnership at the French governmental level, when it was 
accredited in 2007 by the French National Authority (HAS) to be the 
official certifying body for all French health websites. Source: https://
www.healthonnet.org/HONcode/Patients/Visitor/visitor.html
opioid maintenance treatment programmes) were 
considered. The results were consistent across the 
different populations: the internet is a relatively minor 
source for the illicit purchase of prescription drugs. The 
main sources of supply varied across the groups but 
were typically drug dealers, friends or relatives, and the 
medical system itself. The authors suggest that, 
although the internet might not be a major source for 
end-users, it may play a larger role at the dealer level.
A more recent study (Bachhuber and Cunningham, 
2013) investigated the online purchase of the synthetic 
opioid buprenorphine without a prescription. After 
screening for unique sites and testing their stability over 
a six-month period, the study identified 20 illegitimate 
sites selling buprenorphine and only two legitimate sites. 
The price of a 30-day supply offered on the illegitimate 
sites varied between USD 232 and USD 1 163, whereas 
the same dose was sold in the legitimate sites for as low 
as USD 58 and not over USD 135. The authors conclude 
that sites on the surface web are unlikely to be reliable 
sources of buprenorphine supply and that the growing 
dark net markets may provide a more reliable and less 
expensive alternative (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014).
I  Responding to the problem of the illicit online supply of medicines
The criminal market in pharmaceuticals thrives in an 
environment characterised by a lack of stable and 
harmonised legislation within and across countries. 
Specific supply-focused responses do, however, exist 
and they tackle the problem at different levels:
 n regulating the trade of online pharmacies;
 n monitoring prescription drugs;
 n implementing coordinated international supply 
reduction activities.
In June 2014, the European Commission passed a new 
Implementing Regulation (699/2014) that gave Member 
States one year to apply a common logo to the websites 
of all retailers of medicines legally operating in the 
European Union (European Commission, 2014). The 
regulation was implemented across the European Union 
on 1 July 2015 and also involves a national database 
listing details of legal suppliers in each Member State. 
Although the logo could be forged by the illegal sites, it 
is, nevertheless, an important first step in regulating 
online pharmacies across Europe (Figure 11.2).
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I  EMA (European Medicines Agency) (2015), ‘Falsified 
medicines’ http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.
jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/general_
content_000186.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058002d4e8
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developments, Publications Office of the European Union, 
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publications/edr/trends-developments/2015
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Regulation (EU) No 699/2014 of 24 June 2014 on the design 
of the common logo to identify persons offering medicinal 
products for sale at a distance to the public and the technical, 
electronic and cryptographic requirements for verification of 
its authenticity, Official Journal of the European Union. 
Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_184_R_0004&from=EN
I  Evans-Brown, M., McVeigh, J., Perkins, C. and Bellis, M. A. 
(2012), Human enhancement drugs: the emerging challenges 
to public health, North West Public Health Observatory Centre 
for Public Health, Faculty of Health and Applied Social 
Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University. Available at: 
http://www.erpho.org.uk/viewResource.aspx?id=22342
I  FDA (US Food and Drug Administration) (2015), US 
Department of Health and Human Services, ‘Buying 
medicines over the Internet’, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/
BuyingMedicinesOvertheInternet/default.htm
I  Fischer, B., Keates, A., Bühringer, G., Reimer, J. and Rehm, J. 
(2014), ‘Non-medical use of prescription opioids and 
prescription opioid-related harms: why so markedly higher in 
North America compared to the rest of the world?’, Addiction 
109, pp. 177–181.
I  Fittler, A., Bösze, G. and Botz, L. (2013), ‘Evaluating aspects 
of online medication safety in long-term follow-up of 136 
Internet pharmacies: illegal rogue online pharmacies flourish 
and are long-lived’, Journal of Medical Internet Research 
15(9), e199.
I  Forman, R. F., Marlowe, D. B. and McLellan, A. T. (2006a), ‘The 
Internet as a source of drugs of abuse’, Current Psychiatry 
Reports 8, pp. 377–382.
I  Forman, R. F., Woody, G. E., McLellan, T. and Lynch, K. G. 
(2006b), ‘The availability of web sites offering to sell opioid 
highlights the dangers of buying medicines online. The 
last operation took place in June 2015 (Interpol, 2015) 
and resulted in 20.7 million counterfeit medicines (worth 
more than USD 81 million) being seized, 156 arrests and 
more than 2 410 websites being taken offline.
At European level, there is not a common legislative 
approach to tackling the problem of counterfeit 
medicines. National initiatives such as those 
implemented by the MHRA in the United Kingdom 
include routine monitoring of medicines offered for sale 
online, investigative activities of illegal activity taking 
place on a website and, where appropriate, taking 
enforcement action against suppliers who operate 
outside the legal requirements. It also runs campaigns 
with patient associations and the General 
Pharmaceutical Council (the UK regulator for the retail 
pharmacy sector) and collaborates with industry to 
test-purchase medicines from websites. With the 
assistance of the Metropolitan Police Central e-Crime 
Unit and cooperation from domain name providers, such 
as Nominet (the provider of the Dot UK domain space), 
the MHRA has closed down thousands of websites 
(including sites based overseas) and brought hundreds 
more into compliance.
I Conclusion and future trends
This review has shown that the online supply of medicines 
is a complex issue and of growing concern. However, in 
relation to illicit drug markets, the available evidence 
suggests that currently online retailers play a minor role in 
the supply of medicines to illicit marketplaces. New 
evidence also indicates that cryptomarkets on the deep 
web may become more involved in the supply of 
controlled prescription drugs in the future.
Overall, this review has highlighted the need for a better 
understanding of the role of surface web retailers, such 
as online pharmacies, in the diversion of prescription 
medicines, and the need for more targeted consumer-
level research focusing on sources of drug supply. 
Moreover, owing to the very different regulatory systems 
and prescription and dispensing practices in the United 
States and Europe, specific EU studies would be 
desirable.
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I Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of social media 
platforms and how they can affect drug markets. 
Drawing on the literature to explore the drug-related 
content existing on various social media channels, the 
chapter discusses how social media have both a direct 
impact on drug supply and an indirect impact on 
demand for drugs. The chapter goes on to provide a 
summary of responses and discusses the need for 
future research to develop our understanding of social 
media and how they affect drug supply and demand.
I Social media
Social media, according to Mandiberg (2012), are new 
technological frameworks that enable ‘formerly passive 
media consumers to make and disseminate their own 
media’. They reflect the evolution of Web 2.0 
technologies, which allow users to continuously create, 
modify and/or publish content and applications ‘in a 
participatory and collaborative fashion’ (Kaplan and 
Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). Social media sites predominantly 
exist on the surface web and are, therefore, visible to all 
internet users, although they require varying levels of 
user registration for participation. Nevertheless, user-
modified content also exists on the deep web, for 
example in forum discussions such as Silk Road’s ‘Ask a 
Drug Expert Physician about Drugs and Health’ (see 
Chapter 7), while some social media sites established on 
the surface web, including the social networking giant 
Facebook, have recently allowed users anonymous 
access on the deep web through the Tor Browser.
The term ‘social media’ encompasses numerous types of 
social interaction sites and apps, including social 
networking sites, photo- and video-sharing sites, blogs 
and micro-blogs, discussion and forum sites, review and 
ratings sites, and social streams. Figure 12.1 provides a 
visual overview of the different types of social media 
through what Solis (2015) calls the ‘conversation prism’. 
Although sites differ in communication mode, they all 
feature significant user interactivity and participation, as 
well as multidirectional lines of communication, and 
represent a transformation in the way in which we use 
the internet.
FIGURE 12.1
The different types of social media
Source: Brian Solis and Jesse Thomas.
The recent exponential growth of the internet, and in 
particular of social media, and the impact it has had on 
contemporary society is vast. According to Nielsen 
(2012), a US- and Netherlands-based global information 
and measurement company, internet users spend more 
time engaging with social media sites and applications 
than on any other type of site. Facebook, which became 
publicly accessible at the end of 2006, currently has 
more than 1.6 billion registered users worldwide, 
1.35 billion of whom have been active in the previous 
30 days; YouTube, the video-sharing site, has more than 
1 billion active users; and Twitter, the social streaming 
site, has more than 500 million registered users. In 
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shown that traditional media coverage of drugs can 
increase interest in buying drugs (Forsyth, 2012). 
Nevertheless, there remains insufficient evidence to 
provide us with a good understanding of the impact of 
social media on the demand for drugs.
In order to better understand the role of social media in 
drug markets, systematic analyses of numerous social 
media platforms are needed, incorporating a wide range 
of different perspectives. Currently, research studies 
looking at a specific social media application are more 
common in peer-reviewed journals (as well as in ‘grey’ 
literature). These often focus only on the existence of 
drug-related content rather than its impact, generally on 
the premise that this content increases the demand for 
drugs. Examples of the different types of drug-related 
content on social media and of current knowledge and 
research are given below.
I Supply of drugs
Social media can facilitate the supply of drugs in a 
number of ways. One way is that users can directly 
advertise drugs for sale. In 2014, drugabuse.com 
published an infographic documenting drug dealer 
activity on the picture- and video-sharing service 
Instagram (drugabuse.com, 2014). By searching for 
hashtags relating to drug sales, the researchers were 
able to identify 50 drug dealer accounts in a day. Many 
contained photographs of drugs for sale. Social media 
were used to advertise the drugs for sale, but the 
transactions took place through other communication 
channels, such as mobile phones or messaging apps, 
which often allow users to remain anonymous. However, 
the researchers found that more than one-third of the 
drug dealers identified displayed a photograph of their 
face. There have also been numerous media reports of 
dealers caught by law enforcement agencies after 
posting details of their drug dealing activities through 
personal social media accounts, for example through 
Facebook accounts. Some researchers have begun to 
use web analytics to discover the presence of drugs for 
sale on social media.
Social media can also provide potential buyers with 
information on how and where they can purchase drugs, 
as well as evidence of successful purchases in the form 
of positive feedback. In his article ‘Teens on Tumblr can’t 
stop bragging about Silk Road drug deals’, journalist 
Patrick Howell O’Neill analysed the microblogging site 
Tumblr for material posted by teenagers who were 
interested in how to buy drugs on the dark web site Silk 
Road (O’Neill, 2013). The posts included details and 
addition to providing opportunities for increased 
communication and knowledge sharing among 
individuals, social media have substantially changed the 
way that businesses, organisations, communities and 
individuals interact.
As the world of social media develops at a rapid pace, 
many new technologies go ‘viral’ before their potential 
impact can be determined. Although there are 
undoubtedly benefits to the increased opportunities for 
social interaction, there are also well-documented 
concerns around the negative impact of social media, 
particularly in relation to bullying and sexual exploitation. 
There are also reports of social media being used to 
orchestrate the activities of subversive and extremist 
groups (Schils and Pauwels, 2013), organised crime 
syndicates (Kingston, 2014) and terrorist organisations 
(Zeng et al., 2010).
Although some social media users concerned about 
their privacy may protect their identity, many others do 
not take precautions and may have poor security levels. 
Similarly, some users may refrain from posting content 
that may be unlawful or that they know to be unlawful on 
social media platforms, while others may succumb to 
what has been called an ‘illusion of anonymity’ and 
openly post content that transgresses legal and/or moral 
thresholds (Zheleva and Getoor, 2009).
I Social media and drug markets
In general, social media can affect drug markets in two 
ways. First, social media may have an impact on the 
supply of drugs by providing opportunities for buying 
and selling drugs (direct impact). Second, they may have 
an impact on the market by affecting the demand for 
drugs in general and for individual drugs through, for 
example, the impact of drug-related experience sharing, 
drug-themed photo and video sharing, and drug-focused 
opinion forming (indirect impact).
There are, however, few research studies exploring social 
media and drug markets. Where research on social 
media does address drugs, it tends to be in the fields of 
behavioural health, epidemiology and public health, 
rather than criminology. Research, therefore, tends to 
focus on the influence of drug-related social media 
content on young people’s demand for drugs rather than 
on the supply of drugs through social media channels. 
Although concerns exist about the impact of greater 
exposure to drug-related content on demand for drugs, 
particularly among young people, the evidence of its 
impact remains scarce, although some studies have 
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Concerns around online social networks mirror those 
related to offline social networks; principally, that 
exposure to certain behaviours within a social network 
will affect an individual’s behaviour and social norms. 
However, what is unclear is the added impact that easier 
access to groups of like-minded individuals through 
online communities has on individual behavioural norms. 
This may be of particular importance for traditionally 
hidden activities such as drug use and supply, with 
individuals able to seek out online groups easily and 
anonymously.
I Specific drug forums
There are a large number of user forums dedicated to the 
discussion of illicit drugs, such as Bluelight.ru, Erowid 
and Drugs-forum.com. Most research has explored the 
harm reduction aspects of these forums, with the 
majority of users claiming that they access the sites 
primarily to learn how to use drugs more safely (Chiauzzi 
et al., 2013). Research often highlights the opportunity 
to use forums for targeted prevention (Soussan and 
Kjellgren, 2014). Nevertheless, there are concerns that 
the forums’ content could encourage experimentation 
with a wider range of drugs and increase demand for 
certain substances. For example, information about how 
to extract active ingredients from pharmaceuticals may 
increase demand for such substances. Conversely, bad 
trip reports on forums and warnings about individual 
substances and methods of drug use may decrease 
demand for particular substances and influence types of 
use. Although there is limited evidence of the impact of 
forums on drug use behaviours, the ability to monitor 
discussions can be a useful tool for the identification of 
emerging trends in drug use and markets and to inform 
policy and practice (Davey et al., 2012).
I Video and picture sharing
YouTube is the most popular video-sharing site, while the 
picture-sharing sites Flickr and Instagram are also very 
popular at the time of writing. In addition, many other 
social media channels not specifically viewed as focused 
on picture or video sharing provide users with 
opportunities to share these types of media. Lau et al. 
(2012) highlight the potential negative impact of social 
media content depicting behaviours such as drug use, 
although the authors suggest that further research is 
needed on how this online content is disseminated and 
how individuals process it.
pictures (including selfies) of users, as well as advice on 
how to shop on Silk Road. O’Neill discovered that 
adolescents often implicated their friends, girlfriends 
and boyfriends in their Tumblr posts; some even 
mentioned their parents: ‘5/5, package came on 
schedule. My dad intercepted the package though, so no 
Xanax for me!’
Research has consistently found that young people 
obtain drugs through their social networks (Duffy et al., 
2008), with friends being the most common source of 
drugs (European Commission, 2014). It stands to reason 
that, as social networks move increasingly from the real 
world to the digital world, the buying and selling of drugs 
will follow suit. Nevertheless, although social media can 
facilitate drug supply, the exchange of the product must 
still take place in the physical environment, through the 
postal service or face-to-face.
I  Drug-related content on social networking sites
There are concerns that the presence of drug-related 
content on social networking sites could influence 
normative behaviours regarding drug use and increase 
demand for drugs, particularly among young people. 
Cavazos-Rehg et al. (2014) analysed the demographics 
of the almost 1 million followers of a pro-marijuana 
Twitter handle (‘handle’ being Twitter jargon for a user’s 
screen name) and the content of the tweets posted 
using that handle. They found that the majority of the 
followers were 19 years old or under (73 %) and that 
54 % of them were female. The content mainly 
concerned positive cannabis discourse; many of the 
tweets were perceived as humorous. The authors 
warned of the influence of social media during 
adolescence and the potential impact on drug using 
behaviours.
Another study by Hanson et al. (2013a) performed a 
qualitative analysis of the quantity and content of 
tweets containing the drug name ‘Adderall’. The study 
reported 213 633 Adderall-related tweets over a 
six-month period, with a peak coinciding during the 
examinations period. Tweets were also analysed for 
content related to motives, side effects, poly-use and 
possible normative influence. The authors concluded 
that Adderall discussions through social media such as 
Twitter may contribute to normative behaviour regarding 
its abuse. A similar conclusion was drawn by Hanson et 
al. (2013b) in relation to social circles and prescription 
drug abuse.
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I Drug-themed apps
There are a large number of drug-themed apps available 
from app stores such as Google Play and Apple’s App 
Store. These include apps designed to prevent drug use 
such as Your Face on Meth, which allows users to upload 
a picture and see the physical degradation that would 
result over time from using methamphetamine. Other 
apps promote drug use. Research by Bindham et al. 
(2014) focused on apps promoting illicit drug use, with 
the author observing an increase in these types of apps 
over a three-month period. By the end of the study (in 
2012), 410 drug-promoting apps were identified, the 
majority of which (98 %) were found to promote 
cannabis, with many providing a forum for like-minded 
drug-users. Some examples of the types of apps that 
were found included drug-themed ‘wallpaper’ apps; apps 
that provided information on drug use; drug-themed 
gaming apps; drug use simulations; drug-themed clock 
widgets; a drug-themed battery icon widget; drug-
related stickers; and apps that were used to share 
substance use stories. Others, such as the How to Sell 
Weed app, provide instructions for the production and 
selling of cannabis. The authors of the study voiced 
public health concerns, particularly in relation to young 
people, and suggested government intervention as a 
means ‘to enforce [the] proper standardisation of 
app-rating processes’.
In the United States, where the sale of cannabis in 
licensed outlets has recently become legal in some 
states, news reports have highlighted the existence of 
apps related to the cannabis trade. For example, one 
report likened the Leafy App (launched on 
26 January 2015) to a ‘Grindr for weed’ in that the app 
‘offers an interactive catalogue of different varieties of 
cannabis, their characteristics and availability (mostly in 
medical cannabis outlets) based on the nearest GPS 
location’ (Neal, 2014). Another journalist reported on 
Weedhire — an app that was designed to ‘connect pot 
labs, dispensaries and even government regulators’ to 
potential employees in the (legal) cannabis industry 
(O’Neill, 2013).
I  Social media sites and networks facilitating drug-related encounters between men who have sex with men
One of the most common ways to access and interact 
with social media is through smartphone and tablet 
apps. Some geosocial networking apps employ location-
based mobile social computing using the Global 
Much research focuses on the content of social media. 
For example, Manning (2013) examined the link 
between YouTube, drug videos and drug education. The 
study involved a content analysis of 750 drug videos 
(sampled from over 300 000 individual YouTube 
videos), of which 12 % had been posted by official 
agencies (see Figure 12.2). The study found that a 
minority (16 %) of the drug-related videos on YouTube 
were celebratory (i.e., hedonistic), but that these 
differed by drug — for example, no celebratory videos 
about heroin or crystal meth were found. Many 
cautionary videos (also known as ‘vernacular 
prevention’ videos) were also identified. ‘Do-it-yourself’ 
(DIY) videos (e.g. videos that provided instructions on 
how to grow your own cannabis) and legal high 
advertisements were also identified. The study 
concluded that official prevention campaigns should 
use more modern methods to reach individuals.
A similar study (Lange et al., 2010) also identified a large 
number of drug use-related videos on YouTube. It found 
that the researchers were able to analyse the effects and 
side effects of Salvia divinorum solely by viewing 
YouTube user-uploaded videos. Walsh (2011) argued 
that the existence of Salvia videos on YouTube increased 
public awareness of the substance and stimulated 
demand, but also put it on the agenda of law-makers in 
the United Kingdom, thus contributing to its prohibition 
and attempts to restrict the market.
FIGURE 12.2
The sample of YouTube drug videos coded by drug 
discourses
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webcam drug experiences can often locate other Skype 
members and/or active Zoom conference calls through 
services such as Google+ Communities.
Some MSM share their drug ingestion experiences by 
uploading video content to video-sharing websites. 
Gay pornography producer Treasure Island Media 
maintains one such site, ToxxxicTube, which features 
hundreds of user-uploaded videos of men apparently 
smoking or injecting illicit drugs such as crystal 
methamphetamine.
As well as sharing drug use experiences, there are 
suggestions that sites may also facilitate drug supply. A 
recent online article by Vice found that ‘One of the most 
common profile names or sub-headings on Grindr has 
become “GMTV” which implies that the person is using, 
has to share, or has to sell, G (GBL), M (mephedrone), T 
(Tina AKA crystal meth) or V (Viagra). By using colloquial 
slang for drugs, and using search fields on certain sites, 
you can hunt for the drug you’re after, or people who are 
using it who might be willing to hook you up electronically 
with someone who’ll get some for you’ (Daly, 2015).
I  Using web analytical methods to monitor drug use and markets
Recently, researchers have analysed social media data 
using data mining techniques to explore the different 
ways in which large numbers of social media data might 
be processed and how social media analysis can provide 
an additional source of data on drug use and markets. 
Yakushev and Mityagin (2014) found that, through data 
mining, the level of interest in drugs among the users of 
these media could be determined. In addition, the 
authors were able to obtain information on the interests 
of individuals who had posted drug-related content. They 
suggest that social media can provide a better picture of 
those with ‘light’ addiction problems than traditional 
sources of data on drug use.
Web analytics have also been used by criminal justice 
researchers to explore social media and drug supply. 
One of these studies (Watters and Phair, 2012) 
developed a new methodology known as Automated 
Social Media Intelligence Analysis to analyse social 
media platforms for the presence of drug buying and 
selling. The search found many examples of sellers 
advertising drugs and buyers requesting drugs on 
social media. They also found that no examples of illicit 
drug advertising were found among paid 
advertisements.
Positioning System to establish a user’s proximity to 
other users. Grindr, which claims to have 5 million users 
in 192 countries worldwide (1), is an example of this type 
of app and is used primarily by men who have sex with 
men (MSM). It has recently been reported to be a 
conduit for the facilitation of high-risk behaviours (such 
as drug-seeking). For example, Bourne et al. (2014) 
reported that some men use Grindr to locate partners for 
‘chemsex’ or ‘party-and-play’ (PNP) sessions. Chemsex 
and PNP refer to sex among MSM while using various 
drugs, including methamphetamine, cocaine, gamma-
hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL) 
and mephedrone. Grindr can also facilitate ‘slamming 
parties’ — prolonged MSM sex parties that involve the 
injection of illicit drugs (Frederick, 2015).
In addition to Grindr, there also exist numerous MSM 
virtual social networks (VSNs) that feature a high 
number of self-identified drug users.
This sort of social networking is best described as taking 
place on VSNs, rather than online social networks, as 
much communication takes place via smart phones and 
tablets. VSNs can be categorised into static networks, 
which are more permanent and may include user profiles 
and terms of use (e.g. Facebook), and dynamic networks 
(e.g. Skype or ooVoo video chat), which are temporary 
and often by invitation only. A feature of VSNs is the 
creative use of slang and argot to get around 
moderation. Static (and especially) dynamic VSNs that 
use webcams have been recently associated with 
‘chemsex’ parties and/or ‘slamming’ among MSM.
A few examples of MSM VSNs include PlanetRomeo.
com (a German-based VSN), which has at least 11 
member-created drug-themed ‘clubs’; NastyKinkPigs.
com (a US-based VSN with members throughout the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Europe), which 
allows individuals to specify drug use preferences in 
their member ‘profiles’; and Get2ThePoint (ynotmingle.
com), which describes itself as ‘an online clubhouse for 
Slamming enthusiasts’ (ynotmingle.com, 2015). 
‘2ThePoint’ refers to the injection of methamphetamine 
and/or mephedrone, in particular, as well as other drugs. 
Unlike Get2ThePoint, PlanetRomeo and NastyKinkPigs 
also have smartphone apps that employ location-based 
technology.
Another recent trend among MSM drug users is the 
online sharing of sexualised drug ingestion experiences 
via real-time webcam broadcasts — either on MSM 
VSNs with webcam chat rooms, in group conference 
calls (Skype or Zoom) or privately (Skype). MSM seeking 
(1) See Grindr.com
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employ special language when communicating about 
drugs or drug-related activities and behaviours, as 
described in the section on sites and apps for MSM. This 
argot, or drug-related slang words, develops over time, 
making it exceedingly difficult for those monitoring to 
keep up with the changing use of language. This is 
because the purpose of drug-related argot is to ‘maintain 
secrecy so as to hide subculture communications from 
outsiders’ (Johnson et al., 2006), especially law 
enforcement agents.
Some law enforcement actions are successful, though. 
Some social media-related drug arrests concern the 
illegal sale of prescription drugs (rather than the dealing 
of illicit drugs). Others are made in conjunction with 
larger ‘sting’ operations. For example, an August 2013 
Instagram-related ‘gun bust’ sting operation in New York 
City led to hundreds of arrests (the largest in NYC 
history) and in April 2014 a large US-wide sting 
operation (conducted by the US DEA and the FBI) led to 
the arrest of more than 350 drug dealers, all of whom 
had posted drug-related content on Instagram.
I Social media policies and practices
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) recently 
reported that most social media owners do not actively 
monitor and/or remove drug-related content (BBC 
Trending, 2013a). Some social media owners responded 
to these accusations, citing reasons of impracticality or 
invasiveness. Legal reasons were also cited. Others 
claimed to take a ‘reactive’ approach to the presence of 
drug-related content on member-user pages. Typically, 
social media owners give their member-users the 
opportunity to report inappropriate or illegal content, and 
some owners stress their commitment to reviewing such 
reports within a short period of time, usually 48 hours.
In a follow-up to its original investigative report, the BBC 
noted that Instagram had responded by blocking 
numerous drug-related hashtags on its site (BBC 
Trending, 2013b). Still, many lay and professional 
members of the public have demanded that Instagram 
and other social media owner-operators take a more 
proactive approach to removing drug-related and other 
content of an illegal nature.
I Further research and monitoring
Research exploring the link between new forms of 
media, in particular social media, and drug supply and 
I  Social media policies, supply and demand reduction responses
Owing to the large volume of drug-related social media 
user content, the numerous and varied types of 
environments in which such content is posted and a lack 
of understanding about the impact of different types of 
social media content, a comprehensive response to 
drug-related social media content is not anticipated any 
time soon. Although law enforcement agencies continue 
to develop their practices to respond to evolving online 
methods of drug supply, other stakeholders will be 
important in tackling the negative impact of drug-related 
social media content. For example, the policies and 
practices of social media owners are under scrutiny, 
particularly with respect to the monitoring of member-
user activities. The research world also has a role to play 
in creating a better understanding of the impact of 
different types of social media content on behaviour and 
in developing methods of online social media monitoring. 
In addition, researchers can use the opportunities 
provided by increased online social contact to recruit 
hitherto hidden research subjects. Similarly, 
professionals in the prevention, harm reduction and 
treatment fields need to develop their services to align 
them better with today’s digital modes of 
communication.
I  Tackling the buying and selling of drugs: law enforcement responses
According to numerous sources (e.g. grey literature, 
news media reports, peer-reviewed journal articles), the 
drug-related monitoring of social media by police and 
other law enforcement entities does occur. However, 
because of the sheer volume of data involved, the 
automatic (or semi-automatic) screening of drug-related 
social media content by law enforcement can often be 
very tedious, making such operations difficult or even 
impracticable (Watters and Phair, 2012). Moreover, the 
results of such screenings often include false positives. 
Where law enforcement monitoring does lead to arrests, 
media reports suggest that they often involve young 
people found with small amounts of illicit drugs and who 
have little to no prior history of criminal behaviour, or 
small-scale dealers who lack sophistication in their 
operations (Knibbs, 2013; Storm, 2013; Chicoer, 2014; 
Taylor, 2014).
An additional complication for law enforcement agencies 
monitoring social media is that member-users often 
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absence of appropriately delivered services, other actors 
will fill the void. Thus, forums may become the go-to place 
for harm reduction advice, despite concerns about the 
quality of the information provided. Analysis of forums 
has identified demand for harm reduction and treatment 
advice, particularly among users who may not feel 
comfortable attending treatment services, such as 
socially integrated recreational drug users. Social media 
provide opportunities for engaging with hard-to-reach 
client groups (Davey et al., 2012) and show similar levels 
of use across ethnic groups. Targeted messaging using 
demographic and other information (such as interest in 
nightlife) may provide a cost-effective way of reaching the 
right individuals and tailoring messages and responses to 
their specific needs. In addition, social media can provide 
opportunities for creating online communities that 
support recovery from drug dependence.
I Conclusion
The growth of social media has revolutionised methods 
of communication and affected the way we interact with 
each other. In terms of the direct impact on drug 
markets, there remains insufficient evidence of its role in 
the supply of drugs. More vigilant controls by social 
media owners, and greater clarity about their level of 
responsibility for ensuring that services are not used to 
facilitate criminal activity, may help to restrict drug 
supply through these channels.
In terms of the indirect impact on drug markets in 
relation to demand for drugs, the impact of increased 
exposure to drug-related content online, particularly on 
younger people, needs better exploration. This will not 
only increase our understanding of how social media 
influence behaviour but also allow us to target responses 
to the areas with the greatest potential negative effects 
and help us to design more appropriate responses. At 
the same time, there is a need to have a balanced 
approach to the issue, identifying and responding to the 
negative aspects but also identifying ways in which 
social media can be harnessed by the research and 
monitoring community and prevention and treatment 
agencies to better understand drug use and to improve 
demand reduction responses.
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I Introduction
In gathering together contributions from a variety of 
experts in the field, this publication has sought to set out 
what is known about the nature and functioning of drug 
markets on the internet with a view to enhancing our 
understanding of their current and potential importance 
as a source of supply for illicit drugs. At the time of 
writing and reflected in the balance of contributions to 
this publication, there is noticeably more academic 
interest in, and output on, the functioning of drug 
marketplaces in the deep web, an area that has 
witnessed rapid growth since 2010. Given the diversity 
and complexity of surface web markets, operating 
across a diffuse internet landscape, it is particularly 
difficult to map their structure and functioning. The 
constant and rapid evolution of social media sites and 
apps both offer an entry to online markets and represent 
additional platforms where drugs are discussed and 
offered for sale.
Despite evidence of drug selling on both the surface and 
the deep web, the size and scale of these markets is far 
from clear. We have reasonably good descriptions of 
dark net markets, less so for surface web markets, but 
overall there is little evidence on the relative importance 
of online markets as a source of supply. With regard to 
those substances for which there is some legal 
ambiguity or regulatory loophole, the majority of sales 
appear to take place on the surface web. By contrast, the 
majority of sales activity linked to illicit drugs appears to 
take place on the deep web. Although the online sale of 
fake and counterfeit medicines represents a major 
global enterprise, at present, evidence of sourcing of 
medicines for the illicit drug market from online 
pharmacies is slim. We note that more information on 
the online sales of new psychoactive substances and 
research chemicals is now emerging, with some 
evidence of overlap with illicit markets, via so-called grey 
marketplaces.
I Drivers of change
A wide range of factors appear to be driving change and 
development in internet drug markets, mostly linked to 
technology, globalisation and market innovation. Digital 
literacy and knowledge are increasing and thereby 
expanding the pool of potential market users. The 
technology is clearly important, and new developments 
are changing how we interact both commercially and 
socially across the board. Developments in encryption, 
digital currencies and anonymous browsing are among 
the technologies driving change in dark net markets. We 
also note the influence of marketing innovations, for 
example the establishment of the deep web search 
engine GRAMS. This search engine for Tor-based dark 
net markets allows users to search multiple markets for 
products such as drugs and guns from a simple search 
interface.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Tor is the largest and best-
known ‘onion router’ network, offering a level of 
anonymity that has made it a popular tool among 
internet users wishing to avoid government or corporate 
censorship and/or to engage in illicit activities online. 
One of the challenges associated with private browsing 
can be its speed, and this is an area where technology is 
driving innovation. In a recent paper, Chen et al. (2015) 
describe their development of a new anonymising 
network called HORNET (High-speed Onion Routing at 
the NETwork layer), which is an onion-routing network 
that could be the next generation of anonymising 
technology.
Recent years have witnessed a global and exponential 
growth in e-commerce across the board and, in some 
respects, recent trends in the growth of online drug 
marketplaces may merely reflect this broader social 
phenomenon. In this context, the rapid development of 
easy online payment systems has been a major 
facilitator of new developments. Nevertheless, at 
present, e-commerce is still dwarfed by traditional 
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can be assumed that the deep web is growing 
exponentially at a rate that cannot be quantified (2). By 
comparison, the part of the web accessible to traditional 
search engines, the clear or surface web, is estimated to 
be fairly small. Cryptomarkets or dark net markets 
represent only a minuscule element, in terms of the 
space they take up, of the deep web.
There is also some differentiation between the 
availability of products in surface and deep web markets. 
It is estimated that, for medicines and new psychoactive 
substances, most online drug market transactions are 
likely to take place on the surface web, via online shops 
and pharmacies, but also via classified ads and research 
chemical websites. Medicines and new psychoactive 
substances are available on dark net markets, but sale of 
illicit drugs is more common on these platforms. Soska 
and Christin (2015) note that around 70 % of all sales on 
the sites they were monitoring were of cannabis, ecstasy 
and cocaine-related products. Heroin, other opioids and 
new psychoactive substances were also available for 
sale.
A further area of uncertainty is at what level of the 
market online transactions take place, particularly those 
made on the deep web. In Chapter 8, Joost van Slobbe 
argues that, if a European organised criminal group 
wished to order a large consignment of heroin or 
cocaine, there would necessarily be face-to-face contact 
between representatives of the supplying and receiving 
criminal organisations. Martin (2013), however, suggests 
that dark net markets open up the possibility of a direct 
link between drug-using buyers and producers or 
synthesisers of illicit drugs, and may eventually serve to 
cut out some of the middle level of the market. In 
Chapter 2, Aldridge and Décary-Hétu suggest that direct 
producer–user transactions are more likely for the kinds 
of drugs where small-scale producers can operate 
without large-scale international networks (e.g. cannabis, 
mushrooms, NBOMe). They highlight the fact that a 
substantial proportion of dark net market customers are 
buying in bulk, probably sourcing stock to sell offline and 
thereby making these markets the very location of the 
middle market for certain products. Dolliver’s analysis 
(2015) suggests that only a small minority of vendor 
accounts may have connections to more sophisticated 
criminal groups or upper-level retailers markets and that 
the majority are ‘opportunistic’ vendors. Soska and 
Christin (2015) note that the vast majority of vendors in 
their study earned less than USD 10 000 over the 
three-year monitoring period, concluding that these 
markets are primarily competing with street dealers in 
the retail space. Taken together, this evidence suggests 
(2) Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_web_ %28search %29
modes of commerce and, despite online shopping 
having seen a massive increase, data on 2014 retail 
sales (direct to the final consumer) show a European 
average of 7.2 % (1). By analogy, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that, at present, most transactions in the sphere 
of illicit drug supply still take place in offline markets, and 
will probably continue to do so for some time.
Social and cultural dynamics have also been a central 
feature in the rise of dark net markets. Reports highlight 
the charismatic figures involved in running marketplaces, 
such as Ross Ulbricht, Silk Road’s Dread Pirate Roberts. 
In the early iterations of cryptomarkets such as Silk 
Road, there was an emphasis on the value given to 
participation in online communities of like-minded 
people, and the importance of online activism. 
Undoubtedly, an additional major driver of public interest 
in, and use of, these dark net markets has been the 
widespread media reporting, bringing them to the 
attention of a new audience. Buxton and Bingham 
(2015) suggest that as a result of a combination of 
factors — including expanding internet access, a 
tech-savvy generation, new security tools, 
cryptocurrencies and sustained international demand 
for drugs — the expansion of dark net markets is likely to 
continue.
I  The internet and drug markets: mapping and market demarcation
With regard to the size and segmentation of drug 
markets on the internet, some issues have become 
clearer. First, there are a number of different but 
overlapping online drug markets, although the relative 
size of the various markets is hard to quantify. An 
approximate demarcation can be made between 
markets open to all on the clear or surface web; markets 
that are not accessible to traditional browsers on the 
deep web; and actively concealed and anonymised dark 
net markets or cryptomarkets.
The deep web represents the largest part of the internet, 
incorporating as it does all elements stored in 
databases, private networks, unlinked sites and hidden 
services. It is impossible to measure, and hard to 
estimate, the size of the deep web because the majority 
of the information is hidden or locked inside databases. 
Early estimates suggested that the deep web was 400 to 
550 times larger than the surface web. However, since 
more information and sites are always being added, it 
(1) http://www.retailresearch.org/onlineretailing.php
CHAPTER 13 I What is the future for internet drug markets?
129
internet markets have global reach, national 
characteristics still have a significant impact. Many 
buyers prefer home sellers, perceiving less risk with 
fewer borders to cross. It appears that most US and 
Australian vendors on Silk Road were not willing to ship 
drugs across international borders, and Australian 
buyers preferred local sellers. After Silk Road closed, a 
new Finnish marketplace was established on the deep 
web to cater for national customers. Exceptions include 
when overseas markets provide access to different 
products or higher-quality goods or offer price 
advantages to buyers and sellers. Sellers may run the 
increased risk of shipping products abroad when there is 
a lot of competition on the home market or where the 
home market is considered unsafe or vulnerable to 
police infiltration.
Results presented by the I-TREND project team in 
Chapter 10 show that the preference for national 
markets also holds true for new psychoactive 
substances sales. Although online shops may target two 
or more countries, it is more likely that an online shop will 
be aimed at one country and has logistical operations in 
the same country. This finding suggests that the 
distribution of online shops among different categories 
could be related to cultural factors; product choices also 
appear to be linked, to some extent, to country and 
cultural preferences for particular substances.
Finally, there are evidently certain global trends 
expressed within ‘local’ online subcultures or 
communities. These loosely affiliated groups may centre 
on discussion forums or social media sites. Many deep 
web markets do not operate in isolation, but tend to be 
accompanied by user forums and discussion boards 
which allow peer-to-peer information and expertise 
exchange and contact. This publication has identified, for 
example, virtual social networks of men who have sex 
with men engaging in chemsex; the early Silk Road 
‘libertarian’ community; the product-testing LSD 
Avengers; and forums for psychonauts exploring the 
effects of research chemicals and new psychoactive 
substances.
I  Security measures and regulatory mechanisms
A central challenge for dark net markets is the instability 
associated with their functioning. This is primarily a 
reaction to threats of market disruption from external 
sources, in particular law enforcement infiltration, but 
also to internal scams and risks. As highlighted within 
that dark net markets are linked with criminal innovation 
and a new breed of entrepreneurial drug dealer engaging 
in what could be described as ‘disorganised crime’.
I Online versus offline drug markets
The internet offers a relatively open and global virtual 
marketplace, in contrast to the closed networks of 
dealers and buyers more recently associated with the 
use of mobile phone technology. From the perspective of 
the seller, Silk Road has been described as a paradigm 
shifting, transformative criminal innovation, as it 
provided drug dealers with a range of new opportunities 
and potential benefits compared with offline markets. 
The gain: an expanded market for their products; the 
capacity to sell to customers not already known to them; 
and the ability to trade anonymously and in a relatively 
low-risk environment (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014). 
Online marketplaces may also offer the benefit of 
increased personal safety (buyer and seller) and reduce 
the possibility of violence, as buyers and sellers never 
reveal their identities and never meet face to face. 
Improved product quality (purity, price, type of product) 
and reduced risk of detection have also been cited as 
perceived advantages in studies. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a relatively high risk of financial scamming 
in both online and street markets.
In terms of the number of transactions or heaviness of 
traffic, commerce on dark net markets is estimated by 
commentators to be a fraction of all drug commerce, 
with the bulk of illicit activity still likely to take place 
using offline communication. It seems reasonable to 
suggest, however, that this situation will not necessarily 
remain the case for long. Revenues are very hard to 
estimate. According to Christin (2014), the billion-dollar 
amounts alleged in the criminal complaint regarding the 
shutdown of Silk Road in October 2013 (Barratt et al., 
2014) are highly inflated as a result of erroneous 
conversion rates between bitcoins and US dollars. In 
their more recent study, Soska and Christin (2015) 
suggest that total volumes of sales during the three 
years they were monitoring dark web markets averaged 
around USD 300 000 to USD 500 000 a day.
I Global versus national markets
Although the internet offers a virtual global marketplace, 
with the increased accessibility this brings, geographical 
place remains important to buyers and sellers. It appears 
that selling internationally is not the norm. Although 
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already use private servers and protected networks for 
communicating within the group, a move into deep web 
markets represents no technological challenge.
Although marketing and sales activities may take place 
online, in terms of trafficking flows there remains a 
physical component in internet drug-dealing activities, 
primarily at the cultivation/production stage and at the 
distribution stage (e.g. postal systems may be involved). 
Criminals are exploiting legal loopholes, for example 
taking advantage of differences in national regulation. 
Postal systems are seen as the major bottleneck of the 
system, as the substances sold still need to be delivered 
through the (inter)national mail system. We note the 
growth of stealth packaging in this context — and the 
fact that online suppliers’ reputations are linked to their 
creativity in concealing purchases.
This publication highlights a number of conundrums for 
law enforcement: their activity, for example, in infiltrating 
and taking down markets on the deep web can have 
undesirable effects. This includes both the ‘balloon 
effect’, in terms of scattering market activity, and the 
driving of more sophisticated encryption software and 
concealment activities. It is also interesting to consider 
what drug sources online markets replace and, if internet 
markets are closed, removed or seized, what drug 
sources people use instead.
I The buyer’s perspective
A number of studies cited in this publication have 
explored reasons why experienced drug users choose to 
use online drug markets rather than conventional 
sources of supply. Among this population, recurrent 
themes include easy accessibility, availability of their 
drugs of choice and good quality of products. Main 
factors hindering use include the need for a certain level 
of technical competence and fear of financial scams.
The 2015 Global Drug Survey provides further insight on 
this issue with an analysis of respondents who reported 
making web purchases of drugs (3). These results shed 
light on buyers’ considerations when comparing 
purchasing drugs in dark net markets with buying from 
alternative sources. Respondents were asked to report 
the problems they had experienced both with dark net 
markets and with the alternative sources of drugs that 
they would use if they did not have access to those sites.
(3) Available at http://www.globaldrugsurvey.com/the-global-drug-
survey-2015-findings/
this publication, these marketplaces are relatively 
transitory and unstable entities. They are also unique in 
particular in the combination of a number of ‘security 
measures’ that increase possibilities for relative 
anonymity: the use of cryptocurrencies (bitcoin), 
encryption (PGP) and secure web hosting (Tor). They 
also tend to integrate a set of regulatory mechanisms to 
support financial security: escrow services, reputation 
and feedback systems, use of digital contracts (e.g. 
Alphabay) and dispute adjudication. Finally, in order to 
try and ensure safe delivery of goods, stealth packaging 
is used to conceal products.
Market trader scams and police takedowns also act as a 
catalyst for new security developments. New markets 
have sought to combat rogue operators through the use 
of multi-signature escrow, which requires a second key 
from the buyer or seller to access the money. 
Increasingly, sites are not open access but require 
invitation from a member and the use of a guest code or 
URL. In Chapter 3, Lewman suggests how markets are 
likely to further evolve in a bid to evade law enforcement 
infiltration, with the decentralised OpenBazaar 
marketplace offering a potential model. This involves 
distributing the transactions of the e-commerce 
software throughout all participants in the market using 
the basics of the bitcoin block chain. This creates the 
potential for a fully distributed marketplace spread 
across millions of computers around the globe, with 
each computer handling only a part of the marketplace, 
and leaving no single server vulnerable to takedown.
I  Trafficking and supply reduction challenges
An important question raised in this publication is the 
extent to which the internet provides new criminal 
opportunities for drug trafficking. As discussed above, 
there are certainly indications that, in some 
circumstances, dark net markets may be used more by 
suppliers for wholesale purchasing than by consumers 
at a retail level. The extent of involvement of organised 
crime in online drug markets is unclear at present. 
However, if online drug trading offers significant threats 
or opportunities, there will undoubtedly be a presence. In 
Chapter 8, Van Slobbe makes an interesting point on this 
subject: currently, the percentage of the drug trade that 
takes place on the dark net is too limited to affect the 
profits of the larger organised criminal groups. However, 
if cryptomarket turnover and profit potential were to rise 
substantially, then organised crime would undoubtedly 
enter the marketplaces. Given that criminal groups 
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despite their associations with secrecy, it seems that, 
from a research perspective, these markets are a 
relatively visible phenomenon. In many respects, we now 
have more information than was previously available on 
illicit drug markets, and covering many angles. The 
existence of a defined marketplace, Silk Road, has 
assisted with this. As dark net markets become more 
decentralised and diffuse, they will undoubtedly become 
more difficult to monitor, research and understand. In 
fact, the current challenges associated with monitoring 
the complex surface web markets demonstrate this. And 
important questions remain. Does the monitoring of 
online shops and the products they offer actually reflect 
what is available to users on the market? In this respect, 
it is important to bear in mind that the offer of drugs for 
sale does not necessarily equate with supply in these 
online markets and that, from a research perspective, 
the association between offer and availability is not 
known. Potential rich sources of information are drug 
user forums, which have the ability to provide insight into 
what substances are being used by whom. It is possible 
that enhanced monitoring in this area may better predict 
and inform about market changes and trends. Like online 
markets themselves, drug forums provide access to a 
larger population of drug users than was previously 
accessible to researchers. The qualitative information 
gained from these forums can be rich in itself and can 
also inform further quantitative research.
A range of new methodological issues arise with regard 
to researching the web. In some respects, this opens up 
the potential for a golden age of ethnographic research, 
accompanied by innovative developments in online 
research methodologies such as netnography and 
infodemiology. It also brings with it the requirement for 
new ethical considerations, as highlighted by I-TREND’s 
forum monitoring. The recent opening up for public use 
of a database of over 80 dark net markets by Gwern 
Branwen (4) has increased substantially the potential 
opportunities for academic research and understanding 
of dark net markets. It is likely that this will be a rich 
source for studies in future years.
I Questions for future research
Throughout this publication, authors have raised issues 
that they consider to be important for future research. In 
a number of areas, the absence of a body of scientific 
evidence hampers our ability to make valid conclusions 
on market dynamics and function. This is particularly 
true for the online sale of medicinal products and for our 
(4) http://www.gwern.net/Black-market %20survival
The results show that buyers found the dark net to be 
safer than their alternative sources in terms of fewer 
experiences of threats and violence. They were also less 
likely to experience receiving products not containing the 
expected substance. However, dark net users were more 
likely to report losing money as a result of theft, seizure 
of drugs by authorities or exit scams, in which site 
administrators disappear with money being held in 
escrow on their sites.
I Harm reduction opportunities
In addition to supporting drug markets, both the surface 
and deep web offer new ways for drug users to access 
help, and potentially to reduce barriers to help seeking. 
There exist drug user harm reduction communities 
through drug forums on the surface web. These, for 
example, circulate warnings about pills with dangerous 
content, and the sharing of information in forums could 
potentially deter users from buying certain drugs. 
Studies presented here on Silk Road suggest this dark 
net market offered certain benefits to users when 
compared with street-based drug marketplaces. 
Examples include the abovementioned sale of high-
quality products with low risk for contamination, vendor-
tested products, trip reporting and online discussions on 
harm reduction with resources for people who wish to 
reduce their consumption (Barratt et al., 2013; Van Hout 
and Bingham, 2013, 2014). Barratt et al. conclude that 
Silk Road contributed positively to harm reduction, by 
helping users to make informed decisions and enabling 
them to access relevant information more 
comprehensive than was available elsewhere. ‘DoctorX’ 
provides harm reduction advice at point of sale and, in 
Chapter 7, gives concrete examples of his work with dark 
net market users offering drug-related information, 
advice and harm reduction services. Nevertheless, the 
rapid turnover of markets make them an insecure 
longer-term platform, and the limited number of dark net 
marketplaces in existence means the space for large-
scale input from web outreach workers and health 
service personnel is probably limited.
I Researching online markets
As pointed out by Aldridge and Décary-Hétu in 
Chapter 2, our understanding of internet drug markets 
has to a large extent been informed by investigative 
journalists and bloggers, with the body of academic 
research literature, at least in the area of dark net 
markets, lagging somewhat behind. Nevertheless, 
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I Conclusions
This analysis has highlighted a number of significant new 
trends in the fast-changing world of internet drug markets. 
Authors in this publication highlight a tendency towards 
decentralisation of dark net market structures and 
activities. Dark net markets are seeing a move to more 
covert communication and sophisticated encryption 
techniques, in part as a response to the cat-and-mouse 
game of avoiding detection by law enforcement. Similarly, 
we have noted the growth of multi-signature escrow and 
rating systems to try and ensure financial trust and 
security for buyers in the wake of recent scams.
The internet facilitates movement of products, money and 
information across global borders. It also allows the 
movement of drugs, new psychoactive substances, 
precursors, medicines and information on production 
techniques. Social media play a role in facilitating 
interaction, advertising and marketing drugs, in addition to 
providing sales forums, shop access via apps, and 
understanding of the role of social media and apps in the 
demand for and supply of illicit substances. At present, 
there is very limited evidence on the role of social media 
in drug supply, and the limited knowledge and vastness 
of social media platforms suggest that this is an 
important area for further study.
A number of relevant queries have been raised about 
drug markets. Above all else, markets are rational entities 
and a central question raised by the evidence is whether 
or not online markets (all types) are challenging 
established ones and, if so, where they have a 
competitive advantage. Christin (2014) asks whether 
deep web markets primarily displace drug purchases 
from traditional markets or provide access to drugs for 
those without previous access. It is also important to get 
a better understanding of how the online offer of drugs 
affects use and consequences. Do people purchase 
more when they buy online and what effect does that 
have on use? The impact may differ for different types of 
drug user and for different substances; for some 
substances, such as new psychoactive substances, the 
internet may have played a central role in the evolution 
of the trade. Exploring its impact may contribute to a 
wider understanding of the factors that impact on drug 
markets.
There is also clearly a need to better understand the net 
harm/benefit of dark net markets. In particular, as some 
commentators suggest, the extent to which harm might 
actually be reduced by dark net markets requires 
systematic empirical research.
From the perspective of drug supply, it is interesting to 
further assess whether or not the individuals who sell on 
dark net markets fit the same profile as street dealers. Or 
are drug vendors on the deep web, the so-called new 
criminal entrepreneurs, completely different from street 
dealers? Or have street dealers switched to the online 
markets and, if so, what advantages did they expect and 
gain from this switch?
We can ask similar questions about the buyers. Did the 
people who are now buying drugs over the deep web 
previously buy drugs in the traditional way, or did they 
start buying drugs because of the ease of buying them 
over the deep web, which entails fewer risks? Is the 
profile of these buyers similar to the profile of drug 
buyers in the traditional market?
As is now well known, in October 2013, the FBI shut 
down the original Silk Road and arrested its 
founder, Ross Ulbricht, known as ‘Dread Pirate 
Roberts’. A new version of Silk Road (Silk Road 2.0) 
was launched on 6 November 2013. On 
6 November 2014, Interpol announced the closing 
down of 400 deep web sites, including Silk 
Road 2.0. However, the number of sites detected 
had almost returned to previous levels by April 
2015. Other websites have been closing down 
since, supposedly trying to evade arrest, and taking 
the bitcoin money stored in their accounts (5). The 
most well-known instance was the disappearance 
of the Evolution marketplace; in March 2015, the 
administrators of this site disappeared with the 
equivalent of more than USD 12 million 
(GBP 8 million). In May 2015, Ross Ulbricht was 
sentenced to life in prison in the United States, and 
ordered to forfeit USD 183 million. In August 2015, 
Agora ceased trading due to security issues; at the 
time, it was the largest marketplace trading on the 
deep web.
 Latest market trends and developments
(5) See https://www.deepdotweb.com/2013/10/28/updated-llist-of-
hidden-marketplaces-tor-i2p/
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classified ads. The dividing line between surface websites 
(e.g. selling so-called legal highs) and cryptomarkets 
seems to be increasingly blurred, as one level can 
increasingly provide access to another. At present, the 
extent of internet-enabled drug transactions taking place 
on the deep web is very limited; however, growth has been 
exponential and there is no evidence to suggest these 
markets will remain restricted for long. Online new 
psychoactive substance markets and dark net markets 
have certain things in common. Both are extremely 
dynamic and characterised by the closing and opening of 
new sites. In both surface and dark net markets, suppliers 
may use strategies that promote maximum internet 
visibility — for example through spamdexing practices, 
which help them to appear at the top of search engine 
results — or, alternatively, they may choose a discreet, 
targeted presence often using argot.
In Chapter 2, Aldridge and Décary-Hétu explain how in 
recent years many drug markets have moved from ‘open’ 
to ‘closed’, in which drug dealers sell only to those 
customers with whom they have trusted relationships. 
They describe how dark net markets have reversed this 
trend, opening up marketplaces that allow sellers to 
transact with anonymous customers whom they only 
meet in the virtual sphere (Aldridge, 2012; Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu, 2014). We would suggest that, after a brief 
period of operation, recent trends suggest that dark net 
markets may once again be moving from open to at least 
partially closed as a result of scams and takedowns. This 
has been manifested in the recent restrictions placed on 
market entry, such as the need for invitation from an 
existing member. Another sign of market closure has 
been cited: in some cases, users have formed 
relationships with their favourite suppliers, enabling 
them to make private transactions via secured email, 
bypassing the dark net markets altogether.
To date, it appears that buyers and sellers adjust rather 
easily to dark net market takedowns, in a similar way to 
buyers and sellers using surface web stores: when one 
shop closes, others quickly appear to replace them. This 
resilience to both law enforcement takedowns and exit 
scams is also noted by Soska and Christin (2015). 
However, as noted, most dark net markets tend to have a 
fairly short life, with their longevity hampered more by 
scams than by law enforcement intervention. The 
longer-term impact on buyer trust and vendor reputation 
may yet slow down or stall what, to date, has been 
exponential growth. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Van 
Buskirk et al. (2013), the speed with which the internet 
allows transformation to occur in drug markets will 
continue to present major challenges across the board, 
to law enforcement, public health and research and 
monitoring agencies.
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libertarian ideology. He was arrested following the 
shutting down of the website by the FBI in October 2013. 
He has been found guilty of several drug and criminal 
charges and was sentenced to life in prison in 2015.
An eepsite is a website hosted anonymously via I2P.
Escrow is a financial instrument held by a third party on 
behalf of the other two parties in a transaction. The funds 
are held by the escrow service until it receives the 
appropriate written or oral instructions or until obligations 
have been fulfilled. Securities, funds and other assets can 
be held in escrow.
Fiat currency is currency that a government has declared 
to be legal tender, but which is not backed by a physical 
commodity. The value of fiat money is derived from the 
relationship between supply and demand rather than the 
value of the material that the money is made of.
Garlic routing is a variant of onion routing that encrypts 
multiple messages together to make it more difficult for 
attackers to perform traffic analysis. Garlic routing is one 
of the key factors that distinguishes I2P from Tor and 
other privacy or encryption networks.
Hidden services are a feature provided by the Tor Browser 
that enables a user to anonymously host and browse 
content and services within a vast address space.
Internet forums are online discussion sites where people 
can hold conversations in the form of posted messages. 
Their structure is hierarchical: a forum can contain 
different sub-forums dedicated to different themes 
covering several topics or threads.
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) is an alternative to Tor 
hidden services. It is an overlay network based on passing 
messages between routers using garlic routing with a 
distributed hash table for a global directory of available 
routers. All users of I2P are also running routers to pass 
encrypted traffic between other routers. A few 
cryptomarkets have recently started to use I2P as an 
alternative to Tor hidden services (O’Neill, 2013).
I-TREND was a European project co-financed by the Drug 
Prevention and Information Programme of the European 
Union, involving researchers from five European countries 
(the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Poland and 
the United Kingdom). The project activities included 
monitoring online user forums and shops, conducting an 
online survey targeting users of new psychoactive 
substances, and analysis of samples and exchange of 
reference standards.
I Glossary
Block chain is a transaction database shared by all nodes 
participating in a system based on the bitcoin protocol. A 
full copy of a currency’s block chain contains every 
transaction ever executed in the currency. https://en.
bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain
Chemsex refers to sex while on various drugs, such as 
mephedrone, methamphetamine, cocaine; ‘slamming’ 
refers to the injection of these and other drugs by gay 
men/men who have sex with men in the context of chem 
sex parties.
Cryptomarkets are anonymous drug markets located in 
the dark web and accessed via Tor (see later). A 
cryptomarket can be defined as an online forum where 
goods and services are exchanged between parties who 
use digital encryption to conceal their identities. It is not 
necessarily a site for the commission of cybercrime, as 
legal exchanges may also be conducted in such a forum 
(Martin, 2013, p. 356).
The dark web or dark net may be defined as a small 
portion of the deep web that has been intentionally 
hidden and is inaccessible through standard web 
browsers. This is the portion of the internet most widely 
known for illicit activities, because of the anonymity 
associated with this network.
The deep web is a part of the internet not accessible to 
conventional search engines; the only way to access the 
deep web is by conducting a search within a particular 
website; for example, government databases and libraries 
contain huge numbers of deep web data.
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a class of decentralised 
distributed system that provides a look-up service similar 
to a hash table; (key, value) pairs are stored in a DHT, and 
any participating node can efficiently retrieve the value 
associated with a given key.
Doxing is the internet-based practice of researching and 
broadcasting personally identifiable information about an 
individual. This is a practice that drug sellers on the deep 
web can use to coerce or blackmail customers once they 
have obtained personal information (e.g. postal address) 
to make the shipment. At this point in the transaction, 
buyers have no guarantee that sellers will delete their data 
once the deal has been finalised.
Dread Pirate Roberts is the pseudonym used by Ross 
Ulbricht, alleged founder and former owner of the first Silk 
Road. He gained popularity due to his active involvement 
in forums, where he promoted his business model under a 
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Glossary
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a data encryption and 
decryption computer programme that provides 
cryptographic privacy and authentication for data 
communication. PGP is often used for signing, encrypting 
and decrypting texts, emails, files, directories and whole 
disk partitions and to increase the security of email 
communications.
Relays are computers that switch internet traffic from one 
computer to another before it reaches its destination. The 
Tor Network comprises around 7 000 of these relays.
Silk Road was a cryptomarket that operated as a Tor 
hidden service and used bitcoin as its exchange currency. 
Silk Road was the archetypical cryptomarket, being the 
most well-known and remaining the largest for a long 
period.
Spamdexing is the deliberate manipulation of search 
engine indexes. It involves a number of methods, such as 
repeating unrelated phrases, to manipulate the relevance 
or prominence of resources indexed in a manner 
inconsistent with the purpose of the indexing system.
The surface web or clear web or clear net is the internet 
that can be found by the link-crawling techniques used by 
a typical search engine such as Google, Bing or Yahoo. It 
refers to the unencrypted non-dark, non-Tor internet.
Tor (The Onion Router) is a free software that enables 
online anonymity by hiding a computer’s IP address. The 
Tor Network is a group of volunteer-operated servers that 
allows people to improve their privacy and security on the 
internet. Tor’s users employ this network by connecting 
through a series of virtual tunnels rather than making a 
direct connection, thus allowing both organisations and 
individuals to share information over public networks 
without compromising their privacy. It has many societal 
benefits, such as enabling users to avoid censorship and 
allowing anonymous communication with victims of 
abuse, but it is also used for illegal matters, such as drug 
dealing.
A virtual circuit is a means of transporting data over a 
computer network in such a way that it appears as though 
there is a dedicated physical layer link between the 
source and destination end systems of these data.
Web 2.0 describes world wide web sites that emphasise 
user-generated content, usability and interoperability. 
Examples of Web 2.0 sites include social networking 
sites, blogs, wikis, folksonomies, video-sharing sites, 
hosted services, web applications and mashups.
New psychoactive substances (NPS, also known as ‘legal 
highs’) are new narcotic or psychotropic drugs, in pure 
form or in preparation, that are not controlled by the 
United Nations drug conventions, but which may pose a 
public health threat comparable to that posed by 
substances listed in these conventions.
Off-the-record (OTR) is a method for encrypting instant 
messaging services, such as Google Talk, Facebook or 
Jabber. The software typically comes as a plug-in that is 
installed alongside another chat programme. This method 
of communication doesn’t use the messaging system of a 
cryptomarket, but vendors may advertise their OTR 
contact details on a site.
Onion routing is a technique for anonymous 
communication over a computer network. In an onion 
network, messages are encapsulated in layers of 
encryption. The encrypted data are transmitted through a 
series of network nodes called onion routers, each of 
which ‘peels away’ a single layer, uncovering the data’s 
next destination. When the final layer is decrypted, the 
message arrives at its destination. The sender remains 
anonymous because each intermediary knows only the 
location of the immediately preceding and following 
nodes.
OpenBazaar is an open source project to create a 
decentralised network for peer-to-peer commerce online. 
Each computer handles only a part of the marketplace, 
rather than everything being handled by one single 
computer or server. Use of Tor hidden services or I2P 
eepsites could be possible with this model, to further 
protect the identity and privacy of users involved in the 
marketplace.
Operation Onymous was a joint operation by US and 
European law enforcement agencies targeting the dark 
net that resulted in the shutting down of Silk Road 2.0 
(and the arrest of its alleged administrator) and another 
26 dark net websites in November 2014. The operation 
involved the police forces of 17 countries. In total, there 
were 17 arrests.
Operation Pangea is an operation that tackles the online 
sale of counterfeit and illicit medicines and highlights the 
dangers of buying medicines online. It brings together 
several law enforcement bodies from countries around 
the world including customs, health regulators and 
national police and includes the private sector. It started 
in 2008 and runs for a week on an annual basis. The last 
operation took place in June 2015 (Interpol, 2015) and 
resulted in 9.6 million fake and illicit medicines (worth 
more than USD 32 million) seized, 434 arrests and more 
than 11 800 websites shut down.
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS
Free publications
one copy:
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu)
more than one copy or posters/maps:
from the European Union’s representations  
(http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm); 
from the delegations in non-EU countries  
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm); 
by contacting the Europe Direct service  
(http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or
calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11  
(freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though 
some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
Priced publications
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu)
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About the EMCDDA
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) is the central source and 
confirmed authority on drug-related issues in Europe. 
For over 20 years, it has been collecting, analysing and 
disseminating scientifically sound information on drugs 
and drug addiction and their consequences, providing 
its audiences with an evidence-based picture of the 
drug phenomenon at European level.
The EMCDDA’s publications are a prime source of 
information for a wide range of audiences including: 
policymakers and their advisors; professionals and 
researchers working in the drugs field; and, more 
broadly, the media and general public. Based in Lisbon, 
the EMCDDA is one of the decentralised agencies of 
the European Union.
About this series
EMCDDA Insights are topic-based reports that bring 
together current research and study findings on a 
particular issue in the drugs field. This publication 
describes how the proliferation of social media and 
development of web technologies have brought greater 
user interaction and have the potential to influence 
customer and user involvement in drug markets.
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